(anomie) of men, into conservatives, while Weber, who rejected all such "optimistic" views, is a "radical." Indeed, at the conclusion of this book Gouldner makes Weber into the model of a reflexive (read, "radical") sociologist.

Gouldner, then, in order to reduce the dissonance between his own "need" for radicalism and Weber's conservatizing influence, tries to radicalize Weber. But the conservatizing force of Weber's system is, I think, beyond question and has been generally noted. There is, first, the "understanding" function of sociology. For Weber "sociology is a science concerning itself with the interpretive understanding of social action." When Gouldner comes to describe a radical (reflexive) sociology, it is always "Weberian" in this respect. This may be compared, for example, with Marx's 11th thesis on Feuerbach. Then there is the "ethic of responsibility" which implies a Weberian *sociological* ethic. Gouldner's intemperate attack on the extremism of the New Left as well as his patronizing attitude toward them can both be seen as expressions of the absorption of this ethic. Indeed, Weber's matrixlike manysidedness is, I should think, a hallmark of his "conservatism," for it seems to be a historical social fact that radicals are one-sided extremists.

In this regard, Gouldner's violent attack on sociology and sociologists can be seen as a kind of displaced revenge against the alleged sources of *his* disillusionment, and of the "meaninglessness," as he puts it, of sociology for *him*. At the same time, his "reflexive" sociology of self-awareness looks like an effort to psychoanalyze himself out of this situation and to "resonate" the structure of sentiments of the late sixties. At any rate, the book reads that way to me. Of course, since even the self-analysis is self-defense (or better still, self-aggrandizement), he does not move a step beyond abstract homiletics in his effort for "emancipation." Indeed, the whole discussion of the value-free-self-awareness issue looks like a mechanism to make Gouldner *appear* "radical" while saying nothing, an effort to "make it" with the "new radicalism" where, in his conception of it, self-consciousness seems to be the summum bonum. But the trip from "change the world" to "know thyself," from Karl Marx to the Delphic oracle via Max Weber, is fraught with all kinds of dangers and unintended consequences for would-be radical sociologists—not the least of which have long ago been noted by Gouldner in earlier writings.

Having accepted the cognitive validity of Weber's sociology, and the centrality of Weber's problems, Gouldner has also absorbed other "meanings" and "consequences"—there is no "perhaps" about that—despite all the twistings and turnings aimed at recapturing his "youthful yearnings" through the transmogrification of Max Weber.

The culmination of Gouldner's book, its raison d'être (if we are to take him at his word) is the establishment of his "distinctive" sociology of sociology: *reflexive sociology*—which is a sociology that studies itself in the same way that it studies the external subjects it studies. The plea for this kind of sociology of sociology is repeated ad nauseam throughout the book.

To which one can only say: What else would you expect a sociology of sociology to be, if not "reflexive" in precisely this "distinctive" way?

What is remarkable is that Gouldner seems to think that he has somehow "discovered America" in this conception, and in its corollary that values determined by (socially caused) interests underpin sociological theories, which, in turn, affect values, and so on, and on. He has been preceded, of course, by every social theorist, including Karl Marx, Max Weber and, alas, Talcott Parsons himself.

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The Fall and Rise of Modern Europe

SOVIET POWER AND EUROPE, 1945-1970 *by* Thomas W. Wolfe. *Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970, 532 pages, $15.00 cloth, $3.95 paper*

THE REBIRTH OF EUROPE: A HISTORY OF THE YEARS SINCE THE FALL OF HITLER *by* Walter Laqueur. *New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970, 434 pages, $8.95*

THE RECOVERY OF EUROPE: FROM DEVASTATION TO UNITY *by* Richard Mayne. *New York: Harper and Row, 1970, 375 pages, $8.95*

THE EUROPEAN CHALLENGE *by* Louis Armand and Michel Drancourt, *Patrick Evans, translator. New York: Atheneum, 1970, 256 pages, $5.95*

Reviewed by ROBERT McCLINTOCK

The cover of Thomas W. Wolfe's book displays SOVIET POWER in big, bold type that strains to rise off the paper; "and Europe" is small and flat, a mere diminutive quite overshadowed by the communist mammoth. Whether these graphics reflect political reality is moot; they do reflect Wolfe's assumptions, and such assumptions, widely shared by American policy makers, are one reason why American foreign policy has been increasingly ineffective. As the cold war has waxed and waned, perhaps to wax again, the world distribution of power has changed in ways quite independent of the cold war itself. Once again Europe is becoming the locus of effective world power, the source of creative initiative in international affairs; perhaps when measured against Europe, both American and Soviet power is less significant than the leaders of either habitually believe.

dependent on the Soviet-American balance of power, not because that is the necessary outcome of Soviet policy, but because he does not delve into the possible source of an alternative future, the changes in Europe, the changes that may be making the bipolar view obsolete.

When the U.S.-Soviet confrontation across Europe began, Europe was a real power vacuum. Both Richard Mayne in *The Recovery of Europe* and Walter Laqueur in *The Rebirth of Europe* eloquently recount the plight. At war's end the euphoria of peace gave way to anxious concern as Europeans faced up to a bleak future. Rationing became even more stringent; exhausted, hungry, disoriented, doubtful peoples had great difficulty commencing the immense tasks of reconstruction and reorganization. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were the largest and most resilient powers. They soon locked together across a prostrate Europe in a continuing confrontaiton, and each underwrote recovery in the parts of the Continent they dominated. In western Europe the recovery has been superlative and in eastern Europe it has been significant. No longer merely a field for the Russian-American joust, Europe teems with some 500 million people, numerous long and complicated traditions, dynamic and powerful economies, advanced and rapidly changing mores.

Europe is no longer a power vacuum, but the kind of power that Europe is becoming is still an enigma. And because the character of Europe's present power is not well understood, it is still often treated as if it were a power vacuum. The national power of any particular European state is still insignificant in relation to either of the superpowers, and the supranational institutions of Europe are too manifold and immature to serve as the basis for a calculation of the Europeans' common power. Thus, Russian and American policy-makers can continue to pursue a bipolar balance and ro treat Europe as a passive site for a great ideological confrontation. Yet an underlying change in political reality may be making the cold war conception of world politics obsolete, for despite appearances Europe is no longer a passive participant in events; it is an independent locus of significant power, and historic initiative may be subtly shifting away from both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. back into continental Europe.

Both Riehard Mayne and Walter Laqueur are concerned with these changes; both are convineed that the European era has not ended. But unfortunately for those seeking to understand Europe's renascent power, the two books do not, despite the similarity of their titles, reinforce one another and give a clear conception of European development.

Of the two, Walter Laqueur's *Rebirth of Europe* is the more comprehensive and less satisfactory. Laqueur sets out to give an account of more than Europe's common features; he aims to depict the whole panorama of European life, its particularities as well as its commonalities, its small nations as well as the large, the cultural as well as the political and economic. The attempt is admirable, its execution is not.

To write a comprehensive narrative of Europe's rebirth, one cannot simply gather data on all sides of life in all parts of Europe and write it up in passable prose; a complicated, comprehensive narrative réquires careful attention to the plot, which Laqueur does not give. The book is organized as one might organize a clipping file: the four parts cover the postwar period, economic and social trends, the cultural scene and European politics, 1955-1969; each part is divided into numerous sections, few of which provide any transition into that which follows. No sustained themes, no centers of dramatic interest, no personalities, no countries, no common concerns dominate the narrative. Instead, the facts accumulate into a comprehensive yet obscure sketch.

Laqueur's effort to touch on everything, to include the whole picture, might have been carried off if he had donc what Count Hermann Keyserling did in the 1920s in preparing *Europe*, that is, go everywhere and meet everyone. Comprehensive reports about large and rccent subjects, in which interpretation is held to a minimum, risk boring readers because so much of the information that must be included will already be common knowledge to many. Thus, something like Keyserling's immediacy, his direct involvement, his first-hand knowledge is needed to give life to Laqueur's comprehensive reportage, especially since the report has not been given a unique and interesting form by any pervading themes.

Richard Mayne covers much the same ground as does Laqueur, but *The Recovery of Europe* has the virtue of a direct involvement with men and events and a definite interpretative purpose. Although convalescence is rarely as interesting as genesis, *The Recovery of Europe* is much more fascinating than its *Rebirth*. Mayne has a hero, Jean Monnet, and he tells a dramatic and important story of how supranational institutions developed in the course of recovery in western Europe. Whereas Laqueur was content to report what happened, Mayne has tried to explain how men made it happen.

Interpretative history that deals with unfinished developments perforce becomes fuzzy as the account approaches the uncertain future. This is a problem in Mayne's account. He depicts the developments in western Europe from the late stages of World War II up through the early stages of the Common Market with full detail and sure judgement. Thereafter the pace of the account becomes rushed, the interpretation hopeful but uncertain. This problem, however, is inherent in the uncertainties of unfinished events. It is still unclear whether de Gaulle's vetoes of British entry into the market were definitive or merely temporary setbacks.

In an effort to understand the nature of Europe's present power, however, Mayne's *Recovery of Europe* is not as helpful as one would like. Too much weight is put on the Common Market and its future development. Here one must agree with Laqueur that Europe is mueh more than the six or even the hoped-for ten. This is not to say that the Common Market is not one of the importanr features of the New Europe; indeed, it is central, but not sufficient. In particular, undue stress on the EEC and its nascent supranational political institutions encourages the tendency to consider Europe's power to be that of an incipient superstate on the Russian and American model. But European power might be of a quite different kind, a kind less dependent on unitarian institutions and more inclusive of all Europe. This, at any rate, is the

implication that one infers from a curious book by Louis Armand and Michel Drancourt, *The European Challenge.*

On first reading, one's reaction is *"sans blague!"* - "Is this for real?" The book is a translation, a rather hasty one, of *Le Pari européen,* a response to Servan-Schreiber's *Le Défi américain* The authors are mature, distinguished men: Louis Armand is a leading French technologist and European civil servant and Michel Drancourt is a publicist particularly concerned with European economics and industry. Yet the authors engender disbelief with their gee whiz enthusiasm for technology, their exaggeration of American economic power, and their simplicity in spinning great schemes for the future. Yet *The European Challenge* makes a most important point almost inadvertently.

Armand and Drancourt are European federalists, setting forth a basis for a European future. Yet Americans, who have recently witnessed a very explicit effort by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions to redraft the American Constitution, may well find Armand and Drancourt to be advancing seemingly chaotic proposals. They do not design a single set of institutions that will perform definite functions in a particular area. To them, European federalism is not so neat; it comprises numerous supranational groupings—for purposes political, social, cultural and economic—which are springing up in great profusion across and beyond Europe. A complicated web of overlapping links and bonds has already developed and its continued growth is much more dependable than is the possibility that one set of bonds will mature into a unified superstate. In this Europe, Armand and Drancourt see a mission and an effective mode of action.

Both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. are bound, in their view, by the limits inherent in the organization of power by means of the state with its permanent bureaucracies ensconced in a single center. Such rigid structures are no longer suited to dealing with the extremely fluid problems characteristic of the time. Armand and Drancourt perceive that the Europeans have been pioneering a fundamentally new mode of civic action that will not intensify the nation-state into a superstate; on the contrary, this new mode of action may well make it wither in obsolescence. Traditionally, with the nation-state, the governing structure has been considered as established and permanent; although its organs might develop and adapt, its responsibilities and authority were at all times full and fixed. Problems were, so to speak, brought to this given governing structure to be solved as best it could.

Since World War II, the Europeans have been pioneering a quite different mode of action. The sovereign authority of the given nation-states has been called in question. When convenient, problems are still brought to these structures. But it has become clear that frequently the existing structures are not at all commensurate with the real problems. In such cases the Europeans have been showing a significant willingness to initiate ad hoc, temporary systems to deal with these problems. In this system, there will not develop a single center, a locus of sovereignty defined by bureaucratic bulwarks. And if such a departure is in fact the genius of the European challenge, it would be unwise for students of world politics to perceive a power vacuum simply because their standards for measuring national power no longer apply to the area in question.

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Warming Up for 1972

THE EMERGING REPUBLICAN MAJORITY *by* Kevin P. Phillips. *New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1969, 482 pages, $7.95*
THE REAL MAJORITY *by* Richard M. Scammon *and* Ben J. Wattenberg. *New York: Coward McCann, 1970, 347 pages, $7.95*

Reviewed by ROBERT LEHNE

Every election provides an occasion to examine the contours of American electoral opinions in the past and to isolate the currents of change that will alter those opinions in the future. And this opportunity is compounded when the turn of the decade and a new census coincide with the tenure of a president struggling mightily to rearrange the traditional political alignments of millions of American voters. Such efforts have recently stimulated two widely received analyses of the American electorate: Kevin P. Phillips' *The Emerging Republican Majority* and *The Real Majority* by Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg. Both books focus on the 1968 presidential elections and try to plumb the real depths of opinion held by the American voter. Almost identical in style, format and method, both have been eagerly reviewed in the White House and immediately translated into the political rhetoric of TV commercials and soapbox platitudes. Both volumes purport to reveal the true motivations and deep-set feelings of contemporary Americans, thereby predicting the shape of our political future. And yet both books come to almost diametrically conflicting conclusions.

From his examination of decades of voting returns, Kevin Phillips foresees *The Emerging Republican Majority* as the course of the future. People are moving out of the Democratic central cities and the Northeast (labeled the "provocateur of resentment") toward the Sun Belt states of Florida, Texas, Arizona and California and toward suburbia. This suburban movement is not composed of the fashionable "tweedy foundation executives, research directors, publishers and educators," but rather it is dominated by the low-middle-income subdivisions