H

Habermas, Jürgen

See Critical Theory

Habits

The notion of habit has had its ups and downs in the social sciences over the past 150 years. Its use as a key concept dates as far back as Aristotle, who connected it with education. In this entry, a definition of habit is offered, and its cultural mode of acquisition or inheritance is explained and contrasted with biologically inherited instincts. It is proposed that all reason depends on habit; and furthermore, it is a key component of some prominent definitions of culture. The concept is also important from an evolutionary perspective, for overcoming mind–body dualism and dealing with the agency–structure problem in social theory. Thus, the concept has great importance for social science and educational research.

The Concept of Habit

In *The Politics*, Aristotle wrote, "But in fact men are good and virtuous because of three things. These are nature, habit or training, reason." He continued, "education by habit-forming must precede education by reasoned instruction" (Book VII, chap. 13). Aristotle also noted pertinently in his *Metaphysics* that the word *habit* had two meanings: '"Habit' means a kind of activity" but in "another sense . . . 'habit' means a disposition" (Book V, chap. 20).

Confusion between the two meanings (behavior or disposition) persists today. Here, habit is defined as a culturally inherited disposition to engage in previously adopted or acquired behavior (including patterns of thought) that is triggered by an appropriate stimulus. It is "a more or less self-actuating disposition or tendency to engage in a previously adopted or acquired form of action" (Camic, 1986, p. 1044).

Habits are formed through repetition of action or thought. They are influenced by prior activity and have durable, self-sustaining qualities. Habits are the basis of both reflective and nonreflective behavior. They are economizers of scarce mental resources. If we had to deliberate fully on everything, then our reasoning would be paralyzed by the weight of data. Habits overcome this problem.

The concept of habit as a disposition was developed by a linked group of American pragmatist thinkers in philosophy, psychology, and economics. Among them, William James (1893) proclaimed, "Habit is thus the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative agent" (p. 143). The institutional economist Thorstein Veblen (1898) wrote of "a coherent structure of propensities and habits which seeks realization and expression in an unfolding activity" (p. 390). As John Dewey (1922) put it, "The essence of habit is an acquired predisposition to *ways* or modes of response" (p. 42). A similar interpretation of habit as a disposition is found in the work of contemporary psychologists (Wood & Neal, 2007; Wood, Quinn, & Kashy, 2002).

Instinct, Habit, and Reason

By contrast, instincts are biologically inherited reflexes, feelings, or dispositions that can be triggered by specific cues. But (like habits) expressions of instincts can often be suppressed or diverted. There is clear evidence for some human instincts, such as reflexes in babies to clutch and suckle. It is beside the point to argue that acquired habit or socialization is much more important than instinct. But the importance of socialization does not deny the necessary role of instinct. Instincts are necessary for socialization to begin its work.

Brain imaging studies on human subjects show that the formation of habits involves a shift away from parts of the brain associated with conscious, declarative memory and goal setting (the medial temporal lobe and prefrontal cortex) toward areas associated with procedural memory and context-triggered responses (the basal ganglia).

Habits are vital to all thought and behavior. Rational deliberation relies on habits. In turn, instinct is prior to habit, habit is prior to belief, and belief is prior to reason. That is the order in which they have evolved in our human ancestry over millions of years. That too is the order in which they appear in the ontogenetic development of each human individual. That too is the order in which they are arranged in a hierarchy of functional dependence, where the operation of reason depends on belief, belief depends on habit, and habit depends on instinct. The lower elements are necessary but not sufficient for the higher.

As Charles Darwin noted, human rational capacities are built on subconscious mechanisms inherited from our prehuman ancestors. We retain instincts and unconscious mental processes that can function apart from our conscious reasoning. As some animal species developed more complex instincts, they eventually acquired the capacity to register reinforced behaviors through the evolution of mechanisms of habituation. In turn, on these mechanisms, humans built culture and language. Our layered mind, with its unconscious lower strata, maps our long evolution from less deliberative organisms. But when the human species evolved its capacity to reason, its dependence on instinct and habit did not decline.

Evolutionary Versus Mind-First Explanations

Much social science takes it for granted, or as true by definition, that "action" is motivated exclusively by reasons based on beliefs. This proposition is undermined by modern psychology as well as the evolutionary outlook offered by Darwinism. As noted by Benjamin Libet, experiments since the 1970s show that conscious sensations are reported about half a second after neural events, and unconscious brain processes are discernible before any conscious decision to act. This evidence suggests that our dispositions are triggered before our actions are rationalized: We contrive reasons for actions already under way. This apparently undermines explanations of human action wholly in the terms of reasons and beliefs.

But the folk psychology (Stich, 1983) that beliefs are the source of intentions, choices, and actions still dominates social science. These "mind-first" explanations of human behavior are unable to explain adequately phenomena such as sleep, memory, learning, mental illness, or the effects of chemicals or drugs on our perceptions or actions. Mind-first conceptions erect an unsustainable dualism or discontinuity between the mental and physical worlds, which is inconsistent with the fact of human evolution. Humans do act for reasons. But reasons and beliefs themselves are caused and have to be explained.

The habit-based perspective implies neither stasis nor lack of choice. As Dewey (1922) explained clearly, because of our engagement with diverse and changing contexts, we develop different habits of thought and action that sometimes come into conflict with one another. Such conflicts are opportunities for choice and change. Habit does not deny choice. On the contrary, the conflicting rigidities of different habits make choice inevitable.

Pragmatist and habit-based approaches overcome the Cartesian dualism of body and mind, which still pervades the social sciences. Intellect is not regarded as an independent and ungrounded causal power but as an emergent and active property of already-engaged dispositions and unfolding actions. The reality and importance of human intentionality and creativity is reconciled with the Darwinian evolutionary legacy and a philosophy of emergentist materialism (Bunge, 1980).

Conclusion

Once habit is seen as the foundation of preferences or beliefs, we can develop an enriched understanding of the interaction between individuals and institutions. Emergent institutions guide individual behavior. Individuals develop and reinforce habits consistent

with that behavior on which revised beliefs and preferences transpire. These revised beliefs or preferences lead to further actions and form more habits, which may affect institutions, and so on. This gives us two-way mechanisms of reconstitutive interaction from individuals to institutions and back to individuals.

The implications for social theory are profound, including a transcendence of the old debate between "bottom up" (methodological individualist) and "top down" (methodological collectivist) modes of explanation. In a full-fledged evolutionary view, causal influences have to be acknowledged in both directions. From an adequate evolutionary perspective, we have to understand how individuals are affected by social structures, as well as how structures are constituted by individuals. Habit is a crucial mechanism in both cases.

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See also Dewey, John; Evolution and Educational Psychology; James, William

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Happiness

What is happiness and why does it matter? What is the relationship between happiness and education? Should happiness be seen as a key educational aim, as some philosophers, teachers, and policymakers suggest? These questions are at the fore not only of much of philosophy and educational policy and practice but also of psychology, economics, sociology, neuroscience, and other domains. To resolve them may seem like an impossible task. "There is hardly a muddier concept [happiness] in the over 2000-year history of philosophy," says Kristjansson (2010, p. 300); Bruckner describes happiness as "an enigma, a permanent source of debates, a fluid that can take every form but which no form exhausts" (2010, p. 3). Watery metaphors abound, but progress can be made by reflecting on what happiness means to us as human beings and by clarifying basic concepts. This entry discusses various concepts of happiness, including the utilitarian concept of pleasure, the Aristotelian concept of flourishing or a good life, and the contemporary eudaimonic approaches. It then considers how a theory of happiness shapes our understanding of the goals and aims of education.

Two Concepts of Happiness

It is useful to start with the "original" concept. Children learn that happiness is an enjoyable experience that they want to prolong. It is contrasted with unhappiness, an experience they want to avoid, and subjective reports on both are normally taken seriously. If a child is lucky, her happiness is treated as a reason for action, though regrettably not (in all probability) an overriding one. In short, the original concept of happiness is hedonistic, polarized, subjective, and motivational. This concept underpins Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism (1789), which sees happiness as pleasure, unhappiness as pain, and claims that these govern us in all we "do, say and think."

The original concept, often expressed as *feeling happy*, differs from the sense in which we say someone *is a happy person* or has *led a happy life*. The latter was important to ancient philosophers,

and Seneca (1932) expressed the problem well: "To live happily . . . is the desire of all people, but their minds are blinded to a clear vision of just what it is that makes a life happy" (p. 99). Happiness in this sense is something about which we learn by reflecting on our lives, our errors, and the limitations of the original concept. It is linked to Plato's idea of the examined life, and many philosophers (and more recently, positive psychologists) turn to Aristotle for guidance about its meaning.

The Aims of Education

According to Aristotle, eudaimonia (translated as happiness, well-being, flourishing, and a good life) is the ultimate end toward which we aim in whatever we do. In current idiom, it is a *thin specification* of this end, for its meaning is disputed. We generally agree that it is the most important thing in life; the philosophical task is to specify its meaning without, as Aristotle said, seeking more precision than "the subject matter admits of."

Aristotle is an objectivist; he never questions the scope for error in our thoughts about happiness. To thicken its specification is a task requiring reflective discipline, and Aristotle believed that "many" (the uneducated, the wicked, and the young) mistakenly characterize it as pleasure, honor, or wealth. The "wise" by contrast concur in the view that happiness means living and faring well. Living well means developing our distinctively human capacity for reason in moral and intellectual spheres; we cannot be happy without being virtuous or good. Thus, it would be wrong to infer (moving from the subjective to the objective perspective) that someone who gets away with her misdeeds and *feels* happy much of the time is a happy person.

There are no happy tyrants, on this view. Many people, preferring a subjective approach, would disagree, and here is a rich area of philosophical debate to which literature as well as argument may contribute much (Cigman, 2014). Most people nowadays also reject Aristotle's suggestion that happiness belongs within the framework of a complete life "or even beyond." Aristotle quotes Solon's "Call no man happy until he is dead" approvingly and adds (remarkably) that if misfortune befalls one's descendants after one's death, this will detract from the goodness of one's life as a whole. We may resist this thought, but the idea of embedding happiness in years or even decades, rather than moments or other brief periods, makes a certain sense.

We generally agree with Aristotle that a prerequisite of happiness is faring well. He sounds a note of realism (absent from the views of Plato and the Stoics) when he insists that the enjoyment of certain goods—reasonable health, modest wealth, and an adequate moral and general education—is important. Aristotle also resonates with modern intuitions by finding a role for happy *feelings* in the good life. The virtuous person, he says, takes pleasure in doing the right thing; although it is hard to be good, it is satisfying. This reinforces the idea (appealing to educators) that living virtuously is an aspect of living well.

This much seems clear: If happiness is to be an aim of education, we need a conception that is enriched by reflection and embedded in extended periods of time, if not an entire life. We want more for children than happy feelings and happy moments. Progressive educators such as A. S. Neill may have relied too heavily on the original concept, taking their cue from experiences that children enjoy and want to prolong and seeing these (too "precisely," in Aristotle's terms) as educationally motivational. Some philosophers of education have challenged these ideas; R. F. Dearden (1972/2010) argued that the "springs of action may be more complicated than a happiness-doctrine suspects" and "even anxiety can be facilitatory" (p. 82). Many teachers and parents would agree on this.

Scientific Approaches to Happiness

By identifying happy feelings as our governors in all we "do, say and think," and by introducing the idea of a "felicific calculus" that measures their intensity, duration, and other properties, Bentham provided a foundation for a psychology of happiness that many deem suitable for a scientific age (see Layard, 2005). The psychologist Daniel Kahneman's hedonic approach computes happiness in the Benthamite manner from a "dense record" of self-reported pleasurable and unpleasurable states. Positive psychology refines this, adding "life satisfaction" assessments and producing a composite conception of happiness (positive affect and life satisfaction) as subjective well-being. More recently, it has added a eudaimonic dimension, reflected in the title of Martin Seligman's 2011 book *Flourish*. Flourishing is Aristotle's objectivist concept, referring to the fulfillment of natural capacities. Human flourishing, unlike that of a tree or dog, involves virtue, and positive psychologists claim that they can measure this. *Can* virtue be measured? It is a

controversial question on which many philosophers have expressed doubts.

Subjective and objective approaches to happiness have been amply criticized. Few nowadays see happiness as synonymous with pleasure, for a life that ranks highly on a hedonic scale may be utterly pointless. Robert Nozick's "experience machine" thought experiment highlights the undesirability of a condition in which neurological stimulation (the notorious "brain in a vat") might create the *illusion* of a flourishing life. Few would be tempted by the prospect of limitless pleasure if the distinction between reality and illusion were entirely lost. Life satisfaction seems closer to what we mean when we call people happy, until we reflect that some are satisfied with limited or impoverished lives because they are ignorant, self-effacing, or oppressed. Eudaimonic accounts appear to resolve these difficulties, but many regard the idea of *contesting* a person's subjective sense of happiness, on the authority of science or philosophy, as unacceptably paternalistic.

Eudaimonic accounts have, at least, this to recommend them: They recognize that not all kinds of happiness are equally worth having. Criticizing Bentham, J. S. Mill insisted on this point when he argued that some pleasures are "higher" than others. It is better to be Socrates dissatisfied, he said, than a pig satisfied, as any competent judge who knows both will attest. This complicates the quantitative model, for "higher value" is hard, if not impossible, to compute.

Mill's competent judges are problematic. Any attempt to identify them would be infinitely regressive, and the elitist implications are offensive. This is, however, a pivotal moment for contemporary philosophizing about happiness. Like Aristotle, Mill understood that happy and unhappy feelings are not simply experienced; they are also evaluated, reflected on, and "learned about." Sometimes, as Friedrich Nietzsche emphasized, it is good to feel unhappy, and Peter Roberts (2012, p. 209) argues in this vein that suffering has "profound value for our development as human beings" and that education "should make us uncomfortable." If there are "higher pleasures," there are presumably "higher pains," and education could be a rich site for both.

Implications for Educational Theory and Practice

Education is an ethical practice, needing what Avishai Margalit (2002) calls a "literary picture": "We are the authors of our lives, and we had better make sure that they add up to something meaningful" (p. 134). It is arguable that recent educational policy has neglected this picture. The enhancement agenda (social and emotional learning, happiness lessons) tends to polarize positive and negative feelings, promoting the former and trying to inhibit the latter (Cigman, 2009). It asks "how children are" and returns gloomy statistical answers, aiming to reverse these through national interventions (Department for Education and Skills, 2005; Seligman, Randall, Gilham, Reivich, & Linkins, 2009). It is strongly influenced in the United Kingdom by Richard Layard's Benthamite philosophy; happiness ("feeling good"), says Layard, *can* and *should* be learned early in life. Pascal Bruckner (2010) describes this as a perversion of the Enlightenment's "beautiful idea: that everyone has the right to control his own destiny and to improve his own life" (p. 5). Is he right? Is there now a *duty* to be happy, intrusively pursued through education? Many believe this to be the case, and the need to reflect on such questions could not be clearer. Instead of drowning in watery metaphors, this entry aims to provide a rudimentary map.

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See also Aristotle; Mill, John Stuart; Neill, A. S., and Summerhill; Positive Psychology and Education

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Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich

Few thinkers in the history of Western philosophy are as important or as contested as G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831). Slavoj Žižek has argued that there is a unique philosophical moment in the West in which philosophy first appears in-and-for-itself, or in which it rises to its own self-consciousness. This is delineated by Immanuel Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (1968) and Hegel's death (1831); philosophy before and after this, he says, is only preparation and interpretation, respectively. Hegel taught both in schools and in universities while writing his two great works, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Science of Logic*; many of his other books consist of lectures given at the University of Berlin between 1818 and 1831. The range of Hegel's work—across aesthetics, law, religion, the state, logic, epistemology, and metaphysics—and the abstract, difficult, and sometimes apparently paradoxical nature of his prose make conducting a short survey precarious.

Since his death, at least two schools of interpretation have sprung forth: *Right-wing Hegelianism* has followed through with Hegel's claim to have realized the absolute, or absolute truth, in the form of a broadly Christian philosophy; while *left-wing Hegelianism*, to which the young Karl Marx subscribed, absorbed Hegel's dialectical critique of modern civil or bourgeois society. Two French thinkers in particular, Alexandre Kojève and Jean Hyppolite, reintroduced the *Phenomenology* into the existential climate of France in the 1930s and beyond. Foucault, Deleuze, and Derrida, among others who were to be influential in the closing decades of the 20th century, were taught by Hyppolite.

Hegel and the End-of-History Thesis

One topic within educational theorizing above all others implicates Hegel as a theorist of a largely discredited notion of modernity. The now infamous "end of history" thesis, as discussed most recently by Francis Fukuyama, argues that Western liberal democracies are the endpoint to which history has always been leading. Fukuyama states that Kojève in particular claimed somewhat intransigently that history has ended, or is coming to an end, and that observing it is now clear that the future belongs not to the exploitative master in the world but to the working slave. Both Kojève and Fukuyama lean heavily on Hegel's idea of mutual recognition (from the *Phenomenology*), where all persons recognize themselves as identifying each other (such mutual recognition is seen by some to offer a model for the homogenization of human freedom across the world). Kojève also highlighted the seemingly counterintuitive claim, found in Hegel's analysis of the master–slave relationship in the *Phenomenology*, that the master is really the slave because of his dependence on the slave, and the slave is somehow a master because he is true to himself; the implication is that the slave is potentially freer than the master. In a world where masters and slaves remain, Hegel's study is still relevant, offering a powerful philosophical template for the critique of one-sided authority and power wherever it appears (including that between teacher and student).

The association of Hegel with the end-of-history thesis has encouraged many theorists in education and elsewhere to see Hegel as the archetypal modern, Western, White, male, rationalist representative of the imperialist view that "West is best." There is ample evidence in Hegel to support them, ranging from his work on the modern state, to his description of women as plants, and of Negroes as a race of children immersed in a state of uninterested naiveté. But as Hegel realized, those who condemn as an imperialist master any thinker who assumes a position of authority over those deemed less enlightened are repeating precisely that which is being condemned. It is also the case that Hegel understood his own complicity within the dominant social relations of 19th-century Europe, and he explicitly described not only how his own work carried the shape of those relations but also how his work would be interpreted as if it had overcome such complicity—which it had not.

The Dialectics and the *Aufhebung*

It is well known that at the heart of Hegel's philosophical system lies a triune model of human experience or consciousness. Ordinary consciousness accepts a taken-for-granted reality; dialectical consciousness questions and negates that reality; and

philosophical consciousness comprehends the whole of this experience. Few educators would want to oppose a critical consciousness. The controversy in Hegel then is the relationship between critical dialectical consciousness and philosophical consciousness. If dialectics negates our taken-for-granted view of the world, it can be destructive, even violent, for it pulls the rug out from under our feet. It robs us of the certainties which held our world together without seemingly putting anything back in their place. We are left looking down at a gaping abyss where the certainties of life have disappeared.

The key controversy in Hegel begins at this point. How, if at all, does he protect us from this abyss? Right-wing Hegelians call on the religious absolute, and left-wing Hegelians on the value of the critical consciousness in itself. But both camps need to engage with the Hegelian concept that addresses the abyss and which holds all of Hegel's philosophy together, namely, the *Aufhebung*. Seeking help in a dictionary here is not fruitful. The dictionary will tell us that the verb *aufheben* means to abolish, to raise up, and to preserve, while *Aufhebung* describes this process. But abolishing, raising up, and preserving seem to contradict one another. Understanding what Hegel makes of this contradiction is the most important step in appreciating his whole philosophy.

One can approach this issue in many ways, but here are two. First, when we learn something, it is said that we leave behind previous thinking and move on to new thoughts. The new thinking overcomes the old, and the new provisional truth overcomes the old defunct error. This assumption of overcoming error is carried in the idea of *enlightenment*. But overcoming error suggests that it does not also preserve error, and preservation is part of what the *Aufhebung* demands. It is in *philosophical experience as learning* that the *Aufhebung* carries all three meanings of abolish, raise up, and preserve. This is because learning about philosophical experience as an experience of philosophical learning has a unique significance. When learning learns about itself—something Aristotle ruled out in the *Metaphysics*—it overcomes itself and preserves itself. Learning changes and remains itself in doing so. Understood in this way, the *Aufhebung* is fundamentally an educational concept, and it announces Hegel's philosophy as a distinctive, seminal modern philosophy of education.

Second, one might agree that the *Aufhebung* is a continuing experience of learning but still question how Hegel would describe *Aufhebung* as in any sense *absolute*. What we have to realize is that Hegel is trying to reeducate us about how we should understand the very idea of truth. Following Socrates's lead more than 2,000 years earlier, Hegel holds that contradiction—for example, that between abolishing and preserving—far from being a sign of error, is really a sign of truth. This is where analytical philosophy and Continental philosophy part company. Analytical philosophy regards contradiction as indicating error, whereas Hegel finds contradiction to be truthful when it reflects the difficult relationship that thoughts have to their objects. This is what makes Hegel so difficult to read, because his logic is deliberately contradictory; but at the same time, it is absolutely rigorously contradictory—contradiction is the rational and spiritual basis of his whole science of logic.

To put this in another way, for Hegel, thought cannot understand the concept of truth without thought getting in the way, or in Hegelian language, thought inescapably *mediates* everything it thinks, including truth. Here, reason threatens to slide down the slope of infinite regress, unable to resist mediation ad infinitum; this leaves us with something similar to what Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno called the *dialectic of enlightenment*. So the crucial question here is this: Does mediation mean that thought prevents us from ever knowing the truth, or does it make it possible? More philosophically, is there truth in itself, or is truth in itself always unavoidably just truth for us who think about it? More colloquially, is truth objective or subjective?

Hegel's answer to this question is as simple as it is powerful and can be illustrated with the following example. Allan Bloom said in 1987 that the one thing every university tutor could be sure of was that most students will believe that truth is relative and not absolute. Absolutism is a dogma with colonialist, imperialist, gendered, racist, and much other cultural baggage. One should not force one's truth down someone else's throat. Indeed, Hegel says as much in the shorter *Logic* (§23), stating that no one can think for another person any more than one can eat or drink for another. Hegel's response to this challenge of absolutism is direct. How does a student know so much about what truth is, to be able to know so definitively what it is not? To say that mediation is *not* true involves the prejudgment that one knows what truth is. So does this leave one with or without truth? Here, Hegel asks only for integrity in the face of the dilemma. If negation (or mediation) is ubiquitous and unavoidable, if it is universal,

then perhaps this makes a better claim for truth than any of one's presuppositions about what truth is or is not. The upshot is that for Hegel, universality lies in the thinking, or mediation, of truth.

But even if this is so, what difference does this really make to life as we live it? Is such thinking not exactly the kind of scholastic rarefied knowledge that the humanists so lamented in the Renaissance? How can one bring such philosophy down to earth? For Hegel, the problem is the opposite. In the *Phenomenology* (§8), he suggests that there was a time when the gaze of the Western individual needed to be brought down to earth, but presently, the need is the opposite: to raise our impoverished spirit back to something more than the worldly things that demand our attention. Few Western philosophers have put the truth of such a difficult education so firmly at the center of their whole philosophy as Hegel has done.

Influence on Education Theory

How is Hegel currently shaping educational debates? Much recent educational theory is "post-foundational." This means that it holds to a pluralism of values and truths above any dogmatic claims for grand narratives or overarching ideas that are timeless and universal. This perspective tends to see Hegel as representing totality and absolutism over openness and relativity. A notable exception is the reading given by Žižek, which finds Hegel never closing down or resolving thinking in anything that could be final. Indeed, Žižek's Hegel holds that even the self is never transparent to itself and always evades capture by the understanding. For Žižek (and for the author of this entry), the postfoundational readings that see totalitarianism in Hegel fail to take account of the contingency—the lack of ground—that Hegel understands he is condemned to work with by the times in which he lived and in particular by dominant social relations. It is the case that in Hegel, the absolute is always trying to reeducate us philosophically about the subjective nature of absolute truth and the absolute nature of subjective truth, a contradiction which Hegel and the absolute refuse to abandon.

Educational theory that is broadly Marxist, including the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, has largely ignored the significance of the Hegelian absolute for fear of being associated with the right-wing Hegelianism of absolute spirit. At best, they are content to decapitate the absolute or the *Aufhebung* from the dialectic, and while this leaves a very powerful tool for social and political critique, from Hegel's point of view, it treats as optional the significance that dialectical thinking has for itself.

In addition, Hegel's philosophy gets mentioned in relation to the educational theory of *Bildung*, but often only one sidedly. It is true that Hegel saw *Bildung* as an education for learning the value of service to the objective spirit of the state. But the key here again is what is meant by learning. *Bildung* in Hegel is the representation of philosophical learning as a "culture." Culture in Hegel is the sphere of everyday life where we live out the many different ways in which we are exposed to the contradictions of the *Aufhebung*; for example, where openness opposes absolutism, where the subjective opposes the objective, or where man contradicts God. Everything that involves a human being trying to represent himself or herself within or without truth is a culture; and it is a culture, in Hegel's sense, precisely because this is the site of the contestation between truth and nontruth. Hegel's notion of culture offers educational thinkers and practitioners a concept of their own work, their own struggles, difficulties, and contradictions, as the lived truth of their own learning.

What of the future for Hegelian philosophy and educational theory and practice? Žižek has argued that Hegel, as the philosopher of modernity, remains the most relevant thinker in responding to the troubled times afflicting modern Western-style capitalism on a global scale. But seeking a return to Hegel here is ambiguous because in effect modernity has never left Hegel. His philosophy remains the template for trying to grapple with its contradictions. The many still-influential standpoints of postfoundationalism show signs of their own exhaustion; in feminism and in postcolonial studies, the dialectic of enlightenment is emerging in which the champions of the oppressed are gloomily forced to account for the mastery of their own standpoint. Here is the culture of the post-men and post-women; a culture that is already Hegelian. There is no telling how this dialectic of enlightenment will be comprehended within the cultures of cultural studies, but Hegel stands ready to help in comprehending these unavoidable aporias (puzzles that lead to incompatible or conflicting resolutions) as philosophical experiences of human learning. If such truthful learning is comprehended as an end in and for itself, so be it. If not, culture will continue to eschew its own educational significance.

Hegel will also continue to haunt discussions about God and freedom. Just as God returned to Zarathustra in Book IV of Nietzsche's tale, so God returns to modernity in the broken freedoms of Western society. One of Hegel's most challenging thoughts is that the idea of God and the idea of freedom share the same origin in social relations. Religion in Hegel is the way people represent to themselves their lack of freedom. So the Christian God is the representation of one's subjectivity in relation to the universal, reflecting the lack of unity between them and the obstacles to any mending of this brokenness.

Finally, there remains the thorny issue in Hegel of world spirit. Since the Stoics in antiquity, the idea of cosmopolitanism has held the imagination of many thinkers—of a world which is united, embracing fundamental human principles of justice and peace. But such a vision has itself been criticized as a form of imperialism, in that cosmopolitanism is really only Western ideals pushed across the globe. Hegel's notion of world spirit is seen by some to be the most pernicious example of this imperialism. It *is* the case that global capitalism has produced a world spirit—but reading Hegel carefully can open up, not close down, ways of criticizing just this kind of imperialism.

As long as modern educational theory is shaped by the social relations of private property, Hegel's critique of the universality of such relations, and of the complicity of life and thought within them, will continue to be relevant and vital.

Nigel Tubbs

See also *Bildung*; Critical Theory; Dewey, John; Foucault, Michel; Marx, Karl

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Heidegger, Martin

Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), a German philosopher, is best known for his writings on phenomenological ontology, which provided a revolutionary account of human existence and the history of metaphysics, which he provocatively called "the history that we are." Even though Heidegger never formally developed a philosophy of education, it is not wrong to say that he had two of them. The first relates to what I will refer to as "the task of selfhood," which Heidegger develops in his 1927 magnum opus *Being and Time*. The second relates to what this entry will refer to as "ontological education," which he develops in a variety of writings from his later philosophy, but especially in his 1940 essay "Plato's Doctrine of Truth" and his 1951–1952 lecture course *What Is Called Thinking?* In both cases, Heidegger understands education to involve (1) turning away from the everyday world, (2) undergoing a transformative experience of liberation and self-recovery, and (3) returning reflexively to the everyday (one's projects, roles, and the entities of one's environment) with a new understanding of oneself and one's world.

Genuine education for Heidegger (1998c) is always emancipatory. As he says in his famous essay on Plato's cave allegory, "Real education lays hold of the soul itself and transforms it in its entirety by first of all leading us to the place of our essential Being and accustoming us to it" (p. 167). This transformative return to the self, in both of Heidegger's philosophies of education, involves the liberation of oneself

from forces of resistance. In the task of selfhood, resistance comes from "the they" (*das Man*), which encourages conformity and discourages individuality. And in ontological education, resistance comes from the metaphysics of one's age, which shapes our thinking so profoundly that we cannot help but see everything, ourselves included, as resources awaiting optimization. We see nature, for example, as little more than "a giant gasoline station" (Heidegger, 1966, p. 50).

The task of selfhood in *Being and Time* is designed to awaken us from the tranquil but inauthentic lives we lead under the influence of *das Man* and to reconnect us to the everyday world of our concerns with a new appreciation for our freedom and a resolute acceptance of the existential responsibility it entails. This kind of education reacquaints us with ourselves as finite, self-creating beings. In contrast, the purpose of ontological education in Heidegger's later writings is to help us leap over the wall of metaphysics and overcome nihilism. This second kind of education reacquaints us with ourselves as world-disclosing beings and accustoms us to a world that is conceptually inexhaustible, fundamentally mysterious, and aglow with "divine radiance." Ontological education, then, like the task of selfhood, culminates in an enlightened recovery of one's Being and the Being of the world. Its aim is nothing less than the reenchantment of the earth.

The purpose of this entry is to explain the details of these separate but related ideas about the essence of education.

The Task of Selfhood

Heidegger's philosophy of education in *Being and Time* is best understood as a special kind of philosophical perfectionism, the conceptual foundations of which derive from Aristotle. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger provides an account of (a) what makes human beings distinctive among beings, (b) what it means for humans to flourish, and (c) how human flourishing, what Aristotle called *eudaimonia*, is a product of becoming what one is in spite of the contrary education one receives from *das Man*.

What makes us distinctive, Heidegger (1962) says, is that our Being is an issue for us. "*Dasein* [the human being] is ontically distinctive in that it *is* ontological" (p. 32). We are unique among beings because we have an understanding of being, and because, for us, Being is an issue. It is both (a) a constant source of wonder—we ask why there is anything at all instead of nothing—and (b) a task—being human requires that each one of us makes self-creating choices. For Heidegger, we *are* what we choose. We don't just exist, like rocks and plants; we aren't simply given an essence. We are choosing beings, stretched through time, open to a past and a future, and always faced with the task of selfhood. Who we are is who we are not yet (p. 287). "The most primordial and ultimately positive way in which Dasein is characterized ontologically" (p. 183) is as "being-possible" (*Möglichsein*).

This is what Heidegger means when he says we *are* ontological. We don't exclusively understand Being from the theoretical point of view, as the philosophical tradition has always supposed. We also *embody* an understanding of Being and literally live answers to our questions about the sorts of people we ought to be. Sometimes, we live those answers consciously and deliberately; other times—more often, Heidegger would say—we make world-shaping, self-creating choices without thinking freely about our possibilities and taking ownership of ourselves. To be human is to take a stance on who and what we are (Am I a teacher or a lawyer, a husband or a single man?) and to be defined and shaped by that stance. The key question is whether (a) we define ourselves consciously, deliberately, and with a passionate commitment rooted in a profound confrontation with our mortality, or (b) we are simply doing what one does and, as if sedated, going with the flow of life: believing what "they" believe, living as "they" live, and valuing what "they" value.

Two pieces of Heidegger's philosophical perfectionism should be relatively clear at this point. First, we are ontically distinctive because we are ontological: For us, Being is a task that involves choices, as well as a source of wonder that demands reflection. Second, we can make our self-creating choices consciously or unconsciously. If we make them unconsciously and live according to ideas that are not our own, we fail to become authentic selves. We don't really take up the task of selfhood but, instead, flee from it. Heidegger (1962) calls this kind of failure "falling" (p. 219), and he suggests that it characterizes most of us most of the time: "Everyone is the other, and no one is himself" (p. 165). On the other hand, if we choose consciously between the possibilities open to us, and independently of the tyranny of custom, we can complete the task of selfhood and fully become what we are. Heidegger calls this relationship with our possibilities authenticity, and he intends for us to see that it is the *practical* fulfillment of our being.

Aristotle's moral perfectionism tells us that human beings are distinctive because they are rational and that flourishing consists in reasoning well, especially in the context of theory (*Nichomachean Ethics*, Book I, chap. 8). Heidegger's (1962) development of this idea is to say that we are distinctive theoretically *and* practically. On the one hand, he agrees that human beings are perfected, or fulfilled as what we are, through philosophy (pp. 33, 96). But on the other hand, we are also fulfilled practically, that is, through a kind of choice making that is done in the light of death, and done resolutely. "Dasein becomes 'essentially' Dasein in that authentic existence which constitutes itself as anticipatory resoluteness" (p. 370). Anything short of authenticity, on this view, is a failure to flourish because it doesn't involve making free choices or overcoming "the dictatorship of the one [*das Man*]" (p. 165).

For Aristotle, human flourishing is characterized by reasoning well. For Heidegger, human flourishing is partly constituted by completing the task of selfhood in light of one's mortality. Death makes us anxious, and anxiety (*Angst*) is transformative and liberating because it is illuminating. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger is careful to distinguish *Angst*, which is about the burden of living a human life, from the kind of anxiety that we feel over an upcoming test or a difficult conversation. *Angst* is more rare and more profound than these everyday forms of anxiety. We feel it when our worlds collapse, that is, when our projects and roles—all of the things that shape our identities—no longer seem to matter. In these moments, it is as if the ground has dropped out from beneath our feet. The world we had taken for granted, the world of our everyday concerns, slips away from us. Suddenly, the familiar seems unfamiliar, and the ordinary feels uncanny.

In these moments, we continue to exist as "being possible." We go on projecting ourselves into an open future, but we project ourselves on a world and into an identity in which we no longer feel at home. Heidegger (1962) calls this experience "death" (p. 307), and he suggests that through it we encounter the structure of our being. We realize, in a practical way, that we are self-creating beings who enjoy meaning and value as a by-product of our choices, and in proportion to the passion we invest in them.

> With Dasein's lostness in the one . . . Dasein makes no choices, gets carried along by the nobody, and thus ensnares itself in inauthenticy. This process can be reversed only if Dasein specifically brings itself back from its lostness in the one. . . . When Dasein thus brings itself back from the one, the one-self is modified in an existential manner so that it becomes authentic being-one's-self. This must be accomplished by making up for not choosing. But "making up" for not choosing signifies choosing to make this choice, deciding for an ability-to-be, and making this decision from one's own self. In choosing to make this choice, Dasein *makes possible*, first and foremost, its authentic ability-to-be. (p. 312)

Death clarifies our lives for us, allowing us to distinguish between what is trivial and unimportant and what has lasting significance. We return to ourselves from *das Man* with a new appreciation for our freedom and a new ability to embrace and own the task of selfhood.

This experience of existential death and rebirth constitutes a form of education because it "lays hold of the soul itself and transforms it in its entirety by first of all leading us to the place of our essential Being and accustoming us to it" (Heidegger, 1998c, p. 167). In fact, it is hard to imagine how anything else could fit this description of "real education" (Heidegger, 1998c, p. 167) any better: We lose the world in death, rediscover ourselves in resoluteness, and then freely return to our projects with a new capacity for ownership of who and what we are. We are transformed in the process and led back to the place of our "essential being." We are led back to and given an opportunity to repossess ourselves.

Ontological Education

Heidegger's second philosophy of education also involves a transformative return to the self, although in a very different way from the task of selfhood in *Being and Time*. It is easiest to see this by thinking about Heidegger in connection with Nietzsche, who once said famously that the role of the philosopher is to be "a gadfly on the neck of man" and act as humanity's "physician." This medical metaphor applies to many of modernity's most influential thinkers—for example, G. W. F. Hegel and Karl Marx, Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche, Rainer Maria Rilke, Sigmund Freud, Franz Kafka, and the Frankfurt school thinkers—who diagnosed the modern world with a cultural or spiritual "sickness" and presented their own philosophies as a corrective therapy. Heidegger's "later philosophy" can be understood as fitting into this tradition. Modernity, he says, is the age of the "world's night."

It is an era of destitution and decline. The function of his "ontological education" is to help us recognize the symptoms and causes of our condition and to provide us with a therapeutic philosophy that can heal us.

What is revolutionary about Heidegger's critique of modernity is the role he assigns to *metaphysics* in causing the most pressing problems of our time: "the loss of the gods" (the disenchantment of the earth), homelessness (the devaluation of the highest values), and the "violence" of modern technology (environmental degradation, factory farming, vulture capitalism, sweatshop labor, wars for oil, etc.). Heidegger explains these "symptoms" as products of our metaphysical thinking about Being, which mistakes *one* way of disclosing reality for *the* structure of reality itself, and so misses "the truth of Being." We will heal ourselves from the affliction of our age, Heidegger (2003) argues, only if we manage to overcome metaphysics (p. 67) and relate to our world and to ourselves without being blinded by the reifying categories of what he calls "ontotheology," which we experience as "enframing." But what exactly is ontotheology, and why is it a problem?

An ontotheology is any attempt to think about Being ontologically and theologically at the same time (Heidegger, 1998b, p. 340). We think about Being ontologically when we try to understand the most basic "stuff" that makes entities what they are. The pre-Socratic philosopher Thales (ca. 624 to ca. 546 BCE) thought it was Water. Plato thought it was Forms. Nietzsche thought it was the Will to Power. On the other hand, we think about Being theologically any time we try to understand reality from a God's eye point of view; that is, from what Thomas Nagel calls "a view from nowhere," so that we can grasp the structure of the whole and the way entities exist: how they are arranged with respect to each other, how they came to be, and whether they are organized by laws or purposes.

Anaximander (ca. 610 to ca. 546 BCE) was the first "theological" thinker, then, because he speculated that the universe was governed by a cycle of opposites. Plato's forms divided Being into degrees of reality, so that entities are more or less beautiful, more or less good, more or less just, etc. Aristotle's hylomorphism provided the West with its first robust ontotheology, which modern science has replaced with an ontotheology of its own, nonteleological naturalism, the details of which undergo periodic changes as science makes progress, but whose ontotheological structure is unchanging.

> Metaphysics represents the beingness of beings in a twofold manner: in the first place, the totality of beings as such with an eye to their most universal traits . . . but at the same time also the totality of beings as such. (Heidegger, 1998a, p. 287)

In passages like this, Heidegger wants to underscore that *as ontology* metaphysics asks what entities are in general and what entities share in common. And *as theology*, it attempts to identify and define the nature of the whole (for Hegel, God is the whole structure of beings, not an individual entity), which it sometimes, though certainly not always, considers divine (Nietzsche's atheistic "theology" is Eternal Recurrence). Ontotheology, then, is the interior structure of our theories about Being.

The problem with ontotheology is that Being is conceptually inexhaustible. It always exceeds the categories we use for understanding it, and so it is not reducible to the Being of entities. This means that *any* ontotheology, whether ancient or modern, is an incomplete and partial representation of Being, which is *both* what is revealed to us by our ontotheological categories and what is ineluctably concealed by them. In fact, any understanding of Being is incomplete and *incomplete-able*. And yet every ontotheology tries to provide closure on the question of Being, focusing exclusively on the Being of entities. Every ontotheology is therefore forgetful of Being as such. For example, as long as Being appears to us as an intelligently designed, good, and teleologically ordered creation of God, it is concealed as Eternally Recurring Will to Power, and vice versa. Even a metaphysical theory like Plato's, which posits a Good "beyond being," nevertheless treats the Good as a special kind of entity, and so remains ontotheological.

One might be tempted to think that this is all very academic and that it has no bearing on life as ordinary people live it. But Heidegger insists that ontotheology always *matters* because it "grounds an age" (Heidegger, 1993, p. 115) by serving as the "lenses" through which we understand the world and ourselves. In fact, we embody, individually and collectively, the understanding of Being articulated by the ontotheology of our time.

Our own age is nihilistic because our ontotheology (Heidegger thinks it is Nietzsche's picture of Being as Eternally Recurring Will to Power) has disenchanted the world and thereby reduced Being to "a vapor" (Heidegger, 2000, p. 42), the meaningless aggregation and disaggregation of forces. That is how we see the world, deep down. That is how *we*

understand Being. For evidence, Heidegger would simply have us look at the way we live, how we treat one another and ourselves, how we treat the earth, and how we think. We understand everything as lacking intrinsic value. For us, Being is a storehouse of resources, what Heidegger calls "standing reserve" (Heidegger, 1993, p. 23). The world revealed to us as mere resources is what Heidegger means by "enframing," and enframing (*das Gestell*) is the common thread linking the excesses of cosmetic surgery and the plundering of the earth, the neuropharmacology boom and the rise of vulture capitalism, etc. Each of these social and political problems has a common ontotheological root.

The purpose of ontological education is to enable a relationship with the world that happens outside the confines of ontotheological thinking. Heidegger's (1966) goal, in turning to art and poetry in his later philosophy, is to remove the "lenses" of ontotheology and replace them with a receptive openness to the forgotten but inexhaustible effulgence of Being. Heidegger calls this postmetaphysical relationship with the world "openness to the mystery" (pp. 12, 21, 55, 56, 92), and his hope is for us to relearn "to dwell" in the world and to cultivate an open relationship with Being, one that lets entities be what they are by constantly freeing them to be more than what they have been.

Like the task of selfhood in *Being and Time*, ontological education involves (a) turning away from the everyday world (in which entities show up as resources), (b) a transformative experience of liberation (from the reifying confines of ontotheology) and self-recovery (as beings who are in a dynamic, world-disclosing relationship with a mysterious, conceptually inexhaustible reality), and (c) a reflexive return to the everyday that is characterized by receptivity and openness to the unbidden rather than mastery and control.

Both in the task of selfhood and in ontological education, real learning occurs when the student returns to the place where she started and got to know it for the first time.

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See also Aristotle; Kant, Immanuel; Phenomenology; Technology and Society, Critiques of

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Herbart, Johann F.

Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841), a German philosopher and a student of philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte, is considered a foundational figure in the history of educational philosophy. Over the past two centuries, since the time of his major work on education *The Science of Education* (*Allgemeine Pädagogik*; 1806), his thinking has had a profound influence on educational philosophy and educational reform worldwide. This entry thematizes three central components of Herbart's philosophy of education: his twofold concept of education and its connection to his practical philosophy; his concept of perfectibility; and his notion of pedagogical tact, especially as it relates to teacher education.

Concept of Education

Herbart's concept of education draws out the moral meaning of education. For Herbart, education aims toward the self-determination (*Selbstbestimmung*) of the learner. His notion of self-determination refers to the ability to critique one's own self-interested ideas and motives for action, as well as the values and norms that govern society. The concept of a person who is self-determined, or autonomous, is not to be conceived of as one who is individualistic and lacking a connection to the social world. Rather, self-determination for Herbart connects directly to one's ability to make moral judgments, judgments that reflect one's recognition of others. As Herbart (1804) puts it in his influential essay "The Aesthetic Revelation of the World," morality is not simply the highest but the *whole* purpose of education.

From a historical perspective, Herbart's concept of education opposed notions of education of the *ancien régime*, which assumes that the next generation's future is decided by the previous generation, that is, by tradition and socialization. On Herbart's model, it is not the role of education to guide learners into an existing moral order or make them dependent on external authority.

For Herbart, the categorical imperative formulated by Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) is central to understanding morality. The categorical imperative expresses a judgment of oneself according to principles of universality and humanity. It thus captures for Herbart what it means to judge oneself in light of one's recognition of and respect for others. But, going more in depth than Kant, Herbart asks the question of how the educator can help a learner learn how to make judgments for himself or herself about what is good and right to do in a given situation.

Herbart's answer to this question is not a learner-centered model, where the teacher is a mere observer, nor is it a teacher-centered transmission model. Rather, he develops a concept of education that accounts for a certain kind of intersubjective relationship between teacher and learner, which he sees as essential for cultivating the learner's ability to think, make independent judgments, and become what he terms a *multifaceted individual*. A multifaceted individual is someone who is interested in the differing perspectives, new ideas, and new objects that he or she encounters.

Herbart develops a twofold concept of what he calls "education proper" that outlines the educator's task in educating another person. The educator's task is defined using two terms: *educative instruction* and *moral guidance*. The first term, educative instruction (*erziehender Unterricht*), describes the educator's task in cultivating the learner's knowledge and ability. For Herbart, instruction has the aim of introducing learners to multifaceted forms of knowledge and human interaction, so that learners can understand differing perspectives and expand their interests beyond the confines of everyday life. Herbart thus conceptualizes the learner's path as a

series of stages according to the principles of a theory of association. In turn, the educator's task is to support the learner to steadily and continuously associate known objects with closely related new objects and then reflect on the process of making these new associations. Herbart's followers, the Herbartians, simplified and standardized this method of teaching, which came to be widely known outside of Germany, including in the United States, as the "Herbartian steps."

The second term, *moral guidance*, describes the educator's role in supporting the learner's moral development. Herbart's term for moral guidance is "*Zucht*," which comes from the German verb "*ziehen*," meaning *to pull forth*, and is associated with the latin "*educare*." Moral guidance should not be understood as discipline (even though the term *Zucht* is often translated as *discipline*). Although Herbart identifies a need for discipline (*Regierung*), he defines discipline as confined to the task of preventing the learner from harming himself or herself, or others. Thus, discipline is a precondition for, but not part of, education proper.

Moral guidance, for Herbart, describes a form of dialogic interaction with the learner to help him or her critically examine self-interested inclinations and judge these according to moral ideas. A central aim of such dialogue is to help the learner develop an "inner censor." The inner censor comes forth in moral dilemmas when we ask ourselves the question, What should I do? The inner censor can be construed as an individual's inner self-critical voice telling the individual what not to do, much like Socrates's *daemon*.

A key concept associated with how educators should cultivate a learner's inner censor is found in Herbart's notion of "inner struggle." Inner struggle arises when we attempt to confront past decisions and make changes in the way we think and act in the world. Herbart's notion of moral guidance underscores that the educator must not attempt to alleviate the learner's own inner struggle, for example, by telling him or her what to do. Rather, in his view, the educator must support learners to engage in inner struggle, question their past decisions, and inquire into how to make choices that respect others.

The aim of moral education is to develop a disposition in the learner to judge situations of action reflectively, not normatively. Herbart (1808) connects his theory of education directly to his ethics, expounded in his *General Practical Philosophy (Allgemeine Praktische Philosophy)*. Expanding on the idea of the Good Will expressed in Kant's categorical imperative, Herbart delineates five individual moral ideas to which he imparts specialized philosophical meanings: (1) *inner freedom* (*innere Freiheit*) captures the need for critique of one's will in all judgments of what to do; (2) *completeness* (*Vollkommenheit*) addresses the need to have differing perspectives to inform one's view; (3) *benevolence* (*Wohlwollen*) captures the need to express good will toward imagined others; (4) *right* (*Recht*) expresses the need to find agreements in cases of conflict with others; and (5) *justice* (*Billigkeit*) addresses the need to correct broken agreements and compensate those adversely affected. The moral ideas represent aesthetic relations of the will that are meant to orient one's view of oneself in relation to one's will, to objects, and to other human beings when making judgments about what to do.

For Herbart, educative instruction and moral education reciprocally support one another: Instruction helps the learner expand his or her view of the world with differing and conflicting perspectives, while moral education helps the learner learn to recognize wrong or bad decisions, decide which perspectives will guide his or her actions, and contribute to new ideas of the good.

Perfectibility

Herbart names the perfectibility (*Bildsamkeit*) of a human being as the founding principle of education. The term *perfectibility* is meant to capture the idea that all human beings are capable of being formed by the world and also of forming the world around them. Human perfectibility entails that human beings can be influenced by others and thus educated by others. For Herbart, the fact that human beings can change, engage in self-critique, and alter their directions of thought and action provides the basis for the human capacity to become moral individuals, that is, individuals who make choices that respect others.

Herbart's concept of perfectibility connects to the philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau's (1712–1778) idea of perfectibility (*perfectibilité*), which means the ability to learn. The notion Herbart develops also relates to the German idea of *Bildung*, often associated with the work of the philosopher Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835). *Bildung* refers to a process of self-transformation through interactions with the world and others and is most often translated as "education" or "formation."

Herbart's concept of perfectibility has consequences for how we understand the task of the educator. The concept of the human being as changeable neither presupposes that the human being is a blank starting point (*pace* John Locke), nor does it entail that there is a predetermined final endpoint or *telos* to a human being's learning process. By grounding education in the principle of human perfectibility, Herbart makes clear that educators must recognize all human beings as capable of learning, transforming their view of the world, asking questions, and developing an inner censor. Moreover, it brings to the fore the fact that educators must recognize their ability to have an influence on a learner's future. It follows that educators must take responsibility to make conscious choices about how they will influence each learner, without seeking to predetermine the learner's future, a future that can only be decided by the learner. Herbart thus reminds educators that educating is a moral endeavor in which each learner must be given a broad, multifarious view of the world to be able to make decisions for themselves.

Tact and the Teaching Profession

Herbart gives significant thought to the teaching profession and the question of what is entailed in being a good teacher. He developed a concept of pedagogical tact that still has relevance for how we understand the teacher's task today. The concept of tact relates to Aristotle's notion of *phronesis* and can be understood as the teacher's ability to make wise decisions in the moment. According to Herbart, teachers must learn to be pedagogically tactful. This means they have to learn to have distance on educational situations with learners; be innovative and improvisatory on the basis of what the learner brings in terms of questions, understanding, and prior experience; and be able to reflect on and critique their own choices and change.

Herbart's concept of pedagogical tact is important for contemporary discussions of teaching. Tact in teaching, as Herbart develops it, gives a sense of teaching as something much more than a technical task of getting learners to particular outcomes. The concept of tact contributes to understanding teaching as a reflective practice. As such, it involves not only the ability to plan but also the ability to understand and judge what to do in unexpected situations that arise in interactions with learners.

Herbart's thoughts on education give us a vision of education as more than mere socialization. His work influenced American philosophers of education such as John Dewey (1859–1952), who was an active member of the National Herbart Society (which was formed around 1895 in the United States and was renamed the National Society for the Study of Education until it dissolved in 2008). Herbart's theories failed, however, to have a lasting effect in the United States, largely due to the late-19th-century movement called Herbartianism. The Herbartians simplified Herbart's theory of instruction into a rigid method of "steps" that involved teachers getting learners to fixed stages of learning. Although the Herbartians' interpretation of Herbart was limited, this is not to say that Herbart's theory of instruction is beyond reproach. One problem with Herbart's theory of instruction is recognized by Dewey in his *Democracy and Education* (1916). In this work, Dewey points out that Herbart's theory does not adequately take into account the new ideas that the learner brings to learning situations. But this critique only applies to Herbart's theory of cognitive learning, which views learning too strongly as a step-by-step progression toward knowledge that the teacher can regulate; it does not apply to his concept of moral guidance and moral learning.

The reception of Herbart as interpreted by the Herbartians has hindered the fruitful aspects of his work from being acknowledged, such that in the past century, very little has been written on Herbart in the English language. Herbart's concept of moral guidance has strong applicability for renewing our understanding of moral education today. Moral education in his view is not reducible to simple concepts of behavior management, such as seating charts or rules about acceptable behaviors, that we might find guiding teaching practice in today's classrooms. Herbart makes a significant point about moral learning, namely, that it is only through struggle and self-critique of self-interested inclinations that we learn how to make reflective judgments that respect others. Herbart's philosophy of education reminds us of the complexity of educating others, when this is seen as a process of supporting critical thinking.

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See also Autonomy; *Bildung*; Critical Thinking; Dewey, John; Kant, Immanuel; Moral Education; Phronesis (Practical Reason); Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Teaching, Concept and Models of

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HERMENEUTICS

Hermeneutics—"a term whose Greek looks, theological past, and Herr Professor pretentiousness ought not put us off because, under the homelier and less fussy name of interpretation, it is what many of us at least have been talking all the time."

—Clifford Geertz, *Local Knowledge* (1983, p. 224)

Hermeneutics is the theory and philosophy of understanding and interpretation. The term derives from Hermes, a son of Zeus, who interprets messages from the Greek gods. Hermes was not simply a messenger, however. He was also a trickster. It was not always easy to determine which role Hermes was playing.

As Hermes's story suggests, understanding and interpretation can be fraught. In education, for example, students sometimes struggle to understand the meaning of texts. Teachers try to understand students' questions and may wonder about the meaning of teaching for their own lives. Educational researchers who use qualitative and quantitative methods make interpretive judgments (albeit for different reasons) and must determine whether their interpretations are defensible. Hermeneutic theory recognizes that interpretive challenges such as these can be analyzed from various perspectives that posit different assumptions about what interpretation entails and what the goals of interpretation should be. Becoming familiar with debates in hermeneutic theory can help us appreciate the interpretive complexities we encounter every day and permit us to become more thoughtful interpreters.

A key debate concerns how interpretation is defined. One definition frames interpretation in terms of epistemology (the philosophy of knowing and knowledge). From this perspective, interpretation is a method or cognitive strategy we employ to clarify or construct meaning. The goal is to produce valid understanding of meaningful "objects," such as texts, artifacts, spoken words, experiences, and intentions.

The second definition frames interpretation in terms of ontology (the philosophy of being and existence). In this view, interpretation is not an act of cognition, a special method, or a theory of knowledge. Interpretation, instead, characterizes how human beings naturally experience the world. Realized through our moods, concerns, self-understanding, and practical engagements with people and things we encounter in our sociohistorical contexts, interpretation is an unavoidable aspect of human existence.

The epistemological and ontological definitions of interpretation interact as sibling rivals. The hermeneutic "family split" arose more than a century ago when beliefs about the practice and aim of interpretation intersected with the success of physical science and the rise of social science. In the course of this entry, we will examine the German branch of the hermeneutic family tree beginning in the 19th century with Wilhelm Dilthey, who argued that interpretation is both (a) a method and a theory of

knowledge for the human sciences and (b) the prereflective mode of everyday lived experience. As will be shown, Dilthey could not reconcile his aspiration for an epistemology of interpretive social science with his realization that interpretation is an ontological feature of human experience that cannot easily be transformed into reflective scientific knowledge.

In the 20th century, Martin Heidegger argued that Dilthey was correct to intuit that "lived" understanding cannot be fully theorized or methodically regulated. Unlike Dilthey, however, Heidegger maintained that scientific knowledge *necessarily* remains indebted to lived understanding. We will explore why Heidegger argued for the primacy of lived understanding. We will also see how Hans-Georg Gadamer drew on Heidegger's hermeneutics to develop an ontological model of social science, which posits that interpretation in social science is no different from interpretation in ordinary life.

Gadamer's ideas have provoked a range of responses. We will look at two contemporary criticisms. One seeks to replace Gadamer's ontological hermeneutics with epistemological hermeneutics. The other appreciates Gadamer's ontological social science but argues that it must be supplemented by method and theory. In conclusion, the entry will briefly review how educational philosophers use hermeneutics to analyze educational practices, aims, and research.

Interpretive Social Science: Dilthey's Dilemma

Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), a Protestant theologian, devoted his life to developing the *Geisteswissenschaften* (German for social science, also translated as the human or moral sciences, or sciences of mind or of the human spirit). Dilthey thought that human beings express their understanding of life experience in the form of meaningful objects, such as texts, works of art, and various cultural expressions, and that interpreting these meaningful objects is fundamental for maintaining social life. Social science therefore requires a hermeneutic method, not the methods of physical science. It also requires an epistemology of interpretive knowledge, not a theory of knowledge concerned with causal explanation. The German word *Verstehen* (interpretation; commonly translated as *understanding*) captures Dilthey's belief that the social sciences are interpretive and, therefore, are distinct from the physical sciences. Dilthey insisted that the two forms of scientific knowledge, while different, are equally rigorous.

Dilthey based his ideas on the *hermeneutic circle*, a method of interpretation that became prominent during the Reformation, when Protestant theologians sought to interpret the Bible without appealing to the Catholic Church to determine the meaning of problematic passages or resolve interpretive disputes. As its name suggests, the hermeneutic method assumes that interpretation is circular. Because the meaning of the Bible was thought to be unified and self-consistent, the meaning of any specific passage could be determined by referring to the text as a whole. But since understanding the text as a whole presumes understanding its problematic passages, determining the meaning of a problematic passage depends on a preliminary intuitive grasp of the text's entire meaning. Biblical exegesis thus revolves in a continuous cycle of anticipation and revision. Interpreting the meaning of any part of the Bible depends on having already grasped the meaning of the Bible as a whole, even as one's understanding of the entire Bible will be reshaped as one clarifies the meaning of its constituent parts.

Another Protestant theologian, Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), maintained that the hermeneutic circle could ensure understanding not only of the Bible but also of all written and oral expressions. Using this method correctly, interpreters could understand the meaning of linguistic expressions better than the authors who produced them. Schleiermacher transformed the hermeneutic circle from a method of Biblical exegesis into a general theory of interpretation that explained how understanding could be achieved in ordinary circumstances.

Extending Schleiermacher, Dilthey contended that the hermeneutic circle not only helps people reflectively interpret others' meaningful expressions but also enables people to understand themselves and their own lived experience. This is because life experiences do not unfold in linear fashion but, instead, are related to one another as parts are related to wholes. On the one hand, we understand specific life experiences in terms of how we understand the meaning of our life as a whole. At the same time, the way we understand our life as a whole depends on how we understand specific life experiences. Understanding specific experiences thus shapes and also is shaped by understanding the overall meaning of our lives, even as understanding our life's overall meaning both shapes and is shaped by how we understand specific life experiences.

Applying the hermeneutic circle to life, Dilthey realized that understanding is temporal. Past experiences constitute the "parts" of one's biography. The future makes it possible to fathom one's life in toto. Interpreting the meaning of the future depends on and reshapes one's understanding of the past, even as interpreting the meaning of the past anticipates and revises one's understanding of the future.

Interpreting the meaning of time therefore is integral to interpreting the meaning of lived experience. It is important to note that at the prereflective level of interpreting lived experience, time is not an *object* for interpretation. It is impossible to freeze or objectify the past in order to interpret it. Neither is the future a stationary target at which interpretation aims. One rather interprets the meaning of time as one moves through time. Where lived experience is concerned, interpreting time and experiencing time arise together.

Dilthey drew two conclusions from this insight. First, the meaning of life experience is fluid. With the passage of time, the meaning of the past and the future shifts. At different points in the future, one's past will mean different things. The meaning of the future also changes, depending on the particular stage of life from which the future is anticipated.

Second, interpreting lived experience does not produce understanding that is abstracted from the experience of living. We cannot escape our situation to interpret it. Nor can we interpret our life and *then* experience it. Rather, we are practically engaged in living the life that we interpret. Prereflective interpretation, in short, is situated, partial, practical, and personal.

Dilthey believed that prereflective understanding of one's own lived experience could evolve into reflective theoretical knowledge of how other people understand their life experience. Theoretical knowledge thereby extends and refines pretheoretical practical understanding. But Dilthey recognized that because theoretical knowledge is rooted in pretheoretical understanding, knowledge in the social sciences, particularly in history, differs from knowledge in the physical sciences. The historian who reflectively examines the meaning of historical events himself is a historical being. The meaning of the past therefore cannot be established once and for all but instead varies with the perspective of the historian who studies it. Moreover, theoretical understanding remains rooted in the pretheoretical understanding it aims to clarify, even as pretheoretical understanding is changed by the theoretical understanding that it grounds. Interpretation consequently revolves in a never-ending circle, rendering historical knowledge provisional and incomplete.

Although Dilthey believed that the interpretive social sciences could be as rigorous as the physical sciences, the character of knowledge in interpretive social science nonetheless vexed him. What kind of scientific knowledge is possible when the meaning of that which is studied constantly changes? Such knowledge is relativistic, not general and valid. Moreover, insofar as the historian "belongs" to the history he studies, historical knowledge cannot be objective. Historical knowledge instead is subjective, provisional, and partial. The circularity of interpretation raises the possibility that historical "knowledge" simply proves what it presupposes.

In an effort to reconcile understanding lived experience with scientific knowledge, Dilthey turned to his younger contemporary Edmund Husserl (1859–1938). Husserl demonstrated that science grows out of particular "lifeworlds" and necessarily presupposes nonscientific understandings. But while Husserl demonstrated that scientific knowledge depends on prereflectively understanding particular lifeworlds, he also subjected the lifeworld to phenomenological analysis to discover "essences" in lived experience that make theoretical knowledge of the lifeworld possible. In so doing, Husserl encountered a contradiction. On the one hand, pretheoretical understandings are relative to particular lifeworlds. On the other hand, phenomenological analysis aims to produce knowledge of the lifeworld that is universal and unconditionally valid. It was unclear how phenomenological analysis could both transcend and also remain indebted to pretheoretical understanding. Phenomenological analysis seemed both necessary and also impossible. Husserl did not solve Dilthey's dilemma but instead exposed another aspect of it.

Ontological Hermeneutics: Heidegger and Gadamer

Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002) believed that Dilthey was stymied by a false assumption. Dilthey assumed that prereflective understanding is subjective. It therefore is biased and unreliable and cannot be the basis for interpretive social science. Gadamer countered that prereflective understanding is not subjective but instead is intimately and necessarily tied to critical reflection. The intimate necessary relation between prereflective understanding and critical reflection provides an opening for the disclosure of truth.

Gadamer based his ideas on the work of his teacher, Martin Heidegger (1889–1976). In his book *Being and Time* (1962), Heidegger probed two of Dilthey's important insights: (1) we experience the life that we prereflectively interpret and (2) prereflective understanding exhibits a circular temporal structure. Dilthey believed that these two conditions are contingent and apply only to prereflective understanding. Heidegger demonstrated that both conditions are necessary and characterize all understanding, including critical reflection.

Heidegger began by considering the question of existence. To exist, Heidegger reasoned, is to live in the present. As Dilthey showed, the present does not arise in a historical vacuum but instead always implicates the future and the past. Living in the present, we cannot help anticipate the future based on where we have been, even as our expectations for future experience color our understanding of the life we have lived. Heidegger used the term *historicity* to underscore the idea that human understanding is an *inescapably* temporal experience.

Insofar as understanding is an inescapably temporal experience, we do not choose to start (or stop) understanding at a particular point in (or out of) time. Rather, understanding is *a way of being* that always is already going on (to use Heidegger's phrase). It is true that understanding sometimes is mistaken. But breakdowns in understanding signify *mis*understanding, not an *absence* of understanding according to Heidegger.

As an experience that is always happening, understanding does not grasp the meaning of objects that are "present-at-hand," distinct from our interests and concerns. Understanding instead signifies being intimately involved with people and things. Our world is composed of implements that are "ready-to-hand," tied to our purposes, moods, interests, and so on. Heidegger described engaged practical ongoing understanding in terms of "fore-having," "fore-sight," and "fore-conception." The prefix *fore-* signifies that we are able to engage with implements in our world because we prereflectively sense how they are implicated with our interests and how they fit within the context of meaningful relations in which we find them.

The fact that we prereflectively understand meaning does not imply that understanding is stuck in the past. Prereflective understanding can change as human beings move into the future, reconsider prior understanding, and anticipate new possibilities. Heidegger insisted that prereflective understanding could become critical and reflective. But critical reflection does not produce understanding where none had previously existed. Critical reflection instead remains indebted to the preunderstandings it clarifies and corrects.

Heidegger coined the term *thrown-projection* to describe understanding as an experience of being involved in the world. The term *thrown* indicates that we do not construct the meaningful context(s) in which we live. Rather, we are born into a social world that is inherently meaningful and that has already been interpreted by others. Interpretation is possible, because the world discloses meaning through the medium of language. We inherit this social web of meaning as a linguistic "horizon" within which the construal of meaning for our own lives becomes possible. The term *projection* is not synonymous with *planning*, according to Heidegger. Projection instead indicates that understanding is a dynamic experience of anticipating future possibilities. Because expectations for the future necessarily arise in the present, we cannot see them in their entirety or with absolute clarity. Moreover, while future possibilities are open, they nonetheless are partially circumscribed by possibilities that already have been fulfilled.

Heidegger said that the human being who experiences understanding as a cycle of thrown-projection is *Dasein*. *Dasein* means "there-being." Unlike the autonomous epistemological subject who leverages interpretation to grasp the meaning of objects (including objectified experiences), *Dasein* is not an independent agent who confronts discrete objects, the meaning of which he must deliberately choose to discover or construct. *Dasein* rather is "there" in the world, spontaneously involved with things that *Dasein* understands prior to any distinction between subjects and objects. *Dasein* does not initiate understanding and does not regulate the production of meaning. The fact of existing in an inherently meaningful and already interpreted world—not *Dasein's* own initiative—is the condition that makes both prereflective and reflective understanding possible.

Heidegger's claim that understanding is a temporally conditioned way of experiencing the world carries profound implications for social science, Gadamer concluded. He developed these implications in his magnum opus *Truth and Method* (1960/1975). Before sketching Gadamer's ontological view of social science, it is helpful to clarify two points. First, while Gadamer challenged the "science" in social science, he nonetheless used the term

social science (moral science and human science). According to Gadamer, science does not refer exclusively to natural science or exclude the humanities. Like many Continental European thinkers, science for Gadamer refers to systematic study in fields as diverse as theology, archaeology, and politics.

Second, Gadamer did not dismiss natural science. On the contrary, he believed that natural science is necessary and important. But Gadamer wanted to decenter the hegemony of scientific method in social science. He feared that when we rely on method to reflectively understand the social world, we tend to emphasize understanding that we regulate and consciously produce. Consequently, we may delegitimize, occlude, or ignore understanding that we do not control and cannot divorce from our self-understanding and historical situation. Insofar as social science relies on method, Gadamer believed that it alienates us from important dimensions of our ordinary life experience. Overemphasizing method also warps natural science, Gadamer claimed. While method has a place in natural science, magnifying its role conflates natural science with instrumental procedures that negate the importance of interpretive judgment and modesty in scientific practice.

Gadamer thus was not hostile to science. Nevertheless, he sought to significantly reframe *social* science. Following Heidegger, Gadamer argued that interpretation in social science is a temporally conditioned experience or "event" that we live through, not a kind of knowledge that we achieve by methodologically regulating our life experience or by abstracting and justifying critical reflection outside of ordinary understanding. Understanding and interpretation in social science are no different from understanding and interpretation in daily life. In both cases, Gadamer maintained, we experience understanding and interpretation as a dialogue or conversation.

The notion that social science is a conversation might seem startling. We typically think that social scientists collect and analyze data. But the people and texts that concern social scientists are not sources of data according to Gadamer. They are conversation partners.

Texts for Gadamer are conversation partners no less than people. Texts are not inanimate objects in which an author's intended meaning is permanently congealed. Texts are rather dynamic linguistic horizons that disclose meaning over time. Gadamer's social scientist starts to understand a text when she recognizes that it raises a question or issue that does not belong exclusively to the text (or its author) or the question or issue that the text voices comes down through tradition and also concerns the social scientist. Similarly, the social scientist starts to understand another person not because she empathizes with him or is able to leap out of her own body to get inside his head but because understanding begins when the social scientist recognizes the question or issue that concerns the other person and realizes that this question concerns her as well.

Of course, neither party in the conversation can escape the situation into which each has been "thrown." Understanding therefore does not aim to capture *the* meaning of a question. The meaning of a question rather is codetermined by the horizons of the people who interpret it. People who inhabit different horizons will understand the "same" question differently. Insofar as horizons are temporal and change over time, the "same" question will be understood differently every time it is interpreted.

If we necessarily bring our own horizon to understanding an issue, how can we recognize the horizon of our partner? What prevents us from appropriating our partner's perspective or conflating it with our own? Gadamer proposes two answers. First, he notes that horizons are porous, not self-enclosed. In principle, therefore, horizons can interpenetrate.

Gadamer's second answer concerns the disposition of conversation partners. In a successful conversation, each party is open to the possibility that the other's perspective is true and may challenge and even refute one's own understanding. Gadamer insists that one's own understanding cannot be clarified or corrected as long as one entertains the other's perspective from afar and continues to maintain the truth of one's own position. Change instead requires one to *risk* one's assumptions and to actually experience the negation of one's understanding. Gadamer acknowledges that negative experiences are uncomfortable, nevertheless negative experiences can be openings for genuinely reflecting on prior understanding and arriving at new insight into an issue.

Thus, like prereflective understanding, critical reflection for Gadamer is an experience we undergo. In successful conversations, both parties are open to risking their assumptions. As a consequence of being challenged, the understanding of both parties can become more encompassing, perspicacious, critical, and reflective. Gadamer calls the reflective dimension of conversation a "fusion of horizons."

Neither party can predict in advance how its horizons will be fused. When one party tries to direct the conversation or claims to know what the other is thinking, "talk" becomes something other than conversation, Gadamer observes. But when a fusion of horizons genuinely happens, both parties come to understand a truth about life's meaning that neither could know outside of participating in the conversation.

In sum, Gadamer's reframing of social science in terms of a conversation that we experience with others differs from the way we typically characterize social science. Gadamer's researcher does not try to empathize with those whom she studies. Neither does she regard them and their cultures as exotic and distant. Rather, she endeavors to recognize a question or issue that she and her partner share. The meaning of the question cannot be determined "objectively" but instead is codetermined by the horizon of both the researcher and her partner and changes with each interpretive event. The self-understanding of Gadamer's researcher is not controlled or kept out of play but instead is affected by allowing her partner to challenge her understanding of the question that is of mutual concern. The researcher cannot direct this experience or predict the new insight that the conversation will disclose. Instead, she participates in an event that transforms both herself and her partner in ways that neither party can imagine in advance.

Insofar as method helps researchers regulate understanding, Gadamer contends that it distances them from their lived experience. Relying on method seduces people to underplay and even discount the experiential dimension of critical reflection. Social science becomes an intellectual exercise, not an opportunity for personal transformation. In place of honing methodological skill, Gadamer wants social scientists to cultivate the disposition to be open, take risks, and trust that they may have something to learn from their interlocutors. Framing social science as a conversation we experience with others can rehabilitate the moral dimension of social science, Gadamer concludes.

Responses to Gadamer

A number of contemporary scholars are developing the philosophical and practical implications of Gadamer's social science. In his influential essay, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man" (1971), Charles Taylor (1931–) argues that social scientists are "self-interpreting animals" who always prereflectively understand their theoretical conclusions and who inevitably appeal to intuitions and self-understanding to justify their findings. Ruth Behar (1956–) provides a practical example of ontological social science. Behar's book, *The Vulnerable Observer* (1996), does not explicitly reference hermeneutics or Gadamer. Nonetheless, she argues in it that anthropological insight necessarily implicates the anthropologist's self-understanding; the anthropologist's self-understanding, moreover, is vulnerable to (and affected by) the people whom she studies.

While a number of practitioners and scholars embrace Gadamer, his work also provokes criticism. Thinkers such as Emilio Betti (1890–1968), E. D. Hirsch Jr. (1928–), and Dagfinn Follesdall (1932–) epitomize one line of response. According to these critics, Gadamer's claim that the interpreter's situation influences meaning and that meaning is construed differently in each interpretive event leads to relativism. Moreover, Gadamer provides no basis for adjudicating conflicting interpretations. Adjudication must appeal to an extracontextual criterion, which Gadamer believes is impossible. In short, these critics conclude that hermeneutics should remain under the umbrella of epistemology. They endeavor to show how interpretation is or can become a rigorous method and theory of knowledge for producing valid objective understanding of texts.

Jürgen Habermas (1929–) articulates a second response. Unlike the critics noted above, Habermas appreciates Gadamer's insight into the ontological nature of social science. Presuppositions are always operating, Habermas notes. Understanding is irreducibly contextual, historical, and bound up with the interpreter's self-understanding. The social scientist consequently belongs to the social world that he interprets. Social science theories issue from the pretheoretical practices they strive to explain.

But despite these points of agreement, Habermas questions Gadamer's faith in the power of language and conversation to disclose truth and promote critical reflection. Language is not simply a communicative medium for understanding meaning, Habermas argues. Material conditions and power interests can systematically and insidiously distort meaning in ways that language does not make apparent. Hence, reflection must do more than simply *clarify* lived understanding by means of conversation. Reflection must also help people *distinguish* lived understanding from ideology. Becoming liberated from ideology

requires a theory that can methodically explain the genesis of distortion by appealing to rationally self-evident causes.

Hermeneutics and Education

Contemporary scholars employ hermeneutics to analyze a range of educational issues, including children's rights, teaching and teacher education, science education, medical education, curriculum theory, inquiry-based learning, and validity in educational assessment. Some scholars contrast epistemological and ontological hermeneutics. Others focus on ontological hermeneutics as a framework for critiquing and reframing educational practices and aims. These scholars develop ideas articulated by Heidegger and Gadamer, who sought to interrupt utilitarian, technical, and market-based influences on education that emphasize developing skills and mastering knowledge. Heidegger and Gadamer countered that education is "*Bildung*"—an ongoing experience of self-formation and transformation—in which one learns to become receptive to ways of being that differ from and even challenge one's own horizon. Conceived as *Bildung*, education aims to help students become more reflective and humble as their horizons expand in ways that neither they nor their teachers can foresee.

Hermeneutics also resounds in normative debates about qualitative inquiry. From an epistemological perspective, the central issue for qualitative research is the dilemma that vexed Dilthey: Given that interpretation necessarily presupposes prior understanding that is personal, temporal, and situated within particular sociocultural contexts, how can interpretive conclusions be objective, generalizable, and valid? From an ontological perspective, the aim of qualitative inquiry is not simply to produce knowledge about educational questions. Qualitative research also should aim to *be* educative, catalyzing people to challenge their current understanding of education in order to arrive at new, more encompassing insights and questions concerning education and the human condition.

Debates about specific issues appeal to both Dilthey and Gadamer. For example, Dilthey and Gadamer maintained that interpretation necessarily implicates one's self-understanding and sociohistorical situation. While this idea is axiomatic among qualitative researchers, it nevertheless raises questions about the self-understanding of researchers in relation to the people they study.

Epistemologically oriented qualitative researchers wrestle with how they can control or at least reflectively account for their *own* "positionality" and self-understanding so that they can accurately interpret how their subjects make sense of the world. A key question concerns whether and how self-reflection on the part of researchers can be methodically achieved. Are there methods that can help researchers address challenges to self-reflection that arise in the field? If so, which methods should researchers adopt and under which circumstances?

An ontological view of self-understanding raises different issues. Some collaborative action researchers maintain that research questions should be of mutual interest to both "subjects" and researchers. Reflective insight into these questions cannot arise if researchers keep their understanding out of play. Both parties—subjects and researchers—must allow their understanding to be *critically engaged* by the other so that they might become aware of assumptions they might otherwise fail to notice. From an ontological perspective, the key question is, "How can researchers risk their self-understanding and be open to being challenged by their subjects (and vice versa)?" Learning to risk one's self-understanding is not a methodological achievement. It rather requires researchers to cultivate a certain disposition.

Debates about research as conversation illustrate another set of hermeneutic concerns. Some conclude that while conversation is an ideal to which qualitative researchers should aspire, it is unclear whether and how this ideal can be enacted. Institutional review board regulations assume that the rights of research subjects must be protected. This epistemological assumption makes it difficult, if not impossible, to approach research as a Gadamerian conversation that regards subjects and researchers as equal partners.

Some qualitative researchers adopt a Habermasian view of conversation. They point to a legacy of privilege and marginalization and warn that seemingly openhearted conversations can exploit subjects. Scholars of color who conduct qualitative research in their home communities discuss how their university status distances them from people with whom they were able to easily converse before they became university researchers. For these scholars, the unforeseen insights that arise during research conversations are experiences of alienation, not Gadamerian solidarity.

Finally, hermeneutics figures in debates about the scientific status of educational research. D. C. Phillips

has pursued this issue, arguing for the centrality of interpretation in postpositivist science. While the postpositivist embrace of interpretation came by way of Popper and Kuhn, not Dilthey, Heidegger, or Gadamer, the two views of interpretation are remarkably similar. For example, postpositivists acknowledge that research is mediated by the researcher's historical/cultural situation; observation necessarily is theory laden. With respect to social science, postpositivists recognize that researchers struggle to understand themselves as they endeavor to interpret others. Failing to acknowledge the need for interpretive judgment in science and social science results in a phenomenon that Phillips (2006) calls "methodolatry." Methodolatry conflates research with technical method (specifically, randomized field trials) and discounts research as a uniquely human practice.

Phillips's critique of methodolatry sounds Gadamerian. Unlike Gadamer, however, Phillips takes an epistemological view of social science and distinguishes claims about the empirical world from insights into the meaning of lived experience. The latter implicate self-understanding. The former do not. Openness to being challenged may help social scientists recognize when their conclusions are wrong. But claims about the empirical world can be wrong, *whether or not social scientists acknowledge that they are wrong*. Claims about the empirical world can and must be assessed on their own merit, Phillips stresses, irrespective of their origin or the self-awareness of the researcher who produced them. Assessing the validity of empirical claims and clarifying lived understanding are two different projects, Phillips concludes.

Conclusion

Hermeneutics addresses a range of enduring philosophical questions concerning how human beings understand themselves and the social world. Questions about interpretation are not simply theoretical, however. As hermeneutic analyses of education make plain, questions about interpretation are eminently practical. Questions of practice complicate interpretive theories, generating new questions for theory to clarify and explain.

Deborah Kerdeman

See also *Bildung*; Continental/Analytic Divide in Philosophy of Education; Critical Theory; Dialogue; Heidegger, Martin; Phenomenology; Philosophical Issues in Educational Research: An Overview; Qualitative Versus Quantitative Methods and Beyond; Schleiermacher, Friedrich

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Hidden Curriculum

A curriculum is a program consisting of a series of learning activities intended to realize some set of educational objectives. The mission of a school or other educational agency is understood to be the delivery of a curriculum to some group of students or other learners. Generally, the content of a curriculum is announced so that students and other stakeholders are aware of what learning opportunities are available at a given school or set of schools. It is the case, however, that not all of a school's learning opportunities are advertised—schools also feature a hidden curriculum whose objectives and learning activities are seldom spelled out. This hidden curriculum is implemented via routines and attitudes instilled through students' experiences with the explicit curriculum and its milieu; these experiences may be consonant or dissonant with the explicit curriculum. In any case, the instructional outcomes generated by these routines and attitudes are often judged by scholars and social critics to be more significant than those generated by the explicit curriculum. Therefore, ignoring the hidden curriculum is a stumbling block to disclosing the true character and outcomes of any curriculum. This entry discusses how the term *hidden curriculum* is used to refer to a variety of aspects of schooling, including collateral learning, socialization, and perpetuation of advantages based on gender or class.

In the education literature, the term *hidden curriculum* has been used in a number of different ways that are not always consistent. While all senses of the expression imply that it is somehow obscured from general notice, commentators otherwise define it variously and explain the intentions of its creators differently. Hidden curricula are often singled out to identify some educational ill, although it sometimes is argued that they can also take benign or positive forms.

John Dewey wrote about one meaning of hidden curriculum in *Experience and Education* (1938). He drew attention to how "collateral learning" (e.g., of habits and attitudes) affects what students take away from their encounters with subject matter. This collateral learning, he argued, holds equal or greater educational significance than the explicit curriculum because the habits and attitudes instilled have more lasting effects on students than the subject matter itself. There is now persuasive empirical evidence in support of Dewey's view, such as *The Subject Matters: Classroom Activity in Math and Social Studies* (1988) by Susan S. Stodolsky.

Philip W. Jackson is often credited with coining the term *hidden curriculum*. In his influential book *Life in Classrooms* (1968), Jackson portrays hidden curriculum in a manner related to, yet discernible from, collateral learning as described by Dewey. Rather than being focused on the subject matters of the curriculum, such as spelling and history, Jackson is more concerned with how classroom life socializes students to certain norms, expectations, and routines, such as working in a solitary fashion among a crowd of other students. In a similar vein, he points out how schools reward certain behaviors, such as compliance and patience. Jackson affords more significance to these types of factors than to the particular subject matter under study. One way of summing up Jackson's thesis is that patterns of repeated behavior over thousands of hours of classroom life, although seldom remarked on as the salient feature of schooling, may have a bigger cumulative effect on students than the formally announced curriculum. In a later book, *Untaught Lessons* (1992), Jackson further explored the implicit long-term effects teachers have on students.

The attitude Jackson adopts toward the hidden curriculum in *Life in Classrooms* could be considered neutral. Nonetheless, his book and other works with related themes, such as Robert Dreeben's *On What Is Learned in Schools* (1968), appeared during an era of widespread criticism of dominant societal values. Part of this criticism was directed at schools, particularly their role in perpetuating educational inequities. This context seems to have contributed to the keen interest educators took in hidden curriculum at the time. Whereas traditionally answers to what students take away from school referenced the objectives and content of the explicit curriculum, this type of response became regarded as discordant with reality when outcome measures showed that some groups benefited far more from school programs than other groups. In particular, attention was now drawn to how the hidden curriculum discriminated among students on grounds of gender, race, social class, and, in time, sexual orientation.

For example, investigation of gender and the hidden curriculum showed various ways in which girls were disadvantaged relative to boys. For instance, instructional materials were found to feature sexist assumptions while teachers gave more attention to boys than girls. Some of these practices were so overt that there was room for doubt as to whether it was warranted to designate them as cases of *hidden* curriculum.

Yet another sense of hidden curriculum centers on underlying forces that lead to schools reproducing the existing social and economic order. While related to the concern about discriminatory practices just mentioned, this perspective has been inspired by critical theory. It conceives the hidden curriculum as a mechanism by which schools legitimate the success of some students and the failure of others. Thus, schools serve to discriminate along the lines of social class, effectively assigning successful students to a path leading to managerial and professional positions and the rest of the students to skilled and unskilled labor positions. This view of the hidden curriculum came into prominence in the 1970s. In England, Paul Willis explored the role of schools in assigning working-class children to working-class jobs; Michael W. Apple and Linda McNeil were important voices for this line of thought in the United States. McNeil in her *Contradictions of Control: Social Structure and School Knowledge* (1986) argued that the underlying organization of high schools ran counter to realizing announced objectives such as teaching critical thinking. Rather, the unannounced objectives were set by forces beyond the classroom and were aimed at efficiency and control, which undermined the possibilities for engaging teaching and substantive learning. Skeptics of this critical line of thought asked, however, "*Who* or *what* was furtively organizing schools to these ends?"

Sometimes, "hidden curriculum" has been used to mean what schools do not make available—that is, what is not taught. This usage draws attention to the consequences of curricular neglect, since what is not taught is more than a neutral void; it limits what one can think about and the possibilities one can consider. According to Elliot W. Eisner, this is more properly termed the *null curriculum* since it connotes absence rather than lack of visibility.

The hidden curriculum has also been studied as a hindrance to educational change. For instance, the fate of instructional reforms or curriculum changes rests as much on school culture—much of which is in the hidden curriculum—as it does on announced and visible changes. This, according to Seymour Sarason, is a problem as the hidden curriculum serves as an obstacle to change. From this perspective, change generally stays at the surface level, leaving the basic workings of schools largely in place.

Stephen J. Thornton

See also Apple, Michael; Critical Theory; Curriculum, Construction and Evaluation of; Social Class; Socialization

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Higher Education: Contemporary Controversies

Higher education comprises formal or institutionalized education, leading to the awarding of recognized qualifications beyond the level of secondary schooling. It is defined in a variety of ways in different nations; in some countries, including parts of Europe and Australia, "higher education" is confined to degree-granting programs normally of three full-time years or more in duration. However, in some other countries, such as the United States and Canada, subdegree programs of two full-time years are included, while in some jurisdictions, shorter programs are included. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, which

publishes an annual series of comparative statistics on education, remakes the problem by focusing on "tertiary education" and dividing that category into degree and selected subdegree programs.

A related issue is the definition of *university*. This is variously regulated by legislation and custom, and again with a range of approaches. Some jurisdictions confine the title to institutions that conduct formal research activity. Others admit teaching-only institutions. Not all university programs entail degrees, and the length of programs varies greatly. In practice, however, the designation *university* tends to be more exclusive than *higher education*, which in many countries includes institutions designated as *colleges*, *institutes*, or with other titles, as well as *universities*. This entry discusses the role of higher education, the effects of growing enrollment in higher education, and tensions between the state and institutions of higher education.

Competing Narratives of the Role of Higher Education

Higher education institutions together are among the most connected of social sectors, and they are also relatively highly internationalized. Higher education is less ubiquitous than government or financial institutions but equivalent in the scale and scope of its networked relationships with churches and major professions. It includes a large proportion of national populations in its activities, at one or more stages of the life cycle, and is closely connected to government and to all organizations in knowledge-intensive economic and occupational activity.

Higher education is also attended by continuing controversies, for two reasons. The first reason is that higher education is the subject of different narratives concerning the social functions of the sector. These narratives, partly sustained by the various connections between higher education and other sectors, shape its practices. The purposes of higher education are many. The concept of the "multiversity," outlined in the 1960s by the then president of the University of California, Clark Kerr, was intended to capture this. The different narratives combine in often eclectic ways, and under some circumstances, they are in tension. There are various, often ill defined, and competing claims about higher education concerning its roles in individual and social formation, the allocation of social opportunities and fairness in that allocation, political democracy and the formation of citizens, international relations and global cosmopolitanism, economic productivity and the creation of employment opportunities for graduates, and even its contributions to culture, the arts, and civilization. It is impossible for any set of institutions to meet all such expectations simultaneously, expectations that are themselves subject to many interpretations.

The second reason why higher education is open to controversy is that it is primarily shaped by nation-states and open to the techniques of governmental control but needs some institutional autonomy and academic freedom to carry out its functions, especially in research. Government–institution tensions are endemic, especially in those countries with a liberal tradition, such as the English-speaking democracies.

These matters play out in different ways in national higher education systems. In addition to North American higher education, the most influential form, and higher education in the other English-speaking countries, there are distinct approaches to higher education in France, Germany, the Nordic zone, Russia and other European countries, China and the rest of East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere. All research universities have much in common, especially in the sciences, and have moved closer to each other in the era of the Internet through cross-border networking and mobility of people, global academic publishing, and the normalizing role of global university rankings that began in 2003. But national differences remain, especially in political cultures and state–institution relations, in the structuring of the academic profession, and in the financing of higher education. In some countries, the sector is largely funded by governments; in others, the funding is shared by students or households. While there are common trends and issues as discussed here, these are articulated through national systems in distinctive ways.

The classic 19th-century notions of the university, associated variously with John Henry Newman and with Wilhelm von Humboldt's idea of *Bildung* (German for *education* and *formation*), focused on the formation of personal attributes. Whereas Newman emphasized engagement in intellectual disciplines as an end in itself, and refused the possibility of other ends or purposes of education, the German tradition emphasized self-cultivation through learning, coinciding in this respect with Confucian tradition, and it was more open as to the uses or applications of higher education. These

traditions remain influential. More recent narratives have focused explicitly on the uses of higher education and its relations with other sectors and purposes. In a rebuttal of Newman, Clark Kerr titled his authoritative summary of the workings of the post–World War II higher education as *The Uses of the University* (1963).

As noted, the growth and development of modern mass systems of higher education have been shaped and largely financed (albeit to varying degrees) by nation-states. States emphasize the contributions of higher education to national economic development and its role in the provision of social opportunity. Increasingly, state policy also focuses on the role of higher education in augmenting the global capacity and competitiveness of the national economy and the contribution of research and research training to economic innovation. At the same time, the growth of popular demand for higher education, especially among middle-class families, continually drives governments to expand provisions of higher education. This is true in both multiparty electoral democracies and in one-party states such as China, Singapore, and Malaysia. Governments gain support by expanding educational opportunity. The nexus between popular demand for, and state-regulated supply of, higher education is associated with narratives about access, participation, and equality of opportunity. In addition, in many national systems, the focuses on economic development and educational opportunity are joined to discussions about the employability of graduates. There is recurring unresolved debate about whether higher education is responsible for graduate unemployment and what, if anything, it can do to enhance employability.

Since the early 1960s, the dominant policy narrative of vocational and higher education has been human capital theory. Summarized in the work of the Nobel laureate Gary Becker, human capital theory models education as an investment in the augmentation of individual economic attributes. It argues that the economic effects of education can be measured by calculating the difference between the lifetime earnings of graduates and those of nongraduates, though some human capital economists discount the calculation of rates of return for factors such as individual ability. In essence, human capital theory imagines that an increase in individual capability will increase the individual's intrinsic productivity; this triggers an increase in earnings, regardless of the state of the macroeconomy, fluctuations in labor market demand, the stratification of work opportunities, and the role of educational institutions in social selection. The enhanced earnings of graduates in turn feed into macroeconomic growth and prosperity. This narrative ascribes a central role to higher education in driving economic growth and suggests that the better the quality of higher education, the more effective will be its economic contribution. While conclusive empirical grounding for human capital theory is lacking, it remains influential.

Some economists and sociologists pursue an alternative narrative—screening theory. This models education not as a contributor to intrinsic productivity but as a signaling and queue-ordering device that facilitates employee selection of personnel. Human capital theory emphasizes the supply side of the education–economy relationship, and it assumes that education gains value from its intrinsic usefulness; screening theory emphasizes the demand side, and it assumes that education gains value from exchange in the labor markets. Human capital theory implies that more public and/or private resources should be invested in higher education to lift economic growth, whereas screening theory does not. Human capital theory suggests that any student placed in a higher education discipline ought to generate equal returns on investment; screening theory is more consistent with stratification in the value of institutional brands. On the whole, human capital thinking has been dominant in shaping policy, sustaining the expectation that more and better higher education should advance economic growth. However, government commitment to the value of investment is variable. Conditions of economic boom mostly favor an expansion of both state and household investment in higher education. Conditions of economic recession can trigger either increases or decreases in state investment and tend to depress levels of household spending.

Massification of Higher Education

Nation-building policies, economic agendas, and social aspirations, often but not always joined to demographic growth, combine to drive the continuous expansion of higher education systems almost everywhere. In an influential paper published for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in 1974, Martin Trow theorized the evolution of national higher education systems from an "elite" phase in which the rate of participation of young people was no more than 15% of the

age-group, to a "mass" phase in which the participation rate was between 15% and 50%, to "universal" systems with participation more than 50%. He argued that each phase was associated with distinctive institution and systems designs, curricula, and social expectations. Discussion of higher education and social opportunity is often joined to democratic narratives favoring the expansion of opportunity to include all citizens and the enhancement of relative opportunities for social groups underrepresented in the higher education sector. These social groups include women, ethnic minorities, people from rural and remote districts, and people from home backgrounds where income or parents' education is lower than the mean. In the past 30 years, in almost every national system, the overall participation of women in higher education has improved dramatically, so that women often outnumber men, except in a few disciplines such as engineering. In contrast, it has proven difficult to lift the relative proportion of students from poor backgrounds despite significant policy effort in many countries.

Yet the drive for expansion also embodies powerful desires for individual social status and relative advantage, if necessary at the expense of others; and equality of opportunity policies have often focused primarily on ordering a fair competition for scarce high-value places. The different institutions and disciplines do not necessarily confer equivalent value. For example, medical degrees confer relatively high value in terms of both social status and lifetime earnings. The paradox of status competition in education is that the more that aspiration and opportunity become universal, the harder it is for the average place in higher education to provide exalted status, as the number of positions that can provide relative advantage is fixed. Positional competition is a zero-sum game, as Fred Hirsch pointed out in *Social Limits to Growth* (1976). In most, though not all, countries, higher education institutions are ranked in hierarchical terms, whether formally in a system of institutional classifications or informally through social convention and reputation. Trow's elite system of higher education, centered on the strongest universities, seems to survive inside the mass or universal systems.

National research universities, supported by the government, play a leading role in nearly every national system. Only in the United States are most of the leading institutions located in the private sector. In other respects, there are marked variations in system organization. The degree of diversity of institutions itself varies significantly. Some systems exhibit a stable division of labor between institutional types, while in others, there are endemic boundary disputes, contestation over primacy in specific niches, and upward "academic drift" away from established missions. The role of institutions in research and the degree of selectivity of students at the point of entry are differentiating factors. In some systems, like the British, the norm is the large-scale comprehensive teaching and research institution active in most disciplines. In other systems, there are many specialist teaching institutions, which can be of high or low status. Some systems, following a pattern established in France and subsequently in Russia, provide specialist elite teaching institutions and maintain strong nonuniversity research institutes, though there is a trend toward large-scale comprehensive teaching/research universities, which is encouraged by the norms underpinning global university rankings. China has moved from the Soviet model toward the American science university model. In parts of Latin America, the leading universities are organized on a very large scale, exceeding 200,000 students, and located in many sites, providing both leadership training and social access and conducting a large proportion of national research. The role of the private sector varies from country to country. In some countries, all or nearly all institutions are public. In some systems, the private sector is largely confined to low-value, for-profit producers, triggering concerns about quality. In others, nonprofit institutions play a variety of roles. Private-sector quality, especially in the for-profit subsector, is often a concern.

In all countries—whether higher education is conceived as a market or as part of civil society, as in the United States, or is understood to be a branch or aspect of state—the most common location, the system boundaries, the stratification, and the division of labor between institutional types are ordered by governments or public authorities. Even private institutions are closely regulated, except in cross-border online education.

State–Institution Tensions

The continuous state–institution tensions play out in differing ways by country. A wide range of arrangements are in place, from systems where higher education is a branch of the state, university leaders are appointed by ministers, and faculty are paid as public servants to systems in which universities

are governed by independent boards or councils that appoint the executive leadership and fix rates of pay. In some countries, institutions select their own students; in others, the allocation of places is determined by government. Everywhere, however, institutions of higher education, in particular research universities, need partial autonomy. They must exercise their own scholarly judgment to be effective in knowledge production—in most countries academic freedom is seen as a normal operating condition for teaching and research, though the definition of academic freedom varies and manifestations of freedom can be contested. American tradition links academic freedom to tenured (permanent) employment and conceives of that freedom largely in terms of freedom from constraint or coercion by the state, but these are not norms in all systems—and in the United States, faculty can be constrained by university managers or by market forces. For example, companies supporting biomedical research via grants and contracts may seek to restrict research activity and the free flow of research findings. In East Asia, notions of academic freedom are closely joined to responsibility and conceived more in terms of positive freedom—that is, the freedom to act or enable—rather than negative freedom. Some conventions treat academic freedom as confined to the knowledge specialization of the scholar or researcher; others treat it as a general right to make public comments in any area. At the same time, states emphasize the utilities of institutions and seek to manage their autonomy within defined policy parameters and externally determined ends. In some countries, institutional autonomy and academic freedom are more restricted, especially in those countries in which university leaders are appointed by government.

Many governments now favor business and quasi-market models in institutional organization and system design, such as competition in the allocation of research funding and other resources, product formats, strategic executive leadership, financial autonomy for institutions, and expectations that institutions raise some of their own funding. In some systems, tuition fees have markedly increased in the context of a consumer model of institution–student relations. These measures have been accompanied by a weakening of professorial self-government, growth in the power of the university executive, and the growing role of the institution *qua* institution and of its brand, though the academic disciplines also continue to shape practices, especially in the leading universities. The widely used triangle model of higher education developed by the sociologist Burton Clark, incorporating interaction between state, academic oligarchy, and market, requires modification to include the university executive as an influential factor. In some countries, the partial shift from state funding to private funding is associated with a weakening of government commitment to the public role of institutions. While most systems retain a policy commitment to securing broad social opportunity in higher education, this commitment rarely extends to providing equal access of all social groups to the leading institutions—social outcomes based on meritocratic competition still prevail. Though this is consistent with the market model, unequal social outcomes generate continued controversies.

Simon Marginson

See also *Bildung*; Confucius; Globalization and World Society; *House of Intellect, The*; Human Capital Theory and Education; Multiversity; Newman, John Henry (Cardinal)

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High-Stakes Testing

High-stakes testing is a significant aspect of educational assessment in much of the developed world. The phrase indicates that test results are being used to judge the quality of schools and teachers. Such judgments may have serious consequences for the individuals and institutions concerned.

Many feel that such a function for assessment is just one manifestation of an "audit culture" increasingly prevalent in contemporary society, where a variety of agencies and individuals are mistrusted and are believed to require intensive scrutiny to prevent them from "failing." The accountancy metaphor captures many fields, including health care, university research, and social services; they are "audited" by focusing on certain kinds of performance data. Critics argue that high-stakes testing corrupts learning and distorts the curriculum. In contrast, its supporters assert that it raises educational performance. This entry discusses the arguments for and against high-stakes testing, the reasons it is difficult to compare test results across time periods, whether "teaching to the test" skews results, and how the reliability and validity of tests are judged.

Defenders of high-stakes testing note the high cost of education, the importance of safeguarding children from incompetent schools and teaching, and the growing significance of education for competitive industrial economies in globalized markets. They argue that schools themselves should be only too willing to cooperate with our contemporary audit culture if they are genuinely committed to the highest possible educational standards. Champions of current testing functions claim that they play a crucial role in "driving up" educational standards; schools know that poor results will be exposed in published "league tables"—tables ranking schools by performance—and that the mass media will relish the opportunity to expose "inadequate" performers. Moreover, there is said to be strong public support for accountability focusing on tests and widespread appreciation of the easy availability of information about educational institutions in the form of exam grades. Some feel that teachers' very aversion to high-stakes testing suggests that they are afraid of rigorous scrutiny.

Claims about driving up standards are in need of careful scrutiny and analysis. There will be assumptions about what counts as changes over time, about how to detect them, and about what account of "educational standards" is defensible in the first place. Tests can either be *norm referenced*, where a pupil's ultimate grade reflects how well the pupil did compared with others who took the same test, or *criterion referenced*, where test responses are judged according to criteria purporting to describe relevant knowledge, understanding, and performance. Examples of the latter include "count up to 10 objects," "read and write numbers to 10," "decode familiar and some unfamiliar words using blending as the prime approach," and "show some awareness of punctuation marks, for example, pausing at full stops."

Only criterion-referenced tests could, even in principle, have the potential to detect real changes in educational achievements over time. On the face of it, we could discover, for instance, that more seven-year-olds can read and write numbers up to 10 than was the case a decade ago. Norm-referenced tests cannot do this: Grades reflecting how well a student did in comparison with fellow students on a particular occasion can tell us nothing about standards over time.

In some countries where high-stakes testing is combined with a criterion-referenced approach, examination scores have steadily improved. The United Kingdom furnishes us with some examples of this, in the form of National Curriculum tests taken by 11-year-olds and General Certificate of Secondary Education examinations taken by 16-year-olds. There is much controversy over how to interpret such trends. The phrase *grade inflation* is often used in this connection, and it implies that the "same" levels of knowledge and understanding are being awarded higher grades as the years go by. This interpretation is popular with many lay people in the developed world, who have the impression that each generation of school leavers does *not* know and understand more English, mathematics, and so forth than earlier generations.

However, a host of challenges confront any attempt to justify the accusation of grade inflation. Admittedly, in a high-stakes assessment culture, it is likely that teachers have grown more and more skilful at eliciting good test performances whether or not the pupils actually know and understand more. Yet the alleged divide in this supposition, between "real" knowledge and understanding, on the one hand, and test performance, on the other, can only be supported where the tests purport to measure underlying understanding, rather than factual recall or proficiency in observable procedures and skills.

One illustration of the latter might be questions about multiplication, offered rapidly by the tester with the requirement that pupils write their answer immediately. The former might be exemplified by questions involving word problems such as "Mum drives 143 kilometers altogether to visit her aunt. She stops after 47 miles for a coffee. How much further must she drive to reach her aunt?" Here, students must determine which combinations of arithmetical operations are required to arrive at the answer. Such problem solving seems to require an underlying understanding of the relevant arithmetical operations. Note also that at a deeper philosophical level, this whole narrative deserves a proper account of "underlying understanding" that explains how it differs from and yet is manifested by observable performances.

Some empirical researchers have investigated standards over time by repeating exactly the same test on randomly selected groups from each year's pupils. They compare these results with data from different kinds of tests where any one version is not absolutely identical with, but is devised to be "equivalent" to, previous tests. Suppose repeating exactly the same test provides scores that are steady over several years, while grades derived from the merely "equivalent" tests rise in the same period. This at least raises the possibility that the latter tests are afflicted by "grade inflation."

Since test results have been made to matter so much, many educators have felt compelled to *teach to the test*. Broadly speaking, this phrase captures teaching that maximizes pupils' chances of scoring highly in tests without regard to what they actually learn during this process. *Teaching to the test* also indicates teaching focused on the subjects and content to be examined, rather than on other unexamined subjects. So, for instance, in the English tests for 11-year-olds in England, "speaking and listening" have never been assessed. Hence, less attention is given to speaking and listening than to reading and writing.

It may be objected that criticisms of teaching to the test have been overblown and have failed to distinguish between significantly different kinds of learning and teaching. For instance, where specific skills and factual recall are concerned, teaching to the test would seem to be the obvious strategy. If a pupil needs to know irregular French verbs or how to play the scale of A minor on the piano, the kind of teaching that improves the chances of demonstrating just these facts or skills in the relevant test would seem to be wholly justifiable. On the other hand, where the material to be learned very obviously cannot be comprehensively characterized in terms of skills and factual recall, teaching that exclusively focuses on *performance* does seem open to serious objection. Examples crucially involving some depth of understanding include the idea of a "fair test" in science, grasping the concept of a function in algebra, and appreciating the significance and influence of the contexts in which literary texts are written and received in English literature.

Nevertheless, some educators claim that teaching for understanding can, at one and the same time, be the most effective way to boost test performance in any case. The obvious difficulty here is that teachers under pressure from high-stakes testing find this claim hard to accept. Critics of high-stakes testing urge that verdicts on high-stakes assessment must be informed by realism about how teachers feel about the pressures they suffer.

Traditionally, tests are rated in terms of their reliability and validity. Reliability relates to the test's *consistency*. There are several ways of construing this feature, including whether, for instance, different graders would score a particular test paper in the same way or whether someone taking the "same" test on different occasions would obtain the same score each time. Validity concerns whether the test actually measures what it is supposed to measure. So a math test involving problems expressed in words, when administered to a group of pupils whose first language is not English, might not be a *valid* measure of their mathematics achievements, but instead, it may be a misleading indicator of their capacity to read and understand English.

One way of expressing the criticism of the kind of teaching to the test encouraged by a high-stakes regime is that it tends to corrupt the validity of the tests concerned. This criticism makes most sense where the tests purport to measure "real understanding," rather than mere observable performances, since much teaching to the test is held to concentrate on the latter. Of course, if the test is *intended* to measure skills directly, then the worry about corruption of its validity makes little or no sense.

Assessment experts have long debated a tension between test validity and test reliability. Evidently, where tests are performing a high-stakes accountability function, strong levels of reliability are crucial. Perfect reliability is, of course impossible, but schools and teachers expect high levels of consistency when their futures depend on it.

It may be argued that certain types of learning achievement resist consistent assessment. Yet it is not at all obvious that *all* such achievements are educationally unimportant. Candidates for learning of this kind involve pupils in making interpretations and value judgments. Consider, for instance, criteria drawn from English literature exams that include phrases such as *communicate content and meaning through expressive and accurate writing*, and *engage sensitively and with different readings and interpretations demonstrating clear understanding*.

Securing intergrader consistency in the face of such phrases requires examiners to reach uniform verdicts about pupil responses. How can such consistency be achieved? One expedient is for a grading scheme to specify readily observable or measurable proxies for the rich content concerned. For instance, *sophisticated use of sentence structures* might be translated into directly observable text features such as *varying length of sentences*, *using the active and the passive voice*, *beginning sentences with a variety of phrases*, and so on. Now, defenders of the possibility of consistency might dismiss this way of achieving it as manifestly absurd, deliberately designed to undermine their position. They may claim that professional graders can manage perfectly well without proxies, being quite capable of working together to achieve a suitable consensus in verdicts.

Yet such a consensus implies that graders are making very similar interpretations of the responses, backed by a remarkable coincidence in relevant value judgments. Arguably, this is at least suspicious, and if it results from some kind of imposition from an examination authority, it raises the question as to whose value judgment or interpretation would be regarded as definitive, and why. On the face of it, pupil responses of the kind under discussion *should* elicit a variety of reactions from examiners. If such variation is undermined, some would argue that the interpretations themselves are being corrupted.

Andrew Davis

See also Abilities, Measurement of; Accountability and Standards-Based Reform; Behavioral Objectives and Operational Definitions; Quality of Education; Validity, Types of

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HOMESCHOOLING

The modern phenomenon of homeschooling, or "home education," takes a variety of forms, but typically, it involves parents assuming primary responsibility for the schooling of their child—either by providing direct instruction themselves or by arranging learning opportunities such as online coursework, community-based programs, or selected classes from institutional schools. Although the United States has the largest number of homeschoolers by far (perhaps 4% of the school-aged population), the practice appears to be growing in many countries. Philosophical analysis is typically brought to bear on homeschooling in two ways: (1) theories of learning and (2) the relative interests of parents, children, and the state.

Perhaps the ultimate in individualized and privatized education, homeschooling challenges modern notions of institutionalized schooling and standardized curricula. Homeschoolers' varied practices reveal a wide range of philosophies of curriculum and learning. On one end of the spectrum is "unschooling," which relies on the child to direct the shape and direction of learning. Similar in some respects to institutional "free schools," where no formal curriculum is imposed and students decide what questions or topics to explore, unschooling is based on the conviction that children's natural

curiosity provides sufficient motivation and direction necessary for successful learning. By contrast, other homeschoolers choose to replicate the curricular and motivational structure of much institutional schooling, with fixed schedules and assignments. In contrast to unschooling, this structured approach to homeschooling views external requirements as necessary for learning. Not surprisingly, religious conservatives—whose typical views of "original sin" include children's motivations and behavior—tend toward the more structured end of the homeschooling curricular spectrum.

While philosophies of curriculum and learning obviously play an important role in the shape of homeschooling, the bulk of philosophical literature on home education focuses on its implications for the varying—and sometimes conflicting—interests of children, parents, and the state. Parents have an obvious interest in the education of their children; beyond wanting their children to gain academic proficiency, parents seek to instill certain values and commitments. Children themselves have interests at stake; besides intellectual skills, children need to develop a sufficient degree of personal autonomy—having an array of life choices, as well as the capacity to think and decide for themselves about those choices and the people they want to become. Finally, the state has an interest in the development of citizens who can contribute to society, both in terms of economic self-sufficiency and civic participation.

Philosophical arguments typically focus on the tensions sometimes inherent between these respective interests of parents, children, and the state. Parents may have educational goals and priorities for their children that conflict with their children's own best interests. For example, parents may envision a certain career for their son against his wishes or seek to foreclose certain life options for their daughter (believing that females should not be encouraged to have a professional career). Tensions can arise between the interests of the parents and state as well. In liberal democratic societies marked by value pluralism, the state depends not only on the development of economically self-sufficient citizens but also on individuals who can engage respectfully with fellow citizens representing a diverse array of values and ways of life. This educational goal may be in tension with familial, religious, or cultural beliefs that oppose such engagement. In extreme cases, for example, a homeschool parent might sequester the child from interactions with all but the most like-minded people.

Complicating the analysis of relative interests are often conflicting philosophical visions of the requirements of personal autonomy, in terms of what is necessary for both personal fulfillment and virtuous citizenship. In colloquial terms, autonomy can be said to involve thinking and acting for oneself, but liberal theorists differ widely on what exactly this means, not to mention what it would look like or how to determine whether it has been achieved. Some emphasize the ability to shape one's life course from an array of choices, which raises questions about what it means to freely choose. Other accounts emphasize careful reflection on one's beliefs and values, ultimately revising or affirming those core convictions.

Homeschooling is often the site of profound disagreements over the proper role of the state in ensuring that all children realize their interest in developing essential academic skills. Although there is little dispute, either philosophically or legally, that parents have the right and responsibility to raise their children, this consensus does not extend to parents' control over formal schooling. Many homeschool advocates contend that the educational realm should be understood as simply part of the broader framework of parental rights and responsibilities. But parental rights, like any set of rights, are not unlimited. In matters of children's basic welfare and the role of social service agencies, for example, parents have the right to raise their children as they see fit, and the state may not intervene unless compelling evidence exists that children are being abused or neglected. The burden of proof, so to speak, is on the state—parents are not required to submit yearly "child welfare progress reports." In the same way, homeschoolers often assert that parents' rights to direct their child's education should be infringed on only if there is evidence to suspect that they are neglecting this responsibility. Many theorists and legal analysts, however, draw an important distinction between schooling and parenting and insist that the burden of proof regarding homeschooling's effectiveness rests with parents—thus justifying more extensive state oversight.

Not only does homeschooling pose important philosophical questions as a particular educational practice itself, it also points to the increasingly complicated calculus of the state's role in children's schooling more generally. The rise of cyberschooling and distance education has begun to blur the boundaries between formal schooling and informal education in ways that make the oversight role of the state

less clear and more difficult to navigate. What counts as formal education—and what authority the state should have over it—is a question whose relevance will only increase as educational choices proliferate.

Robert Kunzman

See also Autonomy; Children's Rights; Citizenship and Civic Education; Learning, Theories of; Rights: Children, Parents, and Community; School Choice

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House of Intellect, The

Jacques Barzun (1907–2012), a noted American educator, used *the house of intellect* as the title of an influential book, first published in 1959. The house of intellect encompassed "the persons who consciously and methodically employ the mind; the forms and habits governing the activities in which the mind is so employed; and the conditions under which these people and activities exist" (Barzun, 1959, pp. 3–4). Many writers have since come to use the phrase as a loose synonym for the institutions of higher education. Barzun actually wrote about it with a more complicated, distinctive meaning.

Barzun's *The House of Intellect* exemplified his gift for engaging, lucid prose; his concern for the condition of education at all levels; and his questioning convention and fashion, all to strengthen important forms of thought and action. Barzun wrote about a collective capacity, intellect, which he thought was important yet poorly maintained. At the time, Barzun was provost of Columbia University, a cultural historian of great stature who could address a wide range of topics—from baseball and crime stories to Berlioz and all aspects of Western culture—to an extensive, nonspecialized audience. The phrase—*the house of intellect*—stuck, perhaps better than his diagnosis of its plight.

Barzun distinguished *intellect* from intelligence—intelligence was a universal trait of persons, but specific persons constructed *intellect*, a social force supported by special forms and institutions. Intellect was "intelligence stored up and made into habits of discipline, signs and symbols of meaning, chains of reasoning and spurs to emotion—a shorthand and a wireless by which the mind can skip connectives, recognize ability, and communicate truth" (Barzun, 1959, p. 5). The alphabet and its many uses typified the achievement and resources of intellect. The house of intellect had structure and furnishings, as well as component parts and routines, all of which needed care and maintenance.

Intellect had problems of its own making: its abdication of its virtues and capacities. Intellect was losing three strengths—(1) its status as a distinct group apart from others; (2) its abiding effort within to keep its working tools, particularly skills of literacy, in good order; and (3) its confidence that

> with a cautious confidence and sufficient intellectual training, it is possible to master the literature of a subject and gain a proper understanding of it: specifically, an understanding of the accepted truths, the disputed problems, the rival schools, and the methods now in favor. (Barzun, 1959, p. 12)

Readers often interpret Barzun as a conservative elitist, but doing so blurs what is unique in his thought. He generally spoke for matters such as intellect, which had direct and indirect value to all, and he criticized popular and elite developments that diminished them. With intellect, Barzun warned that art, science, and philanthropy were powerful forces abetting the internal weakening of intellect. Art liberated the spirit by celebrating ambiguities but harmed intellect, which could not maintain its standards of precision as devotion to art became too single minded. Science shared with intellect a commitment to precision, but it created difficulties because its jargons and narrow foci made the commitment to common knowledge more difficult. Finally, philanthropy, a pursuit of "free and equal opportunity as applied to things of the mind," weakened intellect's drive to precise discrimination and judgment.

Barzun's book addressed "the state of the language, the system of schooling, the means and objects of communication, the supplies of money for thought and learning, and the code of feeling and conduct that goes with them" (p. 6). These topics summarize well the concerns animating all of Barzun's writing over his long and productive career. For instance, through cultural history, his main professional calling, Barzun was exploring in one way or another "the code of feeling and conduct that goes with" thought and learning:

Superstition: *Race: A Study in Modern Superstition* (1937) and *Darwin, Marx, Wagner: Critique of a Heritage* (1941)

Romanticism: *Romanticism and the Modern Ego* (1943, expanded in 1961 into *Classic, Romantic, and Modern*) and *Berlioz and the Romantic Century* (2 volumes, 1950 and subsequent editions)

Music: *Berlioz, an Anthology on the Pleasures of Music* (1951) and *Music in American Life* (1956)

Art and literature: *The Energies of Art: Studies of Authors, Classic and Modern* (1956), *The Use and Abuse of Art* (1974), and *The Culture We Deserve: A Critique of Disenlightenment* (1989)

Aspects of popular culture, sympathetically appreciated: *God's Country and Mine: A Declaration of Love, Spiced With a Few Harsh Words* (1954), *The Delights of Detection* (1961), and *A Catalogue of Crime* (1971)

Biography: *Berlioz and His Century: An Introduction to the Age of Romanticism* and *A Stroll With William James* (1983)

These works led to his magnum opus, *From Dawn to Decadence: 500 Years of Western Cultural Life, 1500 to the Present* (2000), published at the age of 93. It is an innovative, comprehensive work on the codes of feeling and conduct in the thought and learning of the modern West.

Many of Barzun's other publications concerned "the state of the language" and "the means and objects of communication." These cultivated the value of literacy for the work of intellect.

The Modern Researcher (1957 and later editions)

Follett's Modern American Usage (1966)

On Writing, Editing, and Publishing (1971)

A Word or Two Before You Go: Brief Essays on Language (1986)

Simple and Direct: A Rhetoric for Writers (1975)

Other books dealt with "the supplies of money for thought and learning," not simply their scale and source but also how the supplies could best serve the intellect:

Science: The Glorious Entertainment (1964)

The American University: How It Runs, Where It Is Going (1968)

Clio and the Doctors (1974)

Last, Barzun consistently expressed his commitment to clear and disciplined instruction; to effective, unencumbered teaching; and to curriculum that imparts the skills of intellect to all children:

Teacher in America (1945)

Begin Here: The Forgotten Conditions of Teaching and Learning (1991)

*What Is a Schoo*l? and *Trim the College!* (2002)

Among Barzun's many awards, in 2007, his hundredth birthday, he received the 59th Great Teacher Award from the Society of Columbia Graduates, a fitting recognition of his service in the house of intellect.

Robert O. McClintock

See also Adler, Mortimer, and the Paideia Program; Cultural Literacy and Core Knowledge/Skills; Liberal Education: Overview; Newman, John Henry (Cardinal)

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Human Capital Theory and Education

The notion of human capital in economics is associated with the names of the Nobel laureate Gary Becker (University of Chicago; born in 1930) and Jacob Mincer (Columbia University; 1922–2006). Their main contribution was to consider the decision to pursue schooling as an investment decision, which is different from consumption decisions.

Most students attend school because they are compelled to, especially at the early stages; however, a fraction of students may do so because they enjoy acquiring new knowledge or because of the social status associated with it. In both cases, we are unable to explain why a small proportion of individuals are willing to invest a large amount of money in order to attend prestigious colleges. Similarly, we are also unable to explain why the group of tertiary educated is socially selected (in terms of parental education, income, and/or wealth). If it were just a matter of tastes, the standard approach to consumption would predict that the more educated would have been those youngsters who attribute less value to leisure (and who, therefore, would suffer less in renouncing things such as sporting activity and game playing).

There is of course some truth in this perspective—as for any consumption commodity, the demand increases with disposable income and decreases with the relative price. Richer people demand more education, but the overall demand decreases at later stages of education (since these are more expensive). This explanation, however, is at odds with the fact that people attend schools at earlier stages of their lives despite being richer at later stages.

Here is where the notion of schooling as an investment proves its value in accounting for these observed behaviors. The basic economic underpinning for any investment decision is giving up current opportunities in exchange for future advantages—an investor renounces current consumption in exchange for greater consumption in the future. In the case of educational choices, current income opportunities are renounced in exchange for better income prospects in the future. The decision to remain a student (especially at the secondary or tertiary level) is compared with the alternative of immediate entry into the labor market; and the opportunity cost of forgone income (namely, the potential earnings of working if one forgoes further education) are compared with the future prospects of the wages to be earned as a more highly educated worker.

Thus, the time spent in school (and the correlated amount of knowledge that is presumed to be accumulated) is the resource that is invested by any individual who aims to improve his or her future income prospects. This choice is undertaken under conditions of uncertainty, since no one knows what the labor market situation will be in the near future. For this reason, people rely on expectations by observing the existing wage differential in the labor market. In the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries, the so-called college premium (namely, the percentage difference in earnings between tertiary-educated and upper secondary school graduates of the employed population between the ages 25 and 64) was 55% in the year 2010 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2012). Thus, any youngster completing secondary school has to compare the alternative of immediate entrance in the labor market (where additional knowledge is also accumulated through learning by doing) with spending three to five years in college, in exchange of an estimated increase by half of the earnings over the course of the working life.

In principle, this opportunity is open for unlimited school attendance; but the return on acquired human capital has to be recovered over the remaining working life. This is not in contradiction with the fact that most college graduates do not apply for a second or third degree, knowing that losing additional years out of the labor market would not be compensated for by the potential gains.

Under appropriate assumptions, one can estimate the expected return associated with an additional year of schooling. By comparing the income streams over the entire lives of two otherwise identical individuals, one can statistically obtain the internal rate of return that would make them indifferent between the two alternatives. This procedure is usually indicated in the literature as a *Mincerian wage equation*. It has been repeatedly estimated for many countries, age cohorts, genders, and ethnic groups; the results obtained are of the order of a 4 to 12 percentage point increase for any additional year spent in school.

Given the size of the premium, one may wonder why we do not observe a massive demand for schooling in every country and for every age group. The main economic explanation makes use of two concepts: (1) *ability endowment* and (2) *liquidity constraints*. The first one considers that the learning of additional knowledge takes place at different speeds for different individuals. Thus, the brightest students accumulate more knowledge in a given amount of time compared with the less able. In many respects, this is also true when we replace the notion of ability endowment with the notion of family background. Thus, the speedier a student is, the lower will be his or her cost for acquiring education, and other things being constant, she or he will stay in school longer. The other source of individual heterogeneity derives from different access

to financial resources: Postponing entrance into the labor market requires funding to provide support during the period of study. In addition, tertiary institutions charge tuition fees that also need to be financed. Financial markets are typically reluctant to provide such funding, since poor individuals can provide no collateral.

A final assumption supports the notion of human capital. Educated workers will earn higher wages if and only if they are more productive from the point of view of the potential employer. By inference, countries with more educated labor forces should experience higher incomes. Unfortunately, empirical evidence is rather inconclusive in this respect. One possible reason is associated with the distinction between *quantity* and *quality* of human capital. Given the increasing availability of data on student test scores, some authors have studied the correlation between gross domestic product and average students' achievements in the same countries, even controlling for the average years of schooling in the population. The underlying intuition is that just spending time in school does not necessarily translate into the acquisition of additional knowledge, for this depends on factors such as quality of the teachers and the school management. The empirical evidence does not contradict this intuition.

Overall, the human capital paradigm is nothing more than an analogy, though a convenient one. We do not have compelling evidence that education increases workers' productivity per se. In general, education induces self-sorting of individuals, who therefore differ not only with respect to the education they have acquired but also with regard to many other unobservable characteristics that may be valuable for a firm. Suppose, for example, that self-consciousness favors the acquisition of education, and for similar reasons reduces absenteeism among workers; firms, then, will demand self-conscious workers because they are more productive (i.e., they display less absenteeism), and the workers themselves will also be more educated.

This opens the door to the competing explanation for the positive correlation between schooling and earnings, which is found in the data: the *signaling theory.* In this framework, employers aim to attract abler workers, but ability is not observable. So if abler workers can find a way to signal this, and if their behavior cannot be copied without cost by less able workers, then in a condition of equilibrium, we should observe that abler workers emit such a signal (e.g., signaling that they possess a degree or a school certificate). According to this theory, then, education is worthless from a productive point of view, but it helps in the screening of individuals.

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See also Capital: Cultural, Symbolic, and Social; Education Production Functions

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