THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONCEPTS OF ASSOCIATION IN AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL THOUGHT

A Very Rough Draft

> Not a man there knew what his task was to be, or was fitted for it; every one without exception, Northern or Southern, was to learn his business at the cost of the public. Lincoln, Seward, Sumner, and the rest, could give no help to the young man seeking education; they knew less than he; within six weeks they were all to be taught their duties by the uprising of such as he, and their education was to cost a million lives and ten thousand million dollars, more or less, North and South, before the country could recover its balance and movement.
>
> The Education of Henry Adams, p. 109

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ONE: MURDER AND EDUCATION

The problem of life is death. And the problem of human life is murder. The difficulty of murder is not simple; has it been faced? Great energy is expended finding guilty murderers who are murdered by "society" in punishment. With greater energy mental expediencies are devised in the name of which vast numbers of people are killed. People kill people in war. It is not soldier killing soldier. No, it is people killing people: men, women, and children.

But what has murder to do with education? To ask this is to ask why people kill people. As D.H. Lawrence pointed out every act of murder involves a murderer and a murderee.[1] Both are implicated in the crime, the former positively, by committing the act, the latter negatively, by letting the act be committed.

I assume that people aspire to act rationally; that, if their acts are irrational, some devious twist of mind has convinced them of the rationality of the conventionally irrational. Given this assumption, it follows that people kill because they think it is right, and they must

[1] D.H. Lawrence, Women in Love, Modern Library Edition, Random House, New York, 1950. p. 36

think it is right because of something they have learned. The murderer, somewhere in his personal history, has learned to kill. The murderee, in his, learned to be killed. Education, thus, becomes involved with murder in two ways: positively, we learn the symbols for which we kill in our educative experience; negatively, we fail to learn to put aright the dislocations that lead to death.

As long as the image of "murderer" remains that of the unbalanced individual, the problem shall not be gripped. Murder, the intentional killing of a human being by another human being, is intimately involved with what is called society. In our world, today, multitudes starve in the midst of plenty while the engines of war expand. Now, men are murdering. And man murdering is common enough through the ages to discourage our glorification of any state of innocence. Education in the past has faltered in its struggle to avoid either positive or negative involvement in murder. The problem is not one of lost innocence and degraded standards. The problem is to face our condition. This confrontation shuns sentimentalizing the good society now past or the good society to be built. This confrontation admits that I am implicated in murder and asks why I murder and what I will do about this self-knowledge.

Through the ages the reason most murders are com-

mitted changes. This observation applies more to the positive reasons for murder than the negative ones. Man's limitations have always led to murder involving hungry, terrified, unbalanced, uncertain people. But the killings in the name of men's certainties have been the most repugnant. Here will and ineptitude, cruelty and pathos, horror and terror, seem to intensify; murder becomes a positive act, sometimes on a scale beyond comprehension. For most of the preceeding two thousand years these positive reasons for murder have been variations on a single theme: religion. But in the last few centuries, these positive reasons have shifted to variations on the theme of politics.

An impression of the shift may be gained by a contrast of the Moslem wars of expansion, the Crusades, and the violence of the Counter-Reformation with the French and Russian Revolutions, the Civil War, and World Wars I and II. Religion was central to the former group and peripheral to the latter. Politics was peripheral to the former and central to the latter.

Why do people kill for religion or politics? Because they think it is right and the think it is right because of something they have learned. That is, that religion of the political grouping is more important than the person. To die for God or to die for Country, Class (propertied or prolitarian), of Sulture becomes one's highest destiny.

Here, education becomes positively involved in murder.

What has murder to do with education? Now, to ask this is to ask how education is involved with concepts of political destiny which have so consistently led to people killing people in recent times. This is not a question of showing that in 1890 the Imperial Rescript on Education greatly intensified Japan's plunge into aggressive nationalism; nor of discovering and decrying tendencies to idealize American history in textbooks. Such occurrences undoubtedly have an effect, and they could be multiplied and expanded. But the problem of political destiny goes much deeper. It becomes necessary to confront the basic structure of our thought. Ortega y Gasset has described this purpose well:

> . . . the explanation of a scientific system involves a further postulate: besides being true it must be understood. I am not for the moment referring to the difficulties imposed upon the mind by a scheme of abstract thought, especially if unprecedented, but to the comprehension of its fundamental tendency, of its ideological significance, I might almost say, of its physiognomy.[1]

I shall search for the fundamental tendencies in the thought of certain educators. It is time to shift focus, away from the very general, towards the specific

[1] Ortega y Gasset, The Modern Theme, Harper Torchbook, New York, 1931, 1961. p. 11

subjects I have chosen to examine. To begin with I shall take up a recent editorial in the New York Times. After this editorial I shall turn back 135 years to the Yale Report, once influential in higher education in the United States. Following this introduction to a contrast I shall study a series of educational thinkers: Francis Wayland, Horace Mann, Charles W. Eliot, John Dewey, Irving Babbitt, and Randolf Bourne, inquiring into the comparative physiognomy of their thought.

This is inappropriate as an introduction to a historical essay.

TWO: A CONTRAST OF SOCIAL CONCEPTS

I asserted that the reason people kill changes; and that most modern murders were committed for reasons of political rather than religious destiny. Politics involves the common activities of people. Our term for it derives from the Greek word for city, polis. I think you will agree that political murder in modern times rarely involves a concrete dislike between the murderer and murderee. In political murder justification is derived from ideas held in common about common relationships in every day life. Political murder involves city against city: it involves the clash of groupings, of communities. Because most murders are now political, the key areas in my confrontation will be ideas of the public, of society, of the nation, of the culture, of the community. I shall try to discover the fundamental tendency in the usages of these by the selected subjects.

Avoid this construction.

Avoid.

In the April 25, 1962 issue of the New York Times the editorial "In the Pursuit of Peace" appeared. The first third of this editorial exposited the events that led to President Kennedy's decision to resume atmospheric nuclear tests. In this part "we" was used once, with the meaning of "we, editors of the New York Times." In this part there was little that strikes one as extraordinary at a casual reading.

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The remaining two thirds were introduced as follows:

> Now it is more urgent than ever to explain once again to all humanity that the United States stands for a peaceful world ruled not by force, but by law, and that it has made innumerable efforts, sacrifices and concessions to attain that goal.[1]

The editorial staff of the New York Times (cir. 500,000+) were expounding "once again to all humanity" what "the United States stands for." In the remaining twelve sentences the editorial staff used "we," "us," and "our" twenty-three times. Their usage was precisely "we the people of the United States." Such a usage of "we" occurred in the Constitution only once and it was justified by requiring ratification by nine states and by expressly stating: "Done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present . . . . In witness whereof We have hereunto subscribed our Names, G° Washington, Presid^t and deputy from Virginia. . . . ."[2]

The authors of "In the Pursuit of Peace" repeatedly spoke for we the people of the United States and refrained from subscribing their names to the document. While more thorough documentation may be necessary, I advance the generalization that glibness in reference to the body politic, the society, the nation has become a more common feature

[1] I have appended a copy of the editorial as Appendix A.
[2] See: Documents of American History, H.S. Cammager, ed., 6th edition, New York, 1958. p. 145

of discussion and writing. The use of we the people, at least, appears to have changed. To start eliciting the significance of this, and other changes, I shall return temporarily to the modern act of murder.

Modern murders are committed for reasons of political destiny. I must take this further and observe the peculiar physiognomy of modern political murder. It is not enough to note, as is often done, that this is the century of total war. War has become social war: it is war of the society, by the society, and for the society -- whatever that may be. Note the technique of air bombardment both sides used in World War II. It might justifiably be considered an attempt at applied sociological destruction, the wrenching loose of the fabric of society. Note that this was precisely the technique of the victors wherever they roamed. The enemy society was torn apart and replaced by one fashioned in the image of the victor. Note the technique of the Organization Armée Secrète: random terror coupled with systematic sabotage of social services, the post, garbage collection, governmental records, communications, etc.[1]

The role of the individual in twenieth century

[1] The social role of guerrilla warfare can also be seen reflected in "Operation Sunrise" in South Vietnam where all Vietnamese in trouble areas are being resettled at gunpoint in specially designed villages in which security suspects are settled in the center of the villages while those of sure loyalty are located at the perimeter.

political murder follows from the central place of society in this debacle. A warring society emphasizes the function a person performs, his docile submission to the higher expediencies of the social whole, and his reluctance to doubt socially symbolic characterizations on the basis of mere personal experience. In respective order, illustrative examples are: the terroristic technique of fragmenting key urban occupation categories; ten years of a peace-time draft with no significant dissent compared to the draft riots during the Civil War; and the techniques of brain washing prisoners of war and propaganda and counter-propaganda campaigns designed to weaken or preserve the conviction of soldiers and civilians. Keeping these characteristics of modern political murder in mind, let us return to "the Pursuit of Peace."

> In issuing the orders to the Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission, the President had to weigh the inexorable requirements of both national and free world defense against the many protests voiced not only by the Communists but also by neutralist statesmen, "peace marchers," and even United Nations Secretary General Thant. With deep reluctance and regret, which we share, he decided that our own and free world preservation demands the tests; and nobody who is not privy to the secret military and scientific considerations that went into the decision can gainsay it.

Everyone involved was described by ~~their~~ function.

The requirements of national and free world defense were inexorable. The decision about freeworld strategy, based on secret information, was beyond debate of ordinary people. This physiognomy of thought corresponds remarkably with the nature of modern political murder. The person is reduced to his function in society. The social whole is the level of imperative concern. The symbolic characterization of this whole is maintained in spite of the realities of the actual situation.

Such functionalism, fatalism, and phantasmagoria is not unique to this editorial in the New York Times. Rather it is a feature of our every day speech. The editorial staff of the New York Times are well educated individuals (excuse my functional identification, but they do not give their names) writing for a clientele of above average intelligence. The implication is that we have learned to think easily and with confidence in these terms. But the public has not always had such a dominating usage in our intellectual heritage. What is now a pillar of imprecise usage, once, at least, was used much differently. I refer to the Yale Report of 1828.[1]

The Yale Report exposited the philosophy of the

[1] An edited version of this is reprinted in Hofstadter and Smith, eds., American Higher Education: A Documentary History, Chicago, 1961, pp. 270 - 91. Page references to it will be given in parentheses in the text.

traditional American college with its prescribed curriculum dominated by the classics. This exposition was influential over American higher education until after the Civil War. According to it, the purpose of Yale was to lay the foundation of a superior education. The prescribed curriculum was an intellectual expedient for attaining this goal. It best ministered to the psychology of mental faculties. It effectively disciplined the mind and gave the most valuable mental furnishings for those who would guide their life with good sense and taste. While the intellectual resources available and those needed in living changed, the reporters felt that the prescribed curriculum had also changed. New sciences had been added to it. Expert judgment found the classics still of fundamental value. Prescription of studies, a careful planning of the intellectual experience as a whole, was the special feature of a college education. In respect to this point the concept of the public held by the reporters, President Day and Professor Kingsley, was expounded.

> It is said that the public now demand, that the doors should be thrown open to all; that education ought to be so modified, and varied, as to adapt it to the exigencies of the country, and the prospects of different individuals; that the instruction given to those who are destined to be merchants, or manufacturers, or agriculturalists, should have a special reference to their respective professional pursuits.
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> The public are undoubtedly right. . . . And we rejoice at the prospect of ample provision for this purpose, in . . . the establishment of commercial high-schools, gymnasia, lycea, agricultural seminaries, etc. But do the public insist, that every

> college shall become a high-school, gymnasium, lyceum, and academy? . . . The college has its apprppriate object, and they have theirs. . . . While an academy teaches a little of every thing, the college, by directing its efforts to one uniform course, aims at doing its work with greater precision, and economy of time. (pp. 285 - 86) Cite properly.

The word "public" was used as a plural noun. This emphatically placed the discussion of public interests on a plane different from that common today. Our indefinite, but monolithic "public interest" was not present. President Day admitted discussion of public interests only as special interests to which he could counterpose his special interest on an equal footing. Thus maintaining equal standing between Yale and the public, he stated the college should define its aims regardless of the public's strictures. He possessed special competence. But the public were interested in a little of every thing, owing to the multiplicity of interests among the public. Yale was interested in a special thing, a uniform course of instruction, to which it would devote its full efforts. Its distinctive program would appeal to a distinctive interest: those who wished a superior education.

Not only did the Yale Report exposit a precise concept of public. A concept of social action was at least implied. The authors asked whether merchants, manufacturers, and agriculturists could derive no benefit from a Yale education. These were the men who were going to accumulate

large estates by riding "the tide of prosperity." Given their increasing wealth "ought" they not be men of superior education, additions of "higher distinction" to their society? (pp. 287 - 88) This was asked rethorically, implying the faith that the merchant, confronted by the question of what he ought to do, would answer that he should receive a superior Yale education and cease agitating for technical training.

There was, there, neither a feeling of helplessness, nor of social engineering. There was no effort to manipulate trends. There was no concept of an inexorable character of future society implicit in present society. The tide of prosperity would enrich many: let this be anticipated and acted upon by potential educators and students.

In Democracy and Education John Dewey observed:

> Science, adopting the methods of observation and experimentation, was to give up the attempt to "anticipate" nature - to impose preconceived notions upon her - and was to become her humble interpreter. In obeying nature intellectually, man would learn to command her practically.[1]

The position in the Yale Report was pre-scientific in theses terms. President Day tried to anticipate the workings of society by imposing preconceived notions upon it. For him society was not a thing with a nature: it was an association

[1] John Dewey, Democracy and Education, Macmillan Paperbacks, New York, 1916, 1944, 1961. pp. 282 - 83

of particular men. The good additions to society were those of "large and liberal views," of "solid and elegant attainments, which will raise them to a higher distinction. . . ." (p. 288) The stature of society depended on the quality of its individual members. The individual, after college training, "when he comes to be engaged in the study of his profession, . . . may find his way through the maze, and firmly establish his own opinions, by taking days or weeks for the examination of each separate point."[1] (p. 280) The implication was that the individual could control his own future, and by doing this he would control the future of society. It was not an easy course: it required self-discipline and this, therefore, was the central feature in the Yale education. This, supposedly, was the source of Yale's superiority.

In the Yale Report the public was composed of groups with special interests which each actively tried to further. The individual could make himself superior through discipline, followed by a careful forming of his opinion. The social future depended on the generation of high aspirations, lucid opinions, and a disciplined living by the present

[1] This attitude towards opinion should be compared to that exampled by the National Opinion Research Center which last year felt that thirty minutes each of thirty thousand college senior's time would suffice as a basis for a major study of the relation between college experiences and student's plans for later life.

students. This educational philosophy has frequently been characterized as aristocratic. But Ortega y Gasset has advanced a different juxtoposition than the aristocratic and democratic man.

> Contrary to what is usually thought, it is the man of excellence, and not the common man who lives in essential servitude. Life has no savour for him unless he makes it consist in service to something transcendental. Hence he does not look upon the necessity of serving as an oppression. When, by chance, such necessity is lacking, he grows restless and invents some new standard. more difficult, more exigent, with which to coerce himself. This is life lived as a discipline -- the noble life. Nobility is defined by the demands it makes on us -- by obligations, not by rights. Noblesse oblige.[1]

Without agreeing with President Day's educational philosophy, we can note that he and his philosophy show characteristics of the noble life: "life lived as a discipline." Certainly the Yale idea was the discipline Day would follow; and its stated purpose was to discipline the student's mind. This service to clear thinking had its transcendental aspects as well. The man of superior education would not only continually transcend himself; but, by doing this, he would contribute to the social transcendence.

[1] Jose Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses, W.W. Norton and Co., New York, 1932, 1957. p. 63

> For me, then, nobility is synonymous with a life of effort, ever set on excelling oneself, in passing beyond what one is to what one sets up as a duty and an obligation. In this way the noble life stands opposed to the common or inert life, which reclines statically upon itself, condemned to perpetual immobility, unless an external force compels it to come out of itself. Hence we apply the term mass to this kind of man -- not so much because of his multitude as because of his inertia.[1]

Recall President Day's idea about education for merchants, manufacturers, and agriculturists; since the tide of prosperity would enrich them, they should acquire a superior, rather than a technical, education so as to enhance opulence with elegance, dignity, and the potential of service. The appeal to the manufacturer was to overcome the inertia of being a manufacturer and to pass beyond this by developing other qualities. Avoid.

Earlier I quoted John Dewey to the effect that the scientist gave up the attempt to impose preconceived notions upon nature. The scientist "in obeying nature intellectually, . . . would learn to command her practically." I then observed that the Yale Report, with respect to society, was pre-scientific. It was pre-scientific in just those things in which it was noble. President Day refused to be society's "humble interpreter." He anticipated society, formed a dis-

[1] Ibid., p. 65

cipline, and strove to fulfill it. On the one hand this was characteristic of the noble man. On the other, it was characteristic of the pre-scientific man.

This contrast relates to the editorial "In the Pursuit of Peace." The editorial extolled a heavy inertness in spite of the magnitude of events. The editorial opened with: "As the miracle . . . has failed to materialize. . . ." This set the tone of inexorable events carried out by vast abstractions of functions and forces. The very purpose of the piece was to preserve the inertness of the readers, to still dissent from an important decision.

The editorial expounded not only inertia. It exuded science in the sense of humbly interpreting events for their practical control. This "Pursuit of Peace" did nothing but observe, symbolize, order, and conclude. The product served only to enhance one current of thought while impeding another in the social audience; and, thus, it practically controlled the life of you and I to serve those national and free world interests, shrouded in miracles, secrets, and inexprable forces.

The contrast of public might be said to be the noble, pre-scientific public of [redacted] compared to the inert, scientific mass of 1962. But deduce no golden age in the Yale Report. Its nobility and pre-scientific qualities were

by then anachronisms. Its roots were sunk in times when religious destiny was still supreme. Its surrounding ethos of religion was being challenged by that of politics. Napolean had already risen and fallen. The Civil Was was soon to descend upon the United States. The noble, pre-scientific public of the Yale Report were soon capabable of developing symbols that justified murder. And events proved a vast lack of sufficient learning to put aright the dislocations that led to the Civil War. All this would be of interest, but I shall maintain the focus of my thought: the change in the fundamental tendency of American educational thought.

THREE: FRANCIS WAYLAND

Francis Wayland, President of Brown University from 1827 through 1855, did not kneel before the leadership of Yale. In 1842 he published Thoughts on the Present Collegiate System in the United States. This was followed in 1850 by a Report to the Corporation of Brown University, On Changes in the System in Collegiate Education.[1] In these he criticized the existing system and made proposals for "an institution established with the intention of adapting its instruction to the wants of the whole community." (Report, p. 479)

His proposals pointed towards the elective curriculum which was going to replace the prescribed one. Courses of instruction proposed included the classical and modern languages, sciences, the nascent social sciences, and several professions. These courses of study ranged from two years to one term; and "every student might study what he chose, all that he chose, and nothing but what he chose." (Report, p. 479) Wayland designed his proposals on this premise: "In addition to the present courses of instruction, such should be established as the wants of the various classes of the

[1] Both are partially reprinted in Hofstadter and Smith, eds., op, cit., Thoughts, pp. 334 - 76; Report, pp 478 - 88.

community require." (Report, p. 479)

The contrast with the position in the Yale Report of this social view is immediately apparent. President Day said that the various classes of the community ought to want his course of instruction. President Wayland said his courses of instruction should be what the various classes of the community want. He felt that enrollment had to be increased if the well-being of Brown was to be maintained. The proposed changes were found likely to extend the appeal of Brown to potential students unlikely to go to a traditional college. "Our numbers would thus be increased withour diminishing the number of students in other colleges in New England; and we should be carrying the blessings of science and literary education to portions of the society from which they had thus far been practically excluded." (Report, pp. 481 - 2)

Not only should colleges adapt to public wants, colleges were public institutions. They were "supported in part by the public;" the value of a degree depended on its public recognition; the standards of attainment required by colleges must be correlated with the wants of the public in order to be meaningful; and the object of encouraging liberal education was "to furnish the means for the most perfect development of the intellectual treasures of the country." (Thoughts, pp. 339 - 41)

A logical corollary to this stress on public and social considerations was that the results of education should have a practical value. This was implied in economist Wayland's use of supply and demand to determine course offerings. He reasoned: "If, by placing Latin and Greek upon their own merits, they are unable to retain their present place in the education of civilized and Christianized man, then let them give place to something better." (Report, p. 486)

The importance of a practical value of education was even more directly stated. The object of a college was "the intellectual cultivation of the community." (Thoughts, p. 343) To develop the society intellectually it was "necessary that, whenever unusual talent of any kind exists, it be so cultivated as to be able to accomplish the highest results of which it has been made capable." (Thoughts, p. 341) This was done "by throwing the brightest light of science in the path of those whom nature has qualified to lead." (Thoughts, p. 341)

President Wayland disagreed with President Day over the proper action toward the "tide of prosperity." For Day this tide was a starting point, an anticipated event, upon which individual will should impose itself. Wayland felt that civilization could "only advance in the lines of

the useful arts." (Report, p. 483) He feared that the potential wealth and influence of the productive classes would not be fully realized unless the prescribed curriculum was changed. He reasoned that, if the capital spent for the traditional college since the Revolution had been used to diffuse practical knowledge throughout the society, agricultural and industrial production would have been greatly increased. (Report, p. 483)

In the Yale Report there was a moral undertone. "Ought" was used repeatedly as a call to action. It appears in Wayland's writings, also; but usually in conjunction with rights rather than duties. Wayland noted: "It is frequently said that this is a republic, . . . the avenues to distinction are, and of right ought to be, open to all. . . . To all this I fully agree." (Thoughts, p. 364)

President Wayland is less noble, but more scientific. He interpreted social trends for the Brown Corporation and controlled these for the practical benefit of Brown. How carefully Wayland worked out his plan for increasing enrollment: by properly interpreting class desires and translating these into the program, Brown's enrollment would grow without hurting competitive institutions. Unfortunately, Wayland's interpretation was somewhat visionary. This made his practical control premature, which, in turn, led to his resignation

from the Brown presidency in 1855 after an unsuccessful attempt to implement his proposals.

But let us not leave Wayland too soon. I wish to bring out a concept that shall be important to the remainder of my essay. Wayland reasoned:

> Civilization is advancing, and it can only advance in the line of the useful arts. It is, therefore, of the greatest national importance to spread broadcast over the community, that knowledge, by which alone the useful arts can be multiplied and perfected. (Report, p. 483)

Why was civilization able to advance only in the useful arts? This is an important question, and my answer, unfortunately, can not be exact, because Wayland did not tell why only the practical sector of civilization was capable of advance. But he did give a clue: ". . . progress . . . is measured by. . . ." (Report, p. 482 - 83) If advance was to be measured, it had to be measured in the quantitative activities which corresponded closely with the useful and scientific activities of men. Wayland was questing the certainly of measurement, rejecting the uncertainty of spending days or weeks pondering each point of his opinion. This was also reflected in his concern for the size of Brown's enrollment.

Wayland also said it was of "the greatest national important to spread [knowledge] over the community." Why was the spread of useful knowledge of national importance? Because "the progress of a nation in wealth, happiness, and

refinement, [was] measured by the universality of its knowledge of the laws of nature, and its skill in adapting these laws to the purposes of man." (Report, pp. 482 - 83) Wayland wanted to measure not his progress, nor your's, nor mine, but the nation's progress. And this was a truly remarkable nation: it was wealthy, happy, refined, and skillful -- its people: should they stand in the way of the nation's wealth, happiness, and refinement?

Society had started doing things. I shall call this active society a "container society." A container society exists and envelops its members. The sense of association present in the etymology of "society" is not necessary for the container society. It starts doing things: desiring, requiring, compelling, coercing. As Wayland said: "our institutions of learning are called upon to place themselves in harmony with the advanced and rapidly advancing condition of society." (Report, p. 483)

I shall have occasion to say more about the container society, but now let us turn to Horace Mann. Wayland was an economist; and, perhaps, because of this, he was relatively premature in the development of the container society. Horace Mann was born in the same year as Wayland, 1796, and graduated from Brown College. Mann was a politician rather than an economist. His fundamental attitudes were more obscure and were imbeded in a larger body of writing: his twelve Annual Reports while secretary of the Massachusetts State Board of Education.

He is not talking about
higher education.

FOUR: HORACE MANN

The Annual Reports of Horace Mann represent a considerable body of writings on education. These included ideas on moral, religious, intellectual, and physical training, remarks on pedagogy, the design of school buildings, financing of schools. There was little he did not touch upon. It is this that creates difficulties in discussing his educational ideas.

To say the least Mann was enthusiastic! Was there a problem in the world? Education would fix it! Mann was not against the individual, but neither was President Wayland. The doctrine is of less interest than the perspective from which it was expounded. The editorial staff of the New York Times repeatedly explained things to all humanity about the actions of we the people. President Day was one man with special interests and competencies, speaking to other men with their interests, arguing that his were better. President Wayland began to interpret the public, to try to fit himself to its ensuing trends, and even ventured to explain how the wealth, happiness, and refinement of a nation was to be measured. What was the alignment of Horace Mann's exposition?

Horace Mann was the first secretary of the Mass-

achusetts State Board of Education. This job embroiled him in the political aspects of the publically supported schools. In fact, the existence of his post was able to raise the tempers of many citizens. Mann's committment to common education led him to take part in "selling" the common school idea, a technique sometimes called propagandizing. Here political concepts were not only implied, they were encountered. Horace Mann was a man of political destiny.

The question arising with public schools is: whom do they serve? Mann said: "when any parent or guardian prefers to educate his children at home, or in a private school, he should be allowed to so so, -- the <u>means</u> of education to be left wholly optional with every one, provided assurance is given to the State that the <u>end</u> is attained."[1] But what was the state? "The narrow strip of half-cultivable land that lies between her eastern and western boundaries is not Massachesetts; but her noble and uncorruptible, pure and exalted women, the children in all her schools, whose daily lessons are the preludes and rehearsals of the great duties of life, and the prophecies

[1] Horace Mann, <u>Annual Reports on Education</u>, Rand and Avery Co., Boston. XX, p. 631. (The Reports started in 1837 and followed annually. References to them will be given to the Report by the numeral and the page in the Rand and Avery edition.)

of future eminence, -- THESE ARE THE STATE." (p. 646)

The state was the people, given a suitable deflation of language. The common schools served the people. But did they serve them as a lump or as persons? Here Mann's style becomes a difficulty.

> Under the providence of God, our means of education are the grand machinery by which the 'raw material' of human nature can be worked up into inventors and discoverers, into skilled artisans and scientific farmers, into scholars and jurists, into the founders of benevolent institutions, and theological science. By means of early education, those embryos of talent may be quickened. . . . (p. 646)

In this short compass there was placed a melange of images. God presided over first a great educational machine and then over a huge educational womb. From these sprang an enumeration of categories that give the impression of individuality. But only functions: inventors, farmers, artisans, scholars, jurists, are stamped out by the educational machine.

The Twelfth Report, that of 1848, was Mann's most comprehensive statement of educational doctrine. He introduced the main portion of it thus:

> I proceed, then, in endeavoring to show how the true business of the schoolroom connects itself, and becomes identical, with the great interests of the society. The former is the infant, immature state of those interests; the latter their developed adult state. As "the child

> is the father to the man," so may the training of the schoolroom expand into the institutions and fortunes of the State. (XII, p. 651)

Mann then expanded this concept under headings of "Physical Education," "Intellectual Education as a Means of Removing Poverty, and Securing Abundance," "Political Education," "Moral Education," and "Religious Education." Without disparaging Mann's goals, education was truly a tool of social ends, "the great equalizer of the conditions of life, -- the balance-wheel of the social machinery." (XII, p. 669)

Mann did have a scientific attitude towards society. In fact he stated it in amazingly Dewian terms:

> The fortunes of a State depend upon antecedent causes. . . . By virtue of this universal law, the future condition of the people of Massachusetts will be modified, and to a great extent determined, by the force of causes now put in operation. Enlightened reason discerns the connection between cause and effect; it measures the efficiency of causes; and thus, to a great extent, it is able to adopt and adapt means to the accomplishment of designed ends. (XII, p. 646)

Horace Mann pondered the question of education as a form of power. "The greatest of all the arts in political economy is to change a consumer into a producer; and the next greatest is to increase the producer's producing power, -- an end to be directly attained by increasing his intelligence." (XII, p. 679) ". . . General intelligence can never exist without general education. . . ." (XII, p. 686) Here man displayed the same orientation towards progress as Wayland. Production was good. But Mann's view of education

as a form of power was broader than this specific manifestation.

> Our common schools are a system of unsurpassable grandeur and efficiency. Their influences reach, with more or less directness and intensity, all the children belonging to the State, -- children who are soon to be the State. They act upon these children at the most impressible period of their existence, -- imparting qualities of mind and heart which will be magnified by diffusion, and deepened by time, until they will be evolved into national character, -- into weal or woe, into renown or ignomy, -- and, at last, will stamp their ineffaceable seal upon our history. (IX, p. 420)

The schools had the power to mould the history of Massachusetts and the nation: for good or bad.[1] There was in it the germ of the concept of the common school as a tool to create the good society. "Above all others, must the children of a republic be fitted for society as well as for themselves." (IX, p. 422)

This introduced a vast new dimension in education. Mann's view of the relation of politics and education seems close to that of Thomas Jefferson. But there is a difference. Jefferson said:

> . . . And whereas it is generally true that people will be happiest whose laws are best, and are best administered, and that laws will be wisely formed, and

[1] See: Lawrence A. Cremin, The Republic and the School, New York, 1957. p. 7 from which this point was borrowed.

> honestlyadministered, in proportion as those who form and administer them are wise and honest; whence it becomes expedient for promoting the publick happiness that those persons, whom nature hath endowed with genius and virtue, should be rendered by liberal education worthy to receive the sacred deposit of the rights and liberties of their fellow citizens, and . . . that such should be sought for and educated at the common expence of all, /rather/ than that the happiness of all should be confided to the weak of wicked.[1]

The important thing for Jefferson was that the law makers should be wise and honest. General education was expedient because through it the individuals of greatest potential could be given the education that would enable them to become the wise and honest leaders.

Mann went much further that this. The child had to be fitted to society. Mann created as ideology. Public education was not a direct means to the attainment of better laws and administration. It was, instead, the basic condition upon which the existence of a free society depended. Training for self-government was "one of the highest and most valuable objects" of education. Such training had to commence in childhood. He asserted: "a foreign people, born and bred and dwarfed under the despotisms of the Old World, cannot

[1] Jefferson, Thomas, "A Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge," Crusade Against Ignorance, Gordon C. Lee, ed., New York, 1961, pp. 83 - 4

be transformed into the full stature of American citizens merely by a voyage across the Atlantic, or by subscribing the oath of naturalization." (IX, p. 455)

Mann's educational program was not an expedient for promoting the public happiness. He exclaimed: "I believe in the existence of a great, immortal, immutable principle of natural law, . . . -- a principle antecedent to all human institutions, and incapable of being abrogated by any ordinance of man, -- a principle of divine origin, . . . which proves the absolute right to an education of every human being that comes into the world; and which . . . proves the correlative duty of every government to see that the means of that education are provided for all." (X, pp. 533 - 34) Education for all at public expense had ceased to be a matter of governmental expediency, becoming a principle of natural law!

Man was a visionary, an ideologist. He explained his concept of "true statesmanship:"

> . . . it is the especial province and function of the statesman and lawgiver . . . to study out the eternal principles which conduce to the strength, wisdom, and righteousness of a community; . . . and then to form public institutions in accordance with them. And he is not worthy to be called a statesman . . . who . . . is incapable of marshalling in his mind the great ideas of knowledge, justice, temperance, and obedience to

> the laws of God, -- on which foundation alone the structure of human welfare can be erected; who is not capable of organizing these ideas into a system, and then of putting that system into operation, as a mechanic does a machine. (XII, p. 649)

Institutions were to develop the strength, wisdom, and righteousness of the community. The ideal statesman resembled the modern ideologist; the man who has fathomed the future, predicted its coming by his system, and, given power, coerces the confirmation of his predictions.

This was an attitude allied to science. It differed from the noble idea in concentrating on "the structure of human welfare." Mann was concerned with the eternal laws of God, a very unscientific subject. But his approach was consistent with a scientific attitude: study these laws, learn how they work in society, form a theory or system which permits their control through the pattern, and guide the control "as a mechanic does a machine." Both Mann and the modern ideologist combine a scientific outlook with a vision of the good life, the good life of all rather than of the person.

A key question with Mann is: what has happened to the sense of association among men? As a feeling located in diverse individuals, association was decimated. He implied that the foreign-born were servile serfs who lacked proper "apprenticeship for self-government." (IX, p. 455) By virtue of their despotic training ther were alien to

American-ness. Association was not something felt by men, it was created by education.

Wayland and Mann both envisaged the same type of society, one that contained its members. Their difference was one of perspective. Wayland was concerned with higher education. Mann pondered universal elementary education. But Mann went further than Wayland in one respect. The latter confined his container society mainly to economic affairs. But Mann saw a strong, wise, righteous community as the outcome of an excellent system of universal education.

With Mann, once the verbal fog is cut through, the modern potentials of social concepts are outlined. He said:

> The society of which we necessarily constitute a part must be preserved; and, in order to preserve it, we must not look merely to what one individual or one family needs, but to what the whole community needs; not merely to what one generation needs, but to the wants of a succession of generations." (X, p. 543)

With this the potential of the modern political destiny was explicit in American educational thought. The society was placed in the center of concern, and educational thought was made its interpreter. Education would excercise practical control over society.

But given political destiny, there was still much

shaping of education to be done. Educators found the world around them was dynamic, always changing. Mann quite firmly established education in the service of a permanent society whose interests commanded the place of first premise. But, while this society had an intellectual existence, its actual features were still to be worked out. I shall pause now for an interlude in which this new society can be examined.

FIVE: AN INTERLUDE

The social problem has become a question of localization. I left Horace Mann where he said that to draw conclusions without considering the wants of the whole community over a succession of generations was "to leave out the most important part of the premises." What is the significance of this?

For a moment let us contemplate the phrase "to think for one's self." Its normal usage is to mean that he thinks himself -- he doesn't adopt other people's ideas ready-made. It could also be taken to mean that he looks out for himself -- his thought starts out from himself. In this latter usage, the localization of thought would contradict Mann's.

Mann found the most important premises located in the whole community over a succession of generations. The important premises discussed in the New York Times editorial had a localization similar to Mann's. The requirements of free world defense were the inexorable ones. It was asserted that the decision made could not be gainsaid because it was based on secret information. But, in addition to that, the reader's agreement to the necessity of freeworld defense, rather than personal or family concern,

was presupposed. If the reader does not agree with this localization of important facts assumed by the writer, gainsaying the decision would be very simple.

The problem, then, is one of the locale of important facts. There was a change in the location of important facts in progress. The Yale Report based much of its educational thought on faculty psychology as developed by John Locke. The next figure that will be examined, Charles W. Eliot, rejected that psychology and presided over Harvard while William James and others worked out a new one. Locke's psychology was highly introspective. James used introspection; but let it be guided by a thorough knowledge of all the experimental work of the time. All through the intellectual world the location of important facts was changing: from internal, introspection to external, experiment.

explain?

One of the more influential books of the past decade has been the Lonely Crowd which postulated on the basis of a population growth curve three types of character: tradition-directed, inner-directed, other-directed.[1] The latter two are of interest here. These types have differing locations of important facts. The inner-directed have, metaphorically, an internal system of inertial guidance

[1] See: Riesman, Glazer, Denney. The Lonely Crowd, Abridged ed., Doubleday Anchor Book, Garden City, N.Y., 1950, 1953, pp. 19 - 49

implanted in them by their parental training. The other-directed are very sensitive to the wants of others, continually adjusting themselves to the patterns of action they observe about them.

Why should Riesman have tied the observed characteristics to character and population curves? It is important, here, only to note that the location of intellectual concern was made external by Horace Mann. Was this sufficient, given the gradual diffusion of this externalization, to convert the general way of thought from inner-localization to other-localization? Is other-direction simply a logical corallary to the belief that the important facts are located in the whole community and not in the self? With "other-localization," automatically, thoses individuals who seemed to best represent the community would become objects of character emulation.

The purpose of this digression is to set out the guide lines of the remaining inquiry: into problems of the localization of important facts and the events implicit in those thoughts. "The child is the father of the man." And so the nineteenth century was father to the twentieth. The concern will be to explore the different localizations manifested, and the implication of these for politics. The next figure to be examined is Charles W. Eliot, president of Harvard for forty years.

SIX: CHARLES W. ELIOT

Eliot stated his primary educational concern as follows:

> The general growth of knowledge and the rise of new literatures, arts, and sciences during the past two hundred and fifty years have made it necessary to define anew liberal education, and hence to enlarge the signification of the degree of Batchelor of Arts, which is the customary evidence of a liberal education.[1]

Immediately, what localization does this imply? Where was knowledge growing? Eliot did not assert that he was more knowledgeable than Pico della Mirandola, Ibn Khaldun, or Leonardo da Vinci. Knowledge was growing in the aggregate. Harvard Library had more books in it. In Eliot's day, if everybody stated what they knew, there would be fewer repititions than two hundred years before, although each individual would probably have about the same number of things to say. The general growth of knowledge was located in the community rather than the individual.

What did Eliot do about this growth of communal [illegible]? The elective system was a technique of responding to the growth of knowledge. "The elective system fosters

[1] Eliot, "What is a Liberal Education?" Educational Reform, New York, 1905, p. 89

scholarship, because it gives free play to natural preferences and inborn aptitudes, makes possible enthusiasm for a chosen work, relieves the professor and the ardent disciple of the presence of a body of students who are compelled to an unwelcome task, and enlarges instruction by substituting many and various lessons given to small, lively classes, for a few lessons many times repeated to different sections of a numerous class."[1]

The elective system fostered scholarship and thus enhanced and controlled the growth in communal erudition. According to Eliot universities were "teachers, storehouses, and searchers for truth."[2] The university should have been "able to bring its students to the very frontier of acquired knowledge in every direction."[3] The university was to store all the knowledge men had acquired. In order to search after new truth a university was to "provide a large number of specialists with a livelihood, with all the needed facilities for their work."[4]

These three functions of the university can be summed up as follows: the university was responsible for the dissemination, conservation, and expansion of the communal

1 See: Hofstadter and Smith, eds., op. cit., p. 609. This is from Eliot's Inaugeral Address as President of Harvard in 1869.
2 Eliot, "The Aims of Higher Education" Reform, p. 225.
3 Ibid., p. 228. 4 Ibid., p. 234.

body of knowledge. Thus before Woodrow Wilson stated it, and La Follette implemented it, the university was in the nation's service, given these aims enunciated by Eliot.

Eliot examined the relationship of education and power.

> Many people draw a distinction between an educated and a practical man; but true education is, after all, nothing but systematic study and practice under guidance. In this comparative seclusion the young man learns something of what has been done and thought in the world, before he takes active part in its work. He puts himself in some one subject abreast of the accumulated wisdom of the past; he develops and increases his own powers, and gains command of those powers. He gets knowledge, to be sure, but, better than that, he gets power.[1]

The power gained was the student's power to acquire, exposit, an and apply knowledge. The problem of power circled back into the problem of knowledge.

According to Eliot a oneness of method united the arts and sciences.[2] This was the scientific method. The specific knowledge gained was immaterial; the student's acquisition of the method was the concern of the university. All fields were equally permeated by this method. Therefore, the student was allowed to choose his subjects. "That all

[1] Ibid., p. 224. [2] Ibid., p. 227

branches of sound knowledge are of equal value for mature students is the only hopeful and tenable view in our day."[1]

Eliot wanted all students to get the method of acquiring sound knowledge. But this unity was to be obtained in the midst of diversity. Students were diverse. He said:

> It is for the happiness of the individual and benefit of society alike that these mental diversities should be cultivated, not suppressed. The individual enjoys most that intellectual labor for which he is most fit; and society is best served when every man's peculiar skill, faculty, or aptitude is developed and utilized to the highest possible degree. The presumption is, therefore, against uniformity in education, and in favor of diversity at the earliest possible moment.[2]

This unity of method coupled with the conscious development of diversity in content was a foundation of the modern political destiny. Note above that Eliot claimed that the individual would enjoy specialization most, and society would best be served by it. How characteristic this was of modern mass life: satisfaction for the individual, service for the society; "the individual enjoys," "society is best served."

The problem of power and the problem of knowledge

[1] Eliot, "Liberty in Education," Reform, p. 144
[2] Ibid., p. 134

were united. Power was, and is, derived form knowledge. It is here that Eliot introduced difficulties. He said that the university should be able to bring students abreast of the frontiers of all knowledge; but each student should put "himself in some one subject abreast of the accumulated wisdom of the past." Now if, as Eliot said, power is the ability to apply knowledge to problems, the specialized individual was going to be at once very powerful, and at the same time quite helpless. There was a catch to Eliot's offer of power for the student: he would be required to yield more complacently to the powers of others. Eliot's program was basically an intensification of the division of labor.

It was also a solid blow against individual localization. Localization is where the important facts are. Eliot proposed that each student pick an area and concentrate studying in it. The practical effect was that each individual student was confronted with a simple-minded method for locating important facts. The facts of chemistry were automatically important to the man calling himself a chemist. Each person had his corner. There his power was great.[1] But on venturing out of his corner he stepped into those of others, where their power was greater than his. He had to

[1] cf. Ortega, Revolt of the Masses, p. 111. "The specialist 'knows' very well his own corner of the universe; he is radically ignorant of all the rest."

retreat back into his own corner or accept the tutelage of the other.

Eliot seemed quite proud to point out that it would take a diligent student about forty years to complete the Harvard curriculum and in those forty years the field would greatly enlarge.[1] He told the student to choose one-tenth of that and not to worry about the rest. The student should have accepted power in one area at the cost of ignorance in others. One might say that the essence of Eliot's elective system was to deliberately foster the student's ignorance of nine things for every one the university taught him.

I advance this extreme caricature of the elective system to point up the fact that expert knowledge is attained by relative ignorance of the fields the expert is not expert in. Since we all are to some extent an expert in something, we are all tied toghether, not so much by our knowledge, but by our ignorance. Functionally, modern society is a very negative. We are impelled to commune with others not so much because of what they can do, but because of what we can not do. If our valuation of others was inner directed, it would presuppose our ability to judge their worth. This

[1] Eliot, "Liberty," p. 126

the specialist can only do in his field. His not-field is made up of a large proportion of ignorance. There, he often can not judge, he is not contemporary, he has to rely on some other to tell him what the-thing-to-do is.

Eliot's educative ideas aimed to deliberately advance this derivative way of life. Higher education would produce the experts in all fields of knowledge. Mass education was to ensure that these experts were followed:

> Having, as the result of his education, some vision of the great range of knowledge and capacity needed in the business of the world, he will respect the trained capacities which he sees developed in great diversity in other people; in short, he will come to respect and confide in the expert in every field of human activity. Confidence in experts, and willingness to employ them and abide by their decisions, are among the best signs of intelligence in an educated individual of an educated community; and in any democracy which is to thrive, this respect and confidence must be felt strongly by the majority of the population. . . . The democracy must learn, in governmental affairs, whether municipal, State, or National, to employ experts and abide by their decisions.[1]

Horace Mann located the important facts in the wants of the whole community. Charles Eliot said that "in every branch of governmental, industrial, and social activity"[2]

[1] Eliot, "Education in Democratic Society," Charles W. Eliot and Popular Education, Edward A. Krug, ed., New York, 1961, p. 111

[2] Ibid., p. 112

experts should be relied on to locate and interpret the facts. To see that they were, Eliot advocated "the firm planting in every child's mind" of these "great truths:" each individual is intimately dependent on multitudes of others, and, in spite of all apparent diversity there is an essential unity to democratic society.[1]

Life, in Eliot's hands, was being reduced to function, to externals; it was becoming wholly derivative. He said: "It should be a recognized function of the democratic school to teach the children and their parents how to utilize all accessible means of innocent enjoyment."[2] This may have seemed an admirable goal. But with its political significance, its innocence melts: Eliot was asking that "innocent enjoyment" be defined, organized, and taught. Henceforth all Italians were to be taught to savor their pasta by the scientific method.

The fundamental object of a democracy was "to promote the happiness and well-being of the masses."[3] It is not the purpose here to advocate the abandonment of the common man to the predations of the fortunate. But there was, and is, a great difference between promoting the happiness of the masses as a mass and promoting the well-

[1] Ibid., pp. 112 - 14 [2] Ibid., p. 115
[3] Ibid., p. 114

being less fortunate people as people. An apparently happy mass, dutifully responding to leadership with no visible dissent, may be composed of bored, demoralized, wretched people. Furthermore, in order to move a mass through education a tremendous force is required.

Eliot's concept of association was noteworthy. He said:

> Democratic education should also inculcate on every child the essential unity of a democratic community, is spite of the endless diversities of function, capacity, and achievement among the individuals who compose the community.[1]

This was the container society. Its unity was an essential characteristic of an existing body regardless of individual characteristics. Men were associated in spite of their personal feelings.

But in Eliot's statement there was an implication that the social body was not as assured of existence as might be desired. The school had to inculcate the belief in this social bond. Unity in freedom was "the social goal of democracy, the supreme good of all ranks of society."[2]

This brings up another problem of localization. Where was reality? Reality, for the individual, was beginning

[1] Ibid., p. 113 [2] Ibid., p. 114

To disintegrate. Men, called great, were advocating the inculcation of views into people's picture of reality. Life, and the picture of life, were becoming derivative. Mann felt the important facts were located in the whole community. Eliot agreed; but went further. He wanted to ensure the mental existence of this whole community in the minds of all by the inculcation of belief in it through the "democratic" school. This existence assured, the whole would then be controlled and interpreted by the expert Harvard graduates, followed by the docile mass who had been taught to be happy.

This extreme formulation is useful in that it tends to point out the split between the guiding expert and the guided mass. As was seen above, the expert, on nine questions out of ten, was part of the mass. He guided and was guided. In this situation of broad functional integration, the critical control of a person's life by himself was impaired. With this, the effective social criticism was also impaired. Effective social criticism depends on actual revolt. Only by refusing to obey the expert, can a pragmatic confirmation of criticism be attained. This would have been greatly impaired.

Eliot was fragmenting reality and dividing its location between various experts. This left, as Eliot's essay on "Education in Democratic Society," implied, a large mass of not very expert people living in a world of experts. John Dewey was about to emerge as the principle interpreter of education for these people.

SEVEN: JOHN DEWEY

John Dewey theorized mainly primary and secondary education. In the same year that Eliot described "Education in a Democratic Society" Dewey announced "My Pedagogic Creed." This opened with the assertion: "I believe that all education proceeds by the participation of the individual in the social consciousness of the race."[1] This introduced a problem for the student of Dewey: where was th individual located? and where was the society located? He believe that the i individual to be educated was a social individual and that society was an organic union of individuals.[2] This was a circular position which rolled all through Dewey's later work.

But there was implicit, here, a problem of major concern to Dewey's later educational work: the problem of dualism. Dewey reasoned mightily for the abolition of dualistic concepts. His circular standpoint described above is at the basis of his anti-dualistic view. The individual was a social individual and society was an orgainc unity of individuals. Society was in the individual and the

[1] Dewey, "My Pedagogic Creed," Dewey on Education, Martin S. Dworkin, ed., New York, 1959, p. 19
[2] Ibid., p. 22

individual was in society.

~~individual was in society.~~

Dewey defined his concept of "community" clearly: "What they [men] must have in common in order to form a community or society are aims, beliefs, aspirations, knowledge -- a common understanding -- like-mindedness as the sociologists say."[1] Community depended on what people think, this was the starting point of Democracy and Education. The problem for the educator was to discover "the method by which the young assimilate the point of view of the old, or the older bring the young into like-mindedness with themselves." (p. 11) Dewey immediately announced his discovery of this method: to utilize "the action of the environment in calling out certain responses." (p. 11)

awkward

But Dewey avoided permitting this formulation to establish a dualism of individual and environment. Environment meant the continuity of the individual's surroundings with his active tendencies. The environment consisted "of those conditions that promote or hinder, stimulate or inhibit, the characteristic activities of a living being." (p. 11) A problem of localization was arising. Where did initiative lie?

???

[1] Dewey, Democracy and Education, Macmillan Paperbacks, New York, 1916, 1944, 1961, p. 4. Further references to this will be given in parentheses after the quote.

Dewey said:

> The net outcome of the discussion is that the fundamental means of control is not personal but intellectual. It is not 'moral' in the sense that a person is moved by direct personal appeal from others, important as is this method at critical junctures. It consists in the habits of understanding, which are set up in using objects in correspondence with others, whether by way of cooperation and assistance or rivalry and competition. Mind as a concrete thing is precisely the power to understand things in terms of the use to which they are turned in joint or shared situations. And mind in this sense is the method of social control. (p. 33)

Initiative was in the mind. But it was a special mind, one that understood things in terms of their use in shared situations.

This special mind followed a method. Recall Dewey's remark about the mental change between science and pre-science. The scientific thinker would interpret nature, obey her intellectually, and thus gain control of her. This was another way of saying that mind should understand the use to which things were put, and by obeying usages, mind would gain practical control of society or nature. Man and nature were continuous. Therefore men had to treat human problems with the same methods that natural problems were treated: collecting data, forming hypotheses, and testing them in action. (p. 285)

Dewey also said this about science: "Scientific abstraction and generalization are equivalent to taking the point of view of any man, whatever his location in time or space." (p. 227) With this the significance of Dewey's definition of community appears. Community depended on like-mindedness. Education was the means of attaining like-mindedness, subtly, by introducing the student to the scientific way of thought, training the student to take the position of any man, to despise his own, personal, location in space and time.

This was the same position as Eliot took, only more so. The key to the position was its anti-dualism. Recall that Eliot preached as essential unity in spite of all apparent diversity. This unity in diversity can be found implicit in Wayland's thought: the welfare of the community would be maximized by the maximumuzation of the individual's special talents. The difference between Wayland, Mann, Eliot, and Dewey was one of degree. In Dewey's thought the community attained a vast degree of integration. The individual was not banished in the least. Ideally, he was contained. He was harnessed, controlled by the control of his environment.

The operations Dewey was conducting on the localization of important facts were tremendous. In his "Pedagogic Creed" he announced his belief in society as an organic union of

individuals. Democracy and Education was a very careful program for creating this organic union. The method he used struck at every possible dualism and argued the organic union of both sides of these false dualities. Man v. Nature -- no: man and nature were continuous. Individual v. Society -- no: individuals were social and societies were composed of individuals. He concluded Democracy and Education as follows:

> The two theories chiefly associated with the separation of learning from activity, and hence from morals, are those which cut off inner disposition and motive -- the conscious personal factor -- and the deeds as purely physical and outer; and which set action from interest in opposition to that from principle. Both of these separations are overcome in an educational scheme where learning is the accompaniment of continuous activities or occupations which have a social aim and utilize the materials of typical social situations. For under such conditions, the school becomes itself a form of social life, a miniature community and one in close interaction with other modes of associated experience beyond school walls. All education which develops power to share effectively in social life is moral. It forms a character which not only does the particular deed socially necessary but one which is interested in that continuous readjustment which is essential to growth. Interest in learning from all the contacts of life is the essential moral interest. (p. 360)

"Continuous" was an important concept. Wherever there had been a dualism, there was continuit for Dewey. Life was

continuous, everyone continuous with everyone; the whole, finely interwoven with internal continuities, was continuously growing, expanding, because each individual was continually growing.

Dewey gave this technical definition of education: "It is that reconstruction of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience." (p. 76) He said: "Experience itself primarily consists of the active relations subsisting between a human being and his natural and social surroundings." (p. 274) The questions that arises is who was to say that meaning had been added and ability increased. Who was to judge? Dewey said:

> . . . there was indicated a philosophy which recognizes the origin, place, and function of mind in an activity which controls the environment. Thus we have completed the circuit and returned to the conceptions of the first portion of this book: such as the biological continuity of human impulses and instincts with natural energies; the dependence of the growth of mind upon participation in conjoint activities having a common purpose; the influence of the physical environment through uses made of it in the social medium; the necessity of a utilization of individual variations in the desire and thinking for a progressively developing society; the essential unity of method and subject matter; the intrinsic continuity of ends and means; the recognition of mind as thinking which perceives and tests the meanings

> of behavior. These conceptions are consistent with the philosophy which sees intelligence to be the purposive reorganization, through action, of the material of experience; and they are incosistent with each of the dualistic philosophies mentioned. (p. 323)

Dewey was early in his philosophical career a Hegelian. Supposedly he lost his Hegelianism in developing his instrumentalism. There was, apparently, a vast difference between the Absolute Idea and relativism. But Dewey saw intelligence as the purposive reorganization of experience. Mind was <u>in</u> the activity. Education was to continually permit expansion of activity. Education was life. Philosophy was the general theory of education. Somewhat similarly, Hegel saw the absolute idea unfolding in life.

Dewey said:

> Science represents the office of intelligence, in projection and control of [illegible], intentionally, and on a scale due to freedom from limitations of habit. It is the sole instrumentality of conscious, as distinct from accidental, progress. And if its generality, its remoteness from individual conditions, confer upon it a certain technicality and aloofness, these qualities are very different from those of merely speculative theorizing. The latter are in permanent dislocation from practice; the former are temporarily detached for the sake of wider and freer application in later concrete action. There is a kind of idle theory which is antithetical to practice; but genuinely

> scientific theory falls within practice as the agency of its expansion and its direction of new possibilities. (p 228)

Science was intelligence directing and controlling experience. Science was the instrument of conscious progress. Progress in what -- expansion of new possibilities. Several other concepts of science Dewey gave are necessary: "The problem of an educational use of science is then to create an intelligence pregnant with belief in the possibility of the direction of human affairs by itself." (p. 225) "Science is experience becoming rational." Is this ever expanding experience reason unfolding itself in the world looked at from within? Was instrumentalism Hegelianism plus the scientific method?

explain ???

Scientific generalization was the point of view of any man,"whatever his location in time and space." Education was to use science to create an intelligence that believed it could guide human affairs. Science was the judge. The non-localized point of view was the standard of judgement.

This non-localized point of view was in the service of a container society in an effort to integrate the individual with his contemporaries.

> The devotion of democracy to education is a familiar fact. The superficial

> explanation is that a government resting upon popular suffrage cannot be successful unless those who elect and who obey their governors are educated. Since a democratic society repudiates the principle of external authority, it must find a substitute in voluntary disposition and interest; these can be created only by education. (p. 87)

Note how different the exposition of this "superficial" agruement had become from Thomas Jefferson's quoted above. (pp. 29 - 30) There it was a clear-cut matter of expediency: developing those individuals best fitted to make and administer good laws. Dewey saw democracy devoted to education. Democratic success was impossible without general education. Education had to create a general interest in democratic society!

Dewey went on, giving his less superficial explanation of the "devotion of democracy to education:"

> A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. (p. 87)

The ~~pragmatic~~ meaning of this was that democracy was a giant ogranism composed of a symbiotic relationship of people, machines, books, everything.

He went on:

> . . . A society which is mobile, which is full of channels for the distribution of a change occurring anywhere, must see to it that its members are educated to personal iniative and adaptability. Otherwise, they will be overwhelmed by the changes in which they are caught and whose significance or connections they do not perceive,

> The result will be a confusion in which a few will appropriate to themselves the results of the blind and externally directed activities of others. (p. 88)

The internal balance of relationships had to be maintained by education or else the symbiotic character would degenerate into a parasitic one. The members of a democracy had to be educated to personal iniative and adaptability. What was personal iniative and adaptability? Dewey didn't say. But he did say:

> A progressive society counts individual variations as precious since it finds in them the means of its own growth. Hence a democratic society must, in consistency with its ideal, allow for intellectual freedom and the play of diverse gifts and interests in its intellectual measures. (p. 305)

The society allowed for the individual. Society completely contained the individual. Yet the society was many individuals. There was simply no localization of anything. The student is left with a great amorphous blob of life, located in no particular time or space, growing, ever expanding its experience, ever reducing it to more perfectly communicable form, all tensions resolved, entropy victorious eventually with experience absolutely experienced and perfectly diffused. The absolute idea fulfills itself.

But it was a patent fact that societies didn't "count" anything. People counted and people still count. Societies didn't grow: people grow. A democratic society

did not allow for anything, nor was it consistent with its ideal. People are, and were consistent or inconsistent with their ideals; and they permit or deny intellectual freedom in themselves and others. Dewey was a St. George slaying dragons, a Don Quixote lancing wind-mills.

The first sentence of Democracy and Education was: "The most notable distinction between living and inanimate things is that the former maintain themselves by renewal." (p. 1) Reflection shows this was an absurdity. Contemplate a brook running to the sea, and a wonderful, inanimate process of maintaining the oceans by renewal emerges. Dewey's own example of a stone, if taken in its actual setting, shows the rise of mountain ranges, followed by their gradual erosion, the accumulation of eroded sediments, exerting pressure, forming rock strata, finally to rise in a new range in response to changing geologic balances.

The most notable distinction between living and inanimate things is that the former have a within,[1] a location; that they distinguish themselves from inanimate things. Living things have a subjectivity, a tension between self and not-self. To force human life into taking the point of view of any man was precisely to dispense with

[1] Pere Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, With an Introduction by Sir Julian Huxley, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1959

human life. Any man was the equivalent of no-man. Every man is always at some very particular place at some very particular time. I am here, now. Yourare there, then. The significance for me of Dewey's ideas for any man "whatever his location in time or space" is precisely nothing.

It is absurd to call Dewey a relativist. He studiously refrained from dealing with any concrete relationship. For instance, the main problem of this essay is murder. With this problem we can see the nullity of the point of view of any man. Murder always happens to particular persons, committed by particular persons. Murder is a concrete relationship. Any man can not have concrete relationships. He can only deal in technique. Given this to do, how is the best way to do it? Given the problem, how was it to be solved? To fulfill his aims, Dewey would have to conduct systematic de-personalization against the individual consciousness.

The doctrine of any man intensified the inertness of life. The person who attempted to follow it would be unaware that he did have goals. Aims were to be contained in acts. Only a philosopher with the Hegelian faith that reason unfolds itself in the world could let his concentration fasten so completely on method, on technique, on doing things.

Mass man, other-directed man, and any man are much the same person. The inert person continues living in the same pattern unless moved to change by some outside stimulus. The other-directed person looks for stimulus, for change, outside of him. Internally inert, he knows that the only variety in his life will be derived from others. The non-localized man, any man, becomes, in effect, the epithome of the inert, other-directed man. Any man thinks he has the perfect method for living. He deceives himself. Given a purpose, an activity, any man can discover and utilize the best techniques, he can learn how to do it well. But purposes, activities, are features of the lives of particular men. Any man has forgotten he is a particular man. Before his fine ability at technique can be put to work, the purpose of particular men must enter any man. He must await direction. His ever-expanding experience is derivative. His is like a speck of dust lying on water, vibrating on the surface of things, inert, but continually jumping about, directed randomly by unequal kinetic energy in the molecules that strike, bounding stupidly in a Brownian movement.

Dewey worried mainly about the mass, the multitude destined to no particular distinction (except in their own eyes). This was only one side of the modern political problem of education. Eliot worried about both the mass and

the expert. This latter problem, education for those who would lead, was not left unpondered. One of the major thinkers on this subject was Irving Babbitt, Professor of French Literature at Harvard.

Why deal with Babbitt? Explain.

EIGHT: LEADERSHIP AND STANDARDS IN MASS SOCIETY

- or -

BIG BABBITT IS WATCHING YOU!

> "That's a fact, Mr Babbitt."
> "But I'll tell you -- and my stand on this is just the same as it was four years ago, and eight years ago, and it'll be my stand four years from now -- yes, and eight years from now! What I tell everybody, and it can't be too generally understood, is that . . ."[1] "social justice . . . means in practice class justice, class justice means class war and class war, if we are to go by all the experience of the past and present, means hell."[2]

Abrupt and confusing beginning

Democracy and Leadership was begun with an assertion of a dualism: "a law of the spirit and a law of the members."[3] Literature and the American College was introduced by a quotation of Emerson:

> There are two laws discrete
> Not reconciled, --
> Law for man, and law for thing;
> The last builds town and fleet,
> But it runs wild,
> And doth the man unking.[4]

Babbitt claimed to devote Democracy and Leadership to "a defense of the veto power." (p. 5) The veto was by

[1] George F. Babbitt, Babbitt, by Sinclair Lewis, Signet Classic, New York, 1922, 1961, p. 27
[2] Irving Babbitt, Democracy and Leadership, Houghton Mifflin Co. Boston, New York, 1924, p. 308
[3] Ibid., p.6
[4] Babbitt, Literature and the American College, A Gateway Edition, New York, 1908, 1956. p. v

the law for man of social reform, humanitarianism, expansionism, and all other delusions growing from the law for things. It was a most singular defense of the veto power. For instance, two sentences after anouncing this purpose, Babbitt did "not hesitate to affirm that what is specifically human in man and ultimately divine is a certain quality of will, a will that is felt in its relation to his ordinary self as a will to refrain." (p. 6) Despite the will to refrain, the major portion of this "defense" consisted of Babbitt's assertion of Babbitt's life view.

Babbitt called himself a humanist, one who was not only positive and critical, but individualistic as well. It is this last self-characterization that merits critical examination. I say this because Babbitt's usage of individualism was peculiar:

> Under existing conditions, the significant struggle seems to me to be not that between the unsound individualist and the traditionalist, nor again, as is currently assumed, that between the unsound individualist and the altruist, but that between the sound and the unsound individualist. To be a sound individulist, one needs, as I take it, to retain one's hold on the truths of the inner life, even though breaking more or less completely with the past. (p. 8)

This seems strange, having always thought that an individualist gave up worrying whether his individualism was sound or unsound, preferring to take up questions as the arose, concretely, without filtering the ensuing opinions through the mesh of sound and unsound characteristics suitable for

the adornment of the "individualist's" herd-image.

The main concern of individualistic, critical, humanistic, positivistic Babbitt was the question of standards. Although this concern arose from the basic dualism of the law for man and the law for thing, Babbitt saw the need of a unity.

> If we mean by imagination not merely what we perceive, but what we conceive, it follows inevitably that the problem of the imagination is closely bound up with that of the One and the Many and therefore with the problem of standards; for it is impossible, let me repeat, to achieve standards, at least along critical lines, unless one can discover in life somewhere an abiding unity with which to measure its variety and change. (p. 13)

The unity was the moral law. Because these truths of the inner life had been lost, the concept of liberty had been changed. In its name, men had ceased to submit to the higher will which would be a submission to true liberty. The Catholic method of preserving this submission was unsatisfactory. The sound individualist had to rely on the cooperation of the intellect and the imagination to produce standards that would enlist the service of the ethical will. (pp. 285 - 38)

This cooperation of intellect and imagination centered around the basic condition of life: Nemesis. Nemesis was the poetic justice brought on by man's expansive conceit. A man who could center his intellect and imagination

upon Nemesis would see the worth of humility in approaching life. Humility was the essence of standards. (pp. 181 - 82) Justice was the ideal of life.

Standards and individualism were a very precarious balance. Standards and standardization were not two unrelated factors. Babbitt said:

> The belief in moral responsibility must be based on a belief in the possibility of an inner working of some kind with reference to standards. The utilitarian, as I have sought to show, has put his main emphasis on outer working. The consequence of this emphasis, coinciding as it has with the multiplication of machines, has been the substitution of standardization for standards. (p. 255)

Babbitt had a great problem with the standardization of his standards. There was a dogmatic twist in his mind that led him to objectify his ideas of standards as much as Dewey objectified his idea of society.

Babbitt argued against humanitarian concern for the masses because, among other things, it led to modern mass war. He said: ". . . the humanitarian Messiah [Rousseau] set in motion forces that led by a process that I have attempted to sketch in rough general outline to the rise of a Christ of war [Napolean]." (p. 132) But this was a one sided description, leaving out largely the dynamic of Nemesis he so admired. There were murderers whose heads fell from the guillotine. Their attitudes were not unlike Babbitt's.

Justice, Babbitt thought, was: "To every man according to his works." (p. 196) The laborer ought to realize that the exceptional were getting exceptional rewards justly, that it was the exceptional man who was increasing productivity and enlarging the worker's lunch pail. The worker should have scorned the agitator. There was in this something of the stubborn blindness of "let them eat cake" justice. Babbitt might have been able to convince his fellow, well-fed Babbitts "that exceptional capacity should receive exceptional rewards." (p. 193) But the laborer whose child was hungry might legitimately have asked Babbitt if his standard of justice was either critical, positive, humanistic, or moral in its complacent justification of the death of the worker's child in order to reward capacities such as Babbitt's babblings.

Babbitt's standards approached standardization on another subject: sex. The white race was being imperiled by syphillis. Further:

> The French and also the Americans of native descent are, if we are to trust statistics, in danger of withering from the earth. Where the population is increasing, it is, we are told, at the expense of quality. The stocks to which the past has looked for its leaders are dying out and the inferior or even degenerate breeds are multiplying. (p. 210)

Babbitt summed up the "total trend" by saying that they

were moving through an orgy of humanitarian legalism towards a decadent imperialism. (p. 273)

Babbitt offered solutions to this encroaching decadence. He said:

> Civilization is something that must be deliberately willed; it is not something that gushes up spontaneously from the depths of the unconscious. Furthermore, it is something that must be willed first of all by the individual in his own heart. Men who have thus willed civilization have never been any too numerous so that civilization always has been and, in the very nature of the case, always must remain something very precarious. (p. 229)

The individual had to will civilization in order for civilization to be. But civilization was something that could be willed. Civilization was living according to the highest standards.

Fortunately the United States had an embodiment of civilization and high standards. Offsetting the drift towards decadent imperialism was "our great unionist tradition." But, Babbitt warned:

> One should not . . . underestimate the difficulties in the way of maintaining this tradition. The idea that the State should have a permanent or higher self that is felt as a veto power upon its ordinary self rests ultimately upon the assertion of a similar dualism in the individual. (p. 273)

Babbitt went on to show how this great unionist tradition should be applied as a standard of political judgment:

> At the same time he [Woodrow Wilson] was only too ready to yield to the push for power of the labor unions (Adamson Act),* a form of the instinct of domination so full of menace to free institutions that, rather than submit to it, a genuine statesman would have died in his tracks. one may contrast profitably the way in which Mr. Wilson faced this issue with the way in which Grover Cleveland, perhaps the last of our [illegible]ents who was unmistakably in our great tradition, faced the issue of free silver. (p. 288)

antecedent unclear

We can assume that Babbitt saw Cleveland within "our great tradition" when he vetoed a $10, 000 appropriation for the relief of farmers, ruined by drought, with the purchase of crop seed.[1]

Babbitt's critique appears to argue for the "noble life" as Ortega argued. Babbitt said genuine liberty was the reward of ethical effort, that true liberty was "not liberty to do as one likes, but liberty to adjust oneself, in some sense of that word, to law." (pp. 294 - 95) But this would be failing to see that Babbitt was thoroughly a mass man. Babbitt's mass character derived from his de-personalization of responsibility.

Babbitt's edifice rested on the dualism between the spiritual self and the ordinary self. The question is precisely the same as that regarding the container society:

* 1916; established 8 hour working as a full day on interstate railroads. R.McC.

[1] See. Eric Goldman, Rendezvous with Destiny, Vintage, New York, 1952, 1956. p. 55

does it exist? Is it a true localization?

How was self-reform to be carried out? Babbitt said:

> To have standards means practically to select and reject; and this again means that one must discipline one's feelings or affections, to use the older word, to some ethical centre. (p. 299)

Presumably this ethical center was the higher self. But note how Babbitt continued:

> If discipline is to be effective, so that a man will like and dislike the right things, it is as a rule necessary that it should become a matter of habit, and that almost from infancy. (p. 299)

Disciplining one's own feelings toward some ethical center suddenly became a matter of disciplining some one else's feelings towards an ethical center in order to be sure that he liked or disliked the right things. Babbitt flatly contradicted his assertion that civilization had to be willed by the individual. If one didn't inculcate a like for the right things and a dislike for the wrong things, the youth, by the time he attained reason, would have become the victim of bad habits. Individualist Babbitt was left with no alternative to the inculcation of good habits from infancy to majority in all.

Who was to determine what habits were to be inculcated? Babbitt said:

> If a community is to transmit certain habits to its young, it must normally come to some kind of agreement as to what habits are desirable; it must in the literal meaning of that word achieve a convention. (p. 299)

Notice that Babbitt has arrived at the point where his community is transmitting habits to its young.[1]

It was one thing to observe that a people needed to achieve a convention in order to transmit conventional habits to their young. But it was another thing to recommend how people who were giving up old conventions were to achieve new ones.

> So much experience has accumulated in both the East and the West that it should seem possible for those who are seeking to maintain standards and to fight an anarchical impressionism, to come together, not only as to their general principles, but as to the main cases that arise in the application of them. This convention, if it is to be effective, must, as I have already suggested, be transmitted in the form of habits to the young. This is only another way of saying that the civilization of a community and ultimately the government of which it is capable is closely related to the type of education on which it has agreed. (One should include in education the discipline that children receive in the family.) (p. 302)

The fundamental tendency of Babbitt's thought was quite

[1] "My, what a cute hamlet you have Mrs. State. He has Mr. State's Senate. But -- Oh! -- His Chief Executive looks just like yours. . . ."

similar to Dewey's. The future society was produced by the present education. Dewey programed future society with the point of view of any man -- science. Babbitt's program was based on the conventional man -- Babbitt.

Babbitt camouflaged mightily his central role in the establishment of standards. He looked at government "with the utmost degree of realism" as follows:

> . . . government is power. Whether the power is to be ethical or unethical, whether in other words it is subordinated to true justice, must depend finally on the quality of will displayed by the men who administer it. For what counts practically is not justice in the abstract, but the just man. (p. 308)

Babbitt immediately proceeded:

> The just man is he whose various capacities (including the intellect) are acting in right relation to one another under the hegemony of the higher will. (p. 308)

What counted practically was not other people's abstract justice, but the just man -- the person who fulfilled Babbitt's abstract definition of true justice. Babbitt was quite sure he knew what everyone's inner life should be, what right standards should be. He stated that current educational trends were "lacking in the essentials of the inner life."

Babbitt approved the democratic assertion that everyone should have a chance provided it meant that every-

one should "have a chance to measure up to high standards." (p. 312) "Finally," he said, ". . . in the interest of our experiment in free institutions, we need educational leaders who will have less to say of service and more to say of culture and civilization, and who will so use these words as to show that they have some inkling of their true meaning." (p. 313) Babbitt rarely failed to append a remark implying his superior communion with the "higher will."

Dewey's de-personalization consisted of trying to merge the individual's subjectivity into the point of view of any man. Babbitt's de-personalization merged the individual's subjectivity into the point of view of the higher subjectivity which, fortuitously, coincided with the point of view of Babbitt.

These are the two poles of political point of view in modern educational thought. On the one hand there is the universal man, the scientific point of view. This view practically needs experts to interpret it, a mass to follow it. Deceiving itself with the belief that it is expanding life for any man, it actually directs life into the channels assumed by its interpreters. Since they are unaware of this, they do not question their ends. On the other hand there is the universal standard, the proven eternal good. Defined by just men as justice, these declare them-

selves interpreters of truth for the uncomprehending mass. Deceiving themselves that they are serving the eternally true, theyactually direct life into the channels that they assumed true. Since they are unaware that it is they, not truth, that points the way, they do not question their ends.

These correspond roughly to the liberal and conservative poles in politics -- the left and right. But there has been, during the twentieth century, a growing number who are neither left nor right (although ofter put on a pole by others). They commence their conscious position within the traditional dichotomy. But they break this allegiance. Instead of defending the veto power, as Babbitt did, with a crescendo of dogmatic assertion, they try to excercise it through pointed criticism. Randolf Bourne became one of these individuals.

NINE: RANDOLPH BOURNE

Randolph Bourne began his short career as a disciple of Dewey. The shock of Dewey's support of World War I exploded Bourne's enchantment with instrumentalism and its educational derivatives. Bourne came to feel there was "nothing in the outlook that touches in any way the happiness of the individual, the vivifying of the personality, the comprehension of social forces, the flair of art, -- in other words, the quality of life."[1]

Bourne altered the standard concepts of association radically. Society was still there, as was the state, the nation, and the community. But he treated these subjectively. He related them directly to himself and to people he knew and had sympathy for. The result was startling.

Bourne was well versed in sociology. When he went to Europe, his major efforts were to gain a personal insight into the national characters of the nations he visited.[2] As late as when he wrote "Trans-National America" he saw national character playing a positive role in life.[3] When he came to examine the human condition critically, he did

1 Randolph Bourne, "Twilight of Idols," Untimely Papers, New York, 1919, p. 135

2 See: Bourne, "Impressions of Europe: 1913 - 1914", The History of a Literary Radical and Other Papers, New York, 1956. pp. 77 - 81

3 Bourne, "Trans-National America," Ibid., pp. 260 - 84. I think this was written in late 1916.

not deny these associative concepts. He said:

> No man who ever lived found himself in a different relation to society from what we find ourselves. We all enter as individuals into an organized herd-whole in which we are as significant as a drop of water in the ocean, and against which we can about as much prevail. Whether we shall act in the interests of ourselves or of society is, therefore, an entirely academic question. For entering as we do a society which is all prepared for us, so toughly grounded and immalleable that even if we came equipped with weapons to assail it and make good some individual preference, we could not in our puny strength achieve anything against it. But we come entirely helpless.[1]

On the surface this was as much dominated by objective society as either Dewey or Babbitt were dominated by professions of love for the individual. But Bourne fasteded his thought on the relationship of the individual and the society. With this, social ideology was shed. Instead of finding the organization of society the important concern, instead of the wants of the whole community over a succession of generations, the quality of the relationship between the society and himself, or you, or me, was important. Bourne found this relationship was the coercion of the individual by society.

[1] Bourne, "Old Tyrannies," Untimely Papers, p. 21

Indeed, the human situation was very bleak. The individual entered life like a girl awakening, naked, from a drugged sleep to the physical and psychic terror of unwilled self-prostitution.[1] The individual could not avoid being related to society. It surrounded him. But Bourne turned society and the supporting social sciences upon themselves. He pointed out that primitive customs were thought "outlandish and foolish." Was there any reason to consider our codes, conformities, institutions any less foolish? No.[2]

Bourne proclaimed his faith in malcontent. The malcontent would "seek the vital and the sincere everywhere." He described their purpose as follows:

> All they want is a new orientation of the spirit that shall be modern, an orientation to accompany that technical orientation which is fast coming, and which the war accelerates. They will be harsh and often bad-tempered, and they will feel that the break-up of things is no time for mellowness. They will have a taste for spiritual adventure, and for sinister imaginative excursions. It will not be Puritanism so much as complacency that they will fight. A tang, a bitterness, an intellectual fiber, a verve, they will look for in literature, and their most virulent enemies will be those unaccountable radicals who are still morally servile, and are now trying to suppress all free

[1] Ibid., p. 12 [2] Ibid., p. 20

> speculation in the interests of nationalism. Something more mocking, more irreverent, they will constantly want. They will take institutions very lightly, indeed will never fail to be surprised at the seriousness with which good radicals take the stated offices and systems. Their own contempt will be scarcely veiled, and they will be glad if they can tease, provoke, irritate thought on any subject.[1]

Unfortunately, Bourne died young, before his malcontented work was finished. But, nevertheless, the malcontented aspiration is important, for it is an alternative, perhaps, to murder.

Bourne ignored the Babbitt orientation; he reversed Dewey's. He agreed with Dewey that education was the means of social continuity. He came to believe, though, that social continuity, while perhaps inevitable, was the means to man's endless inhumanity to man. The person, originally interested in education, was forced to turn to criticism. In criticism of society by the person lay hope. Education of the person by society was no longer hopeful. It was the drug given to the girl soon to awake the whore.

The problem left is whether the malcontent offers any educational alternative to either Babbitt or Dewey.

[1] "Twilight of Idols," Ibid., p. 137

The problem centers on Bourne's concept of relationship between the individual and the society. This was an insufficient concept. Bourne made a great step forward when he ceased to talk of the society in the abstract, but related it to himself and others. With this he started to form a true relativism in the sense of its concern with relativity -- how things relate, in this case how the self relates to the not-self. But Bourne did not take this concern with relationships far enough.

Language is the starting point of reform. The malcontent asks that society should be treated experimentally. In order to treat it experimentally we need an example that exists. Experiment means to test, to try out. Exist means to stand out of.[1] We experiment on those things that exist. We try out those things that stand out of us. There is no conceivable experimental relationship valid towards society.[2] With respect to society, it is possible only to insist, to stand in one's self. This is why social concepts are so dangerous. Society does not exist, people can only insist there is a society. Concepts of association are, and always

[1] I first learned of this meaning of exist from Ortega, Man and People, WW Norton, New York, 1957, p. 41. He discussed it in reference to existentialism, pointing out that it is a poor name for the doctrines of existential philosophy.

[2] The sociologist's practice of thrusting questions into people's consciousness violates the scientist's duty not to alter the relationships he is observing by his process of observation: physics, the uncertainty principle.

will be, based on insistence rather than experiment.

There is a possibility of the malcontent developing a vital and sincere education. But they must go beyond Bourne and, with irreverence, deny society and assert that "social" acts are what they are: relationships between individual people. The United States does not exist; it is to the image of it that many people insist we give our homage. The Constitution is nothing more than a piece of paper, except in so far as persons insist on acting as if it was something more. In sum, the only reason people do things is because they insist upon it, they demand it, they choose to do it. Despite our mental institutions, the human condition is anarchy.

Since we live in anarchy, since we do only that upon which we insist, we are similarly responsible. Since what we do we do at our own will, we are ourselves responsible for these acts. We are murderers and murderees. Is this the life, to kill and to be killed, upon which we want to insist, that we want to live?

It was inaccurate to say education was society training persons. Education is persons training persons, educators leading educatees forth. Where? No where but the actual insistence lived by both: the educator is responsible for the teachings on which he insists; the educatee is responsible for the lessons on which he insists.

Utterly out of place in a historical study.

APPENDIX A

In the Pursuit of Peace

The New York Times, Wednesday, April 25, 1962

As the miracle that might have averted new nuclear tests has failed to materialise, President Kennedy has now issued the fateful orders to go ahead with the scheduled tests in the Pacific as soon as operationally feasible. A hundred ships and planes and 12,000 men stand ready at Christmas and Johnston Islands to start the new experiments.

In issuing the orders to the Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission, the President had to weigh the inexorable requirements of both national and free world defense against the many protests voiced not only by the Communists but also by neutralist statesmen, "peace marchers," and even United Nations Secretary General Thant. With deep reluctance and regret, which we share, he decided that our own and free world preservation demands the tests; and nobody who is not privy to the secret military and scientific considerations that went into the decision can gainsay it.

The responsibility for these tests lies patently with Soviet Russia, which both in Moscow and Geneva and as late as yesterday stood adamantly against international

inspection [sic?] as endorsed in United Nations resolution and accepted, in principle, even be the neutrals at Geneva. The Administration is keeping the door open to the very last moment for the Soviets to accept a test ban pact with minimal international controls, but the hope for such a Soviet turnabout is all but gone.

* * *

Now it is more urgent than ever to explain once again to all humanity that the United States stands for a peaceful world ruled not by force, but by law, and that it has made innumerable efforts, sacrifices and concessions to attain that goal.

In the pursuit of peace the United States has been the principle backer of the United Nations as the exponent and executor of peaceful principles which are now part of world law. Without our support, moral and financial, this world organization would collapse and chaos would be the result.

In the pursuit of peace we have submitted, in keeping with United Nations resolutions, draft treaties for both a nuclear test ban and gradual and balanced progress toward total disarmament under a United Nations peace force. We have reduced our insistence on control and inspection to

mere sampling techniques and other minimal requirements which expose us to a calculated risk to our security that for the sake of peace we are willing to assume.

In the pursuit of peace we are offering new concessions on Berlin to reach at least temporary working arrangements within an ultimate European peace settlement -- concessions which have caused serious misgivings both in Bonn and Paris.

* * *

In the pursuit of peace we have backed the United Nations in seeking the peaceful liquidation of the Western colonial empires, sometimes at the price of serious disagreements with our allies.

In the pursuit of peace, and at the risk of losing Laos to the Communist world, we are pressing for a neutralist Laos in which even the army and the police would be in neutralist hands. We have vigorously backed the United Nations in working for a peaceful and united Congo to avert big power intervention, and we have conscientiously supported the U.N.'s peace-making and peace-keeping efforts in the Middle East. In the pursuit of peace we even dissociated ourselves from our British and French allies and from Israel in their attack on Egypt over the Suez Canal.

Finally, in the pursuit of peace we have poured

out more than $80 billion since the war to help other, including Communist-dominated, nations, and are still doing so at the rate of nearly $5 billion a year.

In brief, we have pursued peace in accordance with our principles and to the very limits of our own and free world security, and of our financial resources. At this unhappy moment when we are about to proceed with new atmospheric testing -- in the long-range interests of peace -- let the record speak for us against those who would malign us.

This is an essay, not history.