

VH 20

S O C I A L P E D A G O G Y
A Study of
Humanistic Educational Thought
1914 -- 1939

A Prospectus by
Robert O. McClintock
Of a Dissertation
To Be Submitted
In Partial Fulfillment
Of
The Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

April 1, 1964

Dear Prof. Cremin,

A few words of explanation are needed with this April Fools Day joke. As you will see, the coat has changed considerably. This is a result of my work on defining humanism; and these changes are necessary, if humanism is to be the topic. The new coat is somewhat more international than the first. However, most of the Europeans emigrated to the U.S. during the 30's. Thus, as the mainstays of the study, there will be Albert Einstein (German-American), Wolfgang Köhler (German-American), Max Scheler (German), Ernst Cassirer (German-American), Jacques Maritain (French-American), Ortega (Spanish), and Dewey (American).

The proposal here is largely a rough draft, which ~~will be~~ is longer than I hope to present Tuesday. I hope to have it more to the point, then, and to have eliminated stylistic infelicities that now abound and for which I apologize.

Sincerely yours,

Robert O. McClintock

Social Pedagogy: A Study of
Humanistic Educational Thought

1914 -- 1939

Working Divisions

- I: Prologue: Humanistic Pedagogy
- Ch. 1: The Tradition of Humanism
 - Ch. 2: The Difficulty of Humanistic Pedagogy in a Naturalistic World
- II: Humanistic Educational Thought in the Twentieth Century
- Ch. 3: The Human Laws of Speculative Physics
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"A pupil from whom nothing is ever demanded which he cannot do, never does all he can."

J. S. Mill, Autobiography

In General:

During recent decades the notorious fate of educational thought proved Plato's warning that the clamouring of the public -- in glowing approval or in carping objection -- can so befuddle many philosophers that they cease to distinguish social sophistries from well-wrought wisdom. Ever since they learned that schools were "in the nation's service," the public has been astir over its educational institutions; and many philosophers, bedeviled by the din, began to frame educational theory in terms of the services people wanted from the schools. This tendency to perceive in pedagogy only a classroom significance has become a cherished habit which vitiates the normative aspects of education.

However, diverse agencies transmit culture, both for the good and for the bad; and we know that even the narrow performance of the schools is decisively influenced by what happens in the press, movies, advertising, the universities, corporations, governments-- both national and local--and the home. Educational thought refers to the transmission of culture, not "the classroom," and to the development of humane beings, not "the pupil": therefore, let us leave

behind the narrow world of the school, and instead, study the pedagogy of some who contributed to the best that was thought and said in our century.

Between 1914 and 1939, leading thinkers in almost every field developed a humanistic outlook in which culture and pedagogy were major interests. I propose to study their educational thought. The study of this intellectual movement separates into three parts.

"Man feels himself lost, shipwrecked among things By an energetic effort, man withdraws into himself to form ideas about these things and possible ways of dominating them Then, man again submerges himself in the world to act according to his preconceived plan." The three stages of thought, suggested here by the Spanish philosopher, José Ortega y Gasset, are a useful structure for the analysis of humanistic pedagogy during the inter-war years. Humanists felt a cultural crisis; they gathered and developed intellectual capacities for dominating the situation; and they attempted to employ those capacities to achieve control over their worldly predicament. These stages overlap one another in historical fact, just as the chemical elements are mixed and combined in natural fact. Like the chemist, who must separate the heterogeneous materials of the world into samples

of the homogeneous elements that theory postulates, the historian must analyze complex intellectual products into the constituent categories of thought; that is, as I see it, into three parts: defining the outlook of humanists and showing how they perceived a cultural crisis during the inter-war years; analyzing the humanistic conception of culture that they formed in order to dominate the crisis; and surveying some attempts at educational action which were based on this conception of culture. Below I outline more specific aspects of these divisions.

I: Prologue: Humanistic Pedagogy.

1. The Tradition of Humanism:

Humanism holds that the animal, man, makes himself human by using mind to order the universal flux that he finds both within and about him.

The world is a product of man's ability to order nature and himself; and neither God nor nature guarantee our knowledge. The ordering thoughts are as insecure as the mortals who form and hold them; and this insecurity makes education the sole guarantor of the laws that men have given nature and themselves. The successive generations maintain and

extend the world to the degree that each assimilates and develops the ideas which make the world intelligible. Unless men are trained to appreciate and improve the cultural means by which predecessors created their inner and outer environment, the continued existence of these orders will be endangered; and, although the future is always uncertain, insufficient cultural training will increase the probability of man's destruction of his own creations.

Briefly, the above defines the humanistic attitude towards education. I shall develop it, if possible, in a chapter which surveys the history of humanistic pedagogy. Important figures in this story would be Heraclitus, Socrates and Plato, Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, Ibn Khaldun, Montaigne and Rabelais, Rousseau and Kant, Pestalozzi and Herbart, Jefferson and Horace Mann, and a series of late nineteenth century writers: Friedrich Nietzsche, Wilhelm Dilthey, John Henry Newman, Matthew Arnold, William Torrey Harris, and Henry Adams. This introductory survey will be most difficult because of the historical sweep it will attempt, the compression of detail its short length will require, and the risk of dullness and vagueness these two combined will create at the very beginning. However, if successful, the survey should serve the reader by defining the conceptions of humanism and educational thought used throughout the

essay, explaining the historical grounds of these conceptions, and thus, specifying the realm of discourse in which ~~their~~ ^{of humanism} modern exponents participate. Although for the reader this introduction will lead into the main material, it will be drafted last, since for the writer it grows out of the principal considerations.

2. Humanistic Pedagogy in a Naturalistic World:

As the previous chapter will show, at all times maintenance of the cultural heritage has been a basic activity of humanists; and it was they who had traditionally formed educational theory. The twentieth century crisis in humanism occurred when they realized that other principles had supplanted theirs as the practical guides of educators. The educational changes of the nineteenth century occurred with little effort to graft onto the new educational expedencies the old ideals of paideia, kalos, kagathos, humanitas, and the gentleman, which had given the violent development of Western Civilization a part of its continuity and unity. Democratic education had become ascendent by demonstrating its superiority on matters of expediency, such as adapting man to industrial technology, while cultural questions, such as the obverse problem of adapting industrial technology to man, were permitted to languish. When Charles W. Eliot

became president of Harvard, the die, already fashioned, was cast; and it became a matter of time before the ethic of the market place ^{superseded} ~~replaced~~ that of noblesse oblige, and the educational hierarchy became unable to exert the normative influence that was once its raison d'ê[^]tre.

Worse, the intellectual basis for a normative influence seemed to disappear. The development of biological, social, and psychological sciences overcame the division between a law for man and a law for thing, and replaced the sense of duty derived from the former with the sense of ~~the~~ inevitability which resulted from the latter. This naturalistic attitude proved its worth by providing ever better material conditions, although ignoring the ever worsening spiritual situation. Humanistic moralists had long been calling for a transvaluation of all values in order to combat this matter of fact naturalism; and the Great War gave this call a ring of urgency. The cultural fatalism of Marxian and Darwinian materialism, the apparent undercutting of reason when the human sciences revealed its rationalizations, and a sense, nevertheless, of a potential for advance in the human soul, if only it could remain human, -- these provoked humanists to vigorously restate the permanent problem of maintaining culture in terms ~~of~~ adequate to "their time."

Humanists agreed that contemporary civilization needed

to improve the place of culture, knowledge, and reason in public life, if the human spirit was to continue its self-liberation. Irving Babbitt, whose pen had already inscribed many words questioning the viability of a "romantic" culture, published Rousseau and Romanticism in 1919, which roundly blamed the romantic temperament for the bleakness of "the present outlook." A year later, Walter Lippmann wrote Liberty and The News which led into his famous study, Public Opinion, in 1922. Here, the capacity of the public to conduct its affairs in the light of knowledge and reason was cast in doubt; and this doubt was reiterated and extended in The Phantom Public (1925) and American Inquisitors (1928). In 1924 Babbitt culminated his work with Democracy and Leadership which raised much the same question: how could reasoned choice be actuated in contemporary democracy. Joseph Wood Krutch published Our Changing Morals in 1925 and in 1929 The Modern Temper, which articulated the dilemma humanists perceived from the destruction of traditional morality by the biological and psychological sciences. John Dewey had been in doubt, as well. Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920) assumed, as did Human Nature and Conduct (1922), many of the questions put by Babbitt, Lippmann, and Krutch. And in The Public and Its Problems (1927) and Individualism Old and New (1929) he added his own questions about the difficulties of political intelligence. During 1929 John Cowper Powys expounded on The Meaning of Culture; and by 1930 the pseudonymous Frank N. Notch could synthesize the doubts about the viability of contemporary civilization into the exasperated condemnation of King Mob.

The same movement of doubt occurred in Europe. Albert Schweitzer analyzed the impediments in the cultural tradition to an ethical view of life in The Philosophy of Civilization, which appeared soon after the war. Max Sheler published On The Eternal in Man in 1921. In it he suggested that a renewed sense of man's eternal worth be the basis of reconstructing European culture. Ortega's The Modern Theme appeared in 1923, and in it he contended certain cultural adjustments were needed to overcome the tendency in contemporary culture to loose touch with the issues of life. In Théonas ou les Entretiens ... Sur Diverses Matières Inégalement Actuelles (1921) and Réflexions sur L'intelligence (1924) Jacques Maritain discussed problems in contemporary civilization. During the twenties Paul Valéry wrote many essays on European life, many of which are collected in Regards sur le Monde Actuel (1931) and Variété, premier volume (1931), and in his Discours de Réception à l'Académie Française in 1927 he analyzed the intimate relation between an independent intelligence, the

artistic tradition, and political freedom. During the same year Julien Brenda exposed La Trahison des Cleres. From 1926 to 1930 Ortega published a steady flow of newspaper articles which he brought together in his acute critique of contemporary standards of character, The Revolt of the Masses. In Time and Western Man (1927) the Englishman Whyndham Lewis attacked the philosophical tendencies which he feared would destroy the kind of intelligence that had traditionally given permanence to its values by embodying them in something spatially real. F.R. Leavis's Mass Society and Minority Culture appeared in 1930, and Culture and Environment followed in 1933. Many of the essays of T.S. Elliot dealt with problems of culture, especially the lectures After Strange Gods: A Primer on Modern Heresy. In 1931 Karl Jaspers published The Intellectual Situation of Our Time (poorly titled Man in the Modern Age in the English translation). There were, as well, studies by the Russian Nicholas Berdyaev, The End of Our Time and The Fate of Man in the Modern World. With a passion that belied the lateness of the hour, 1935, Leonard Woolf showed how the tendencies exposed in the above literature produced the Quack, Quack of Mussolini and Hitler.

Two problems dominated these humanistic critiques of contemporary civilization: on the one hand there were important issues concerning the nature of thought and its relation to action that had to be mastered, if men were to continue conceiving of themselves as responsible, potent beings; and on the other, the intellectual re-establishment of the humane in man had to be actuated in the process of cultural transmission, so that this sense of responsibility and potency would spread among men and improve their performance in the mundane spheres of economics, politics, and social relations. The first of these was the basic question that humanistic educational theory dealt with during the inter-war years. In Part II of this study I shall recount some of the major efforts to arrive at a viable, humanistic

conception of the place of thought in life. Humanists tried to show that, in the light of their conception of thought, men should devote more effort to maintaining culture. The second basic problem, that of actuation, resulted in many efforts by humanists to implement programs to meet the needs and potentials of a humanistic education. Several of these will be surveyed in Part III: specifically, attempts to counteract excessive specialization in the university, which was ceasing to be universal; efforts by critics and creators to use the press, both big and little, and the arts, as means for extending the public and elite comprehension of themselves and their life; and the Bauhaus, which was, perhaps, the one successful attempt at "teacher" education during this period.

Having belabored the outline of the Prologue to make the general argument reasonably explicit, the remainder of the proposal will merely indicate the substance pertinent to each chapter by a brief exposition and bibliographical references.

II: Humanistic Educational Thought: 1914-1939.

Humanism felt threatened by the naturalization of all things human. They responded by humanizing the world of nature. They did this by arguing that the thinking man was the key referent in all thought, even thought about nature. Thus,

they, too, eliminated the distinction between a law for man and a law for thing; but instead of making the law for thing applicable to man, they asserted that all law was man-made: he gave some to nature and others to himself.

Evolution had caught the imagination of men during the late nineteenth century. It created a feeling of implacable power behind nature's stern decrees that some were fit and others would not survive. It was easy to view this law as the inevitable outgrowth of the very nature of life. Theodor Drieser could see it at work in a pet shop window; and it did not appear to him, or anyone, as a creation of genius for the greater glory of the human soul. Relativity was different. It was, as is all good thinking, a brilliant abstraction made by a man who conceived a new system of order in which recalcitrant facts could be explained. In the twentieth century a conception of mind must be anchored in a theory of science. The very weakness of humanism had been its incompatibility with conceptions of science dazzled by evolution. Suddenly the queen of the sciences, physics, offered humanists the opportunity to turn the tables.

3. The Human Laws of Speculative Physics.

Relativity dramatized the importance of theorizing in science. The prior decline of Newtonian mechanics reminded

men that "the laws of nature" were laws men provisionally ascribed to nature. Einstein's relativity equations were not a work of classical induction, for the facts were explained, rather inelegantly, by the theory of ether, properly qualified. Relativity gave a more productive explanation by substituting, as Galileo and Newton had done, a new "ideal of natural order" to use an apt phrase of Stephen Toulmin. The influence of this, and later developments in physical theory, on conceptions of science has not yet been fully established; but clearly, the outlook for humanism improved, ^{and} ~~which~~ the more alert humanists quickly perceived, ^{This improvement.} It is of great importance to understand the transformation in the conception of science that developments in physics made possible. Cassirer, Dewey, and Ortega championed a sophisticated science; and the nature of this science should be our starting point, for Dewey, especially, has been misunderstood because his many references to scientific thinking were to rational theorizing and not to the naive fact gathering still found in the more retrograde of social sciences.

Fortunately, a literature suitable for this chapter has developed. Useful works by historians and philosophers include:

Stephen Toulmin, Foresight and Understanding,
The Philosophy of Science: An Introduction;

J. Bronowski, Science and Human Values,
The Common Sense of Science;

L.S. Stebbing, Philosophy and the Physicists;

F.S.C. Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities;

Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of the Mind;

C. Lanezos, "Albert Einstein and the Role of Theory in Contemporary Physics," American Scientist, 47:41-59, 1959.

*Ernst Cassirer, Substance and Function, and Einstein's Theory of Relativity, Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics;

José Ortega y Gasset, The Modern Theme;

Adolph Grunbaum, Philosophical Problems of Space and Time.

Relevant works by physicists include:

Max Plank, A Survey of Physical Theory, Das Weltbild der neuen Physik, Wege zur physikalischen Erkenntnis;

Albert Einstein, The Meaning of Relativity Mein Weltbild The Evolution of Physics (with Infeld);

Schilpp, ed., Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist;

Werner Heisenberg, Wandlungen in der Grundlagen der Naturwissenschaft, Physics and Philosophy;

Max Born, Experiment and Theory in Physics;

Sir James Jeans, Physics and Philosophy;

Arthur S. Eddington, The Nature of The Physical World, The Philosophy of Physical Science, New Pathways in Science;

Edwin Schroedinger, Science Theory and Man.

Some background reading in Charles S. Peirce, Ernst Mach, and Henri Poincaré will be necessary.

4. The Value of Gestalt:

Biology and psychology also had developments congenial to the humanistic temper. Hans Driesch and Baron von Uëxkull

were the leaders of a vitalistic school of biology which, although by-passed by recent obsession with genetics, showed many interesting instances of how the animal's vital capacities structured its "environment" (the world as it can perceive it). This insight led directly to ethics: man was the only animal with moral action among his capacities, and ignoring the effect of this capacity on the human environment would prevent the scientific attitude. Gestalt psychology also showed how the perceiver structures the world. This is not the place to enter into the meaning of gestalt: it did, however, by putting initiative with the perceiver, make him responsible for properly configuring the world; and this stress led Koffka to define "the arousal and perfection of more and more complicated configurations, in which both the phenomena of consciousness and the functions of the organism go hand in hand," as the goal of child-psychology, and it prompted Köhler to search for "the place of value in a world of facts." The intellectual and normative goals of gestalt psychology helped humanists find the place of man in a world of fact.

The following is a basic bibliography for this chapter, although Koffka and Köhler's selections will be extended somewhat:

- Driesch, Hans. The History and Theory of Vitalism,
The Crisis in Psychology,
Der Mensch und die Welt,
Ethical Principles in Theory and Practice;
- Uexküll, Jakob, Baron von. Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere,
Theoretical Biology;

- Wertheimer, Max. Productive Thinking,
Drei Abhandlungen zur Gestalttheorie;
- Köhler, Wolfgang. The Mentality of Apes,
Gestalt Psychology,
The Place of Value in a World of Facts,
Dynamics in Psychology;
- Koffka, Kurt. The Growth of the Mind,
Principles of Gestalt Psychology;
- Piaget, Jean. Judgment and Reasoning in the Child.

5. Man's Ideas of Phenomena:

Another psychologist concerned with value, Franz Brentano, had established the philosophical basis for twentieth century humanism by developing a school concerned with value theory and out of which "phenomenology" developed. Although Brentano and his school were prior to the period under consideration, they are important for having raised the issue crucial to humanistic thought, what are values? Because value theory went counter to 19th century positivism, its effect was strongest in the twentieth century by virtue of its influence on the phenomenologists Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler. ^{Husserl and Scheler pointed out that} The uncautious scientist tended to perceive things through a haze of value; and, therefore, the inquirer had first to enumerate all the qualities of the thing under examination. This discipline proved so bracing for Husserl that he concluded little himself, although he provided many others with a productive method. One was Max Sheler who applied a phenomenological outlook to ethics and

who developed radically humanistic conceptions of man, ethics, and religion. He related this philosophical anthropology to both the transmission of culture and public affairs.

Sources for this chapter will be:

Franz Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, Wahrheit und Evidenz;

Christian von Ehrenfels, System der Werttheorie;

Alexius von Meinong, Über die Annahmen, Zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Werttheorie;

Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Ideas: A General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, Meditations cartesiennes, Husserliana;

Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, Abhandlungen und Aufsätze, On the Eternal in Man, Universität und Volkshochschule, The Nature of Sympathy, Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre, Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens, Man's Place in Nature, Philosophical Perspectives.

6. Kant, Cassirer, and Symbolization.

Neo-Kantianism was another movement which helped develop a humanistic pedagogy. Centered at the University of Marburg, its early leaders, Hermann Cohen and Paul Natrop, wrote on pedagogy, ethics, and the theory of knowledge. They trained Ernst Cassirer, Heinrich Rickert, Arthur Liebert, and José Ortega y Gasset. Cassirer and Ortega departed from strict

neo-Kantianism to become two of the leading humanists of the time. However, Rickert and Liebert were also significant for this subject, especially the latter with his Philosophy of Teaching and Universal Humanism.

During the inter-war years symbolization became a major topic in philosophy, which, like the medieval controversy over nominalism and realism, had room for many different outlooks. Cassirer conceived of symbols as receptacles for humanly given meanings, which contrasted sharply to the attitude of logical positivists. Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms clarified much that happened in physics, it drew from gestalt theory, value theory, and phenomenology, and it proved capable of useful application to the human affairs of this century. Most important for resecuring the place of humanistic thought, Cassirer broke the dichotomy between the "logical" moderns and the "pre-logical" primitives. One first had to comprehend the realm of discourse in which a man was speaking to judge his logic: the great speakers were those few who created new realms of discourse, Socrates and Plato, Galileo et al., and Einstein.

Bibliography:

Heinrich Rickert, Kant als Philosoph der modern literatur;
Die Logik des Prädikats und das Problem der Ontologie,
Über idealistische Politik als Wissenschaft,
Grundprobleme der philosophischen Methodologie,
Ontologie, Anthropologie;

Arthur Liebert, Geist und Welt der Dialektik,
Erkenntnistheorie,
Philosophie des Unterrichts,
Die Krise des Idealismus,
Der universale Humanismus;

Ernst Cassirer, Das Erkenntnis-problem in der Philosophie
und Wissenschaft der neuen Zeit, 4 vols.
Substance and Function,
Kants Leben und Lehre,
Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, 4 vols.
Language and Myth,
The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau,
The Myth of the State,
An Essay on Man,
Idea: und Gestalt,
The Logic of the Humanities,
The Problem of Knowledge.

7. Kant, Pragmatism, and John Dewey.

One of my purposes in this dissertation is to treat Dewey in the realm of discourse that humanists created: he belonged in it. The basic response of humanists to naturalism was not to defend the distinction between the human and the natural but to humanize all nature. Unfortunately, Dewey did this in language that lacked the deprecating connotations that most humanists gave to "science," "natural," and "method." This led to misunderstanding. While we may agree with Santayana that Dewey had a metaphysics, we should ask whether it was naturalistic. The term "experience" is the key to whether Dewey was a naturalistic or humanistic metaphysician. If we understand "experience" in sensationalist, post-Lockean, positivistic terms, in which the world writes upon our blank states, Dewey will appear as a naturalist. However, if we understand

experience in a post-Kantian sense, in which the experiencer enters actively in the formulation of an experience, Dewey will appear a humanist. This is not the place to settle the question. But it should be noted here that Dewey began as a neo-Kantian, he became a "pragmatist," not a positivist. Both Peirce and James were anti-positivistic and considerably influenced by Kant. (James defended the Kantian a priori at the close of his Principles of Psychology).

If a humanistic interpretation of Dewey proves viable, a radically new reading of his educational theory will be possible. It will show Dewey's educational concern becoming progressively more inclusive, starting with the child and the school, turning to democracy and education, and, after careful studies of politics, science, art, culture, and valuation, ending as the study of "the problems of men and the present state of philosophy." In this interpretation, Dewey's pre-war studies of education will be secondary to his post-war studies of culture and philosophy.

Bibliography:

C.S. Pierce, Chance, Love and Logic,
Values in a World of Chance;

William James, The Principles of Psychology,
Talks to Teachers,
The Will to Believe,
Pragmatism,
Varieties of Religious Experience;

John Dewey, 1880's Articles in The Journal of Speculative
Philosophy,
1900 The School and Society,

- 1902 The Child and the Curriculum,
1908 Ethics, (with Tufts),
1910 The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and
Other Essays,
1910 How We Think,
1916 Essays in Experimental Logic,
1916 Democracy and Education,
1920 Reconstruction in Philosophy,
1922 Human Nature and Conduct,
1925 Experience and Nature,
1927 The Public and Its Problems,
1929 The Quest for Certainty,
1929 Individualism Old and New,
1931 Philosophy and Civilization,
1931 Art as Experience,
1935 Liberalism and Social Action,
1938 Education and Experience,
1938 Logic: the Theory of Valuation,
1939 Theory of Valuation,
1939 Freedom and Culture,
1946 Problems of Men, and
1949 Knowing and the Known (with Bentley).

8. Jacques Maritain and Christian Humanism:

Maritain is important to humanistic educational thought because he arrived at generally the same conclusions as other humanists via neo-Thomism rather than neo-Kantianism. This different grounding raises a problem, for Maritain frequently criticized other humanists because he disagreed with their premises. It may happen that, when I achieve a better acquaintance with his work, I will decide he does not fit into the subject. However, I think his different premises produce the same view of man that other humanists had; and, if this is true, his many sided writing on aspects of culture and their relation to human life will contribute to the synthesis of humanistic pedagogy during the inter-war years.

Bibliography:

- 1914 La Philosophie Bergsonienne,
1920 Art et Scolastique,
1921 "Jean-Jacques Rousseau et la Pensée Moderne,"
1924 Réflexions sur l'Intelligence et sur sa Vie
Propre,
1925 Théonas, ou les Entretiens d'un Sage et de
Deux Philosophes sur Diverses Matières
Inégalement Actuelles,
1927 Primauté du Spirituel,
1930 Religion et Culture,
1932 Distinguer pour Unir, Trois Degrés du Savoir,
1932 Le Songe de Descartes,
1935 Science et Sagesse,
1936 Humanisme Intégral,
1938 Questions de Conscience,
1939 Trois Réformateurs,
1941 Le Crépuscule de la Civilization,
1942 Les Droits de l'Homme et la Loi Naturelle,
1943 Education at the Crossroads,
1941 Ransoming the Time,
1946 Redeeming the Time,
1945 Pour la Justice,
1945 Messages (1941-1944),
1947 Court Traité de l'Existence et l'Existant,
1947 The Person and the Common Good,
1951 Man and the State,
1951 Neuf Leçons sur les Notions Premières de la
Philosophie Moral,
1952 The Range of Reason,
1953 Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry,
1955 An Essay on Christian Philosophy,
1957 On the Philosophy of History,
1958 Reflections on America,
1960 La Philosophie Moral,
1960 The Responsibility of the Artist, and
1961 On the Use of Philosophy.

9. José Ortega y Gasset and the Examined Life:

I have written a chapter length essay trying to show how Ortega's life work was a continuous attempt to make culture a more beneficial force in human life by improving its quality and its dissemination. The emphasis in that essay was on

Ortega's early work, through the mid 1920's, and it will pertain mainly to the Prologue in which attempts to define the *cultural* task ~~for~~ humanistic pedagogy will be considered. In his work from 1923 on, Ortega devoted himself to advancing humanistic conceptions of history, society, and philosophy and to building up the strength of cultural institutions -- the university, the library, the theater, and publishing -- in order to make his humanistic conceptions operative in ~~human~~ life. Thus, this chapter, as will the ones on Dewey and Maritain, will stress the general philosophy of culture he offered, rather than the technical analyses of relativity, gestalt, phenomenology, and symbolic forms. However, it will also be shown that the feasibility of such cultural philosophies depended in large part on the availability of the more technical work to men of intense and inclusive mind.

Bibliography:

Obras Completas, 9 vols.

Books:

- 1914 Meditaciones del Quijote,
1914 Vieja y nueva política,
1916-1934 El Espectador, 8 vols.,
1921 España invertebrada,
1923 El tema de nuestro tiempo,
1924 Las Atlántidas,
1925 La deshumanización del arte e ideas sobre la novela
1930 Misión de la Universidad,
1930 La rebelión de las masas,
1933 En torno a Galileo,
1935 Misión del bibliotecario,
1939 Ensimismamiento y alteración,
1940 Ideas y creencias,
1941 Historia como sistema y Del Imperio Romano,

1942 Teoría de Andalucía y otros ensayos,

Posthumous: (many were written considerably earlier.)

1957 El hombre y la gente,

1958 Que es filosofía?

1958 La idea de principio en Leibniz y la evolución
de la teoría deductiva,

1958 Idea del teatro,

1960 Una interpretación de la historia universal

1960 Meditación de Europa

1960 Origen y epílogo de la filosofía, and

1962 Pasado y porvenir para el hombre actual.

III. Epilogue: Towards Actuation:

This epilogue will deal briefly with attempts to implement humanistic conceptions of education. It will definitely deal with efforts to improve the university: Ortega and Karl Jaspers wrote books on this; and Ortega founded the Instituto de Humanidades after World War II to implement his theory. I know of substantial articles by Max Scheler, Paul Valéry, Julien Benda, and F.R. Leavis on the university. Irving Babbitt began his writing with a concern for the college, and I expect to find more on the issue. A second possibility was the founding of reviews, especially the Nouvelle Revue Française and the Revista de Occidente as forums for a universal interest in culture; and the using of criticism, both in the manner Walter Lippmann proposed in Public Opinion and F.R. Leavis used in Culture and Environment. Lastly, an essay on the Bauhaus and its cultural philosophy might illuminate how it ~~is~~ transformed architecture and design by means of humanistic thinking.

The purpose of the Epilogue, whatever substance goes into

it, will be to show that the highly developed educational theories described in the main part were not thoughts in a void: they made a difference in the way some men acted, and the still should.